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1. Introduction 
In this research project, I am engaging with J. L. Nancy’s book “The Ground of 
the Image”, and his ontological understanding of the image in the context of the 
turn from the metaphysics of presence towards a presence as presentation in ‘ex-
cess’; that is: as ‘ek-sistence’1, ‘ak-cedence’, ‘ek-stasis’ and ‘ek-phanes’2. 
Throughout the text, my main interest will be the notion of the image in relation 
to representation and arts, the faculty of imagination and the way in which Nancy 
establishes the claim that the image ‘touches’ in an immediate and direct way 
worldly existence and the sense of the world. In this respect, my thesis will take 
the form of a close reading of Nancy’s book in and as a dialogue with other 
poststructuralist thoughts. Additionally, I will also refer to the chapter “On the 
schematism of pure concepts of the understanding” from Kant’s “Critique of Pure 
Reason”3 and to Heidegger’s take on Kant in his book, “Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics”4, especially chapter §20 “Image and Schema”, to which Nancy 
himself refers directly in “The Ground of the Image”. The reasons behind my 
interest in J-L. Nancy and in his understanding of the image come from the nature 
of my painting practice, from my passion for the material and the figure, and the 
ardent need ‘to speak’ and ‘to write’ – but how? – (from within) painting.      
“The Ground of the Image” is a collection of nine essays written between 1999 
and 2004. In all these essays, Nancy discusses the meaning or sense of the image 
and puts forward his belief that the image is the medium of presentation in which 
“alterity” (term established by Emmanuel Lévinas throughout his essays collected 
in “Alterity and Transcendence”) can be embodied and in which the “there of the 
beyond” is presented. All essays were originally written for various other contexts 
and the first six essays were published for the first time in 2003 under the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Martin Heidegger choose this spelling, ‘ek-sistence’, in order to distinguish human existences 
from the old meaning of ‘existentia’. 
2 Dieter Mersch, Negative Präsenz, S. 99-117, in: Arno Böhler, Susanne Granzer (Hg), Ereignis 
Denken. TheatRealität, Performanz, Ereignis, Passage Verlag, 2009, p.111  
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 14th 
printing 
4 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997, 2nd edition 
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title. These essays have been included previously also in exhibitions catalogues, 
academic journals, or in an anthology that explored the relation between art and 
the memory of concentration camps. 
I believe that, what concerns Nancy in all of these nine essays, is one main thing 
that he tries to appropriate in different ways and in showing that it cannot be 
appropriated at all – the secret of schematism, this one thing that is the mystery of 
the pure image, the schema of all schemas, the schema of the ‘I’, the ‘advent’ as 
the birth of all birth, which dwells in the ground of each image. This embodied 
mystery of schematism, “a hidden art in the depths of human soul”5, is a secret 
that can be unveiled only by veiling it anew, since it is not enveloping any secret 
at all.  It is a mystery that is illuminated from itself – “a blind spot that also forms, 
at every moment, and as every moment, the focal point where an image lights 
up”6. Pure imagination exists as the spacing of a “limit, an edge, contour, 
extremity, outline, local subject-color, which can be withdrawn, concentrated, and 
pulled into the nonextension of a point or self-center – blind spot; simultaneously 
distending or extending itself through passages and partitions.”7 Thus, pure 
imagination is not something that can be imagined as such, identified or 
appropriated; but it is some thing that remains unimaginable and unpresentable. 
It is Nancy’s claim, that this is, why Heidegger’s example of the death mask is so 
exemplary in showing the operational mechanism of the Kantian schematism – 
the death mask masks the imagination itself, even if, in some ways, it does also 
uncover it as dead. Heidegger’s example shows thus that the logic of ‘aletheia’, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 14th 
printing, p. 273, B181: “This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances and 
their mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can 
divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with great difficulty. We can say only 
this much: the image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination, the schema 
of sensible concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure a 
priori imagination, through which and in accordance with which the imagination first becomes 
possible, but which must be connected with the concept, to which they are in themselves never 
fully congruent, always only by means of the schema that they designate…”   
6 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 95 
7 Quotation slightly changed by me of: Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand, New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2008, p. 23 
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the veiling unveiling, is what withdraws in the ground of every ‘eidos’, of every 
Idea and that, reciprocally, every Idea hosts a place in ‘aletheia’. 
While it is important that Nancy’s aim is to untie the image from any logic of 
representation, what is even more important for any artistic image or for aesthetics 
in general, is the path he goes in following the demand (manifested in 
Heidegger’s ‘Kantbuch’) that there “must also be a self-showing of the 
unshowable, a tracing out of the effacement, a modelling of the absented gaze 
[…] an eidos of aletheia”.8  The unshowable, the effacement and the absence, 
they all refer to the real and to the sense of the world as ‘the being-with’ in the 
event of becoming. The image, as the ‘being-there’ and as “proffering” is the trace 
of the immemorial past, the infinite and dispersed sense of worldly existence9. 
Nancy’s attempt thus is to show that the unimaginable imagining, what was 
thought also in the Romantic notion of the sublime or in the Kantian “intuitus 
originarius”, doesn’t imply “a poetic making/ making poetic of the world” (The 
italics are Nancy’s)10 nor an auto-intuitive self, but a being-with in the world as an 
alterity. The image and art in general has for Nancy an ontological status.   
    
1.1. Gestalt Psychology  
In his reading of Nancy’s book, Ian James proposes two background ideas for 
“The Ground of the Image”: the first one takes account of the Kantian schematism 
and of the pure power of imagination (including Heidegger’s attempt ‘to lay bare’ 
the secret of schematism) and the second one, relates, in a less explicit but still 
important way, to the account of the image in the perception offered by Gestalt 
psychology. We shall look now, at the distinction made by Gestalt psychology 
between the figure and the ground, since the Kantian schema is one of the main 
points on which I will focus throughout this essay. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 96 
9 Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, The being-with of the being-there, trans. Marie-Eve Morin, in: 
www.springerlink.com, published online 12 February 2008, 8.9.2009  
10 Jean-Luc Nancy, Multiple Arts. The Muses II, edit. Simon Sparks, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2006, p. 71  
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Gestalt psychology (known also as Gestaltism, or Gestalt of the Berlin School)11 
developed in Germany in the early twentieth century as a theory of the mind and 
brain. It has its roots in theories by J.W. Goethe, I. Kant and Ernst Mach. The 
operational principle of our brain functions in a holistic, parallel and analogue 
way, showing several self-organizing tendencies. This means that the whole is 
different from the sum of its parts. Our senses show a form-forming capability, 
especially with regard to the visual recognition of figures. This means, that we see 
not only simple lines and curves, but through this form-forming capability of our 
senses, we are able to and we have the tendency to recognize whole forms and 
figures. The existence of dynamic structures determines the appearance of the 
perceived forms and what we perceive within these forms, as fore- and 
background, part or whole. The ground of our mental life has to be seen as the 
experience of forms and not in atomistic terms, and it represents the experience, 
of those organic unities or wholes, which manifest themselves within the spatial 
and temporal field of perception or representation. When we perceive a figure as 
distinct from the ground, then this fact is a result of an internal quasi-
instantaneous choice that nevertheless involves complex internal processes. For 
the Gestalt psychology, the relation between the figure and the ground given in 
the instant when the distinction is made, is what gives the figure its meaning.  A 
classical example here would be the image showing either a vase or a face, 
whereby a moment of confusion occurs between the figure and the ground. 
The instant in which the distinction is made - let us pause for a moment before I 
continue my thoughts on the figure-ground oscillation, on the instant. The painter, 
Hélène Cixous writes, “is a bird-catcher of instants”12. For Cixous, the moment of 
the instant is the possibility for absolute presence, what she calls, the third person 
in the present, that is the present itself. Painting opens and gives itself as the 
chance to take hold of the instant, the absolute presence, the fall into the instant’s 
depth grasped in the surface and skin without depth. Painting is agony directed 
towards instants, errancy through or in those moments when distinction is made. 
In trying to keep up with the speed of time, painting is itself – at least it should be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gestalt_psychology 
12 Hélène Cixous, The Last Painting or the Portrait of God, p. 583-597, in: The Continental 
Aesthetics Reader, edit. Clive Cazeaux, London: Routledge, 2008, 4th edition  
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– mad speed. But mad speed is erratic in itself. Speed is spacing. The speed of the 
erratic displaced bodies touching each other. Everything that might hold the 
painter back needs to be broken off with – knowledge, thoughts, plans, 
calculations…even and especially the painter’s ego. The mad speed of the instant 
is the power of the metamorphic flux of the figure, of the body, that the painter 
aims to take hold on in the image. Inexhaustible distinctions in whose depth the 
painter should fall and come few steps nearer - or further, repulsed by the 
impenetrable matter - uncountable instants to err around towards “a little sense in 
a pure state, infinitely opened and infinitely lost”13. The speed of accidental 
contours and foreign adumbrations of illusory apprehensions in the spacing of the 
nervous lace of endless modifications in obsessive successions – speed spacing 
the depressive decay of any form in the imminence of the sublime instant. 
Uncountable differentiations in the final discreteness of their spacing-speed.  
 
 
The simple example of the face-vase image shows the oscillation that might take 
place between the two, between the figure and the ground. Each one of us might 
perceive either the vase or the face first. What each of us automatically perceives 
firstly, is related to what is called the ground of the viewer’s experience. In 
Gestalt psychology this would be a rich mix of all the past experiences of the self, 
of the world, and their endless interactions. All this, together with feelings, 
beliefs, values and needs embedded in one’s internal world. In this sense, we can 
say that the ground defines the figure and gives it its meaning. This ground is 
what allows the figure to emerge from and to distinguish itself from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 13 
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background. It creates the meaningful unity of an image/figure from a diversity of 
sensible appearance.  
It is in this context (while also following Heidegger’s ideas on the ground and on 
truth), that for Nancy the world is the surface of surfaces on surfaces, faces on 
faces, an “infinite foliation of layers of the obvious”14 and that the ground is not 
the support for the figure, but the very “coming about of forms”, “the appearance 
of the world”.15 The ground and the figure are not opposing each other, but, on the 
contrary, they share the intimate relation of intertwining and interlacing. Both the 
figure and the ground tend to open towards the manifest and absolute presence, 
while also exercising a power for closure and withdrawal.   
The ground declares itself as the ground only in its rising in the image. The 
ground becomes distinct in the image through its own repetition. It depends on the 
image to clarify itself as the ground in a movement of doubling itself, and the 
image protects itself against it and, simultaneously, opens itself to it. The image 
and meaning in general are both in the ambivalent position of being distinct from 
the network of significations while, at the same time, touching ceaselessly on the 
order of signification and representation. 
It was Gestalt theory, the first theory of perception that confronted the “bucket 
theory of a passive registration of stimuli”16 and that denied the concept of the 
“innocent eye”17. We cannot see things or forms as they are, because we inherit 
certain ‘properties’ that are not reflected directly by the received stimuli, but that 
con-figure them and draw them in pre-arranged slots. So for example, we tend to 
‘look for’ or to ‘seek’ to see simple configurations, straight lines or circles rather 
then seeing random shapes. The nervous impulses reached by our visual cortex 
are ‘subject to forces of attraction and repulsion’. It is our tendency, and inherited 
intentionality that makes us content to probe the real world and its representations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 76 
15 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 76 
16 E. H. Gombrich, The Sense of Order. A Study in the Psychology of Decorative Art, London: 
Phaidon Press Limited, 2nd edition, 2006, p. 4  
17 Term established by John Ruskin in “The Elements of Drawing” (1857) 
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against regularities that are not abandoned unless they are refuted. We reduce the 
realm of sensible forms to schematic renderings, or ‘conceptual images’, which 
are “minimum-representations” of the object they intend to conceptualize for the 
subject, but these ‘minimal schemas’ are first of all ‘con-structed’ and ‘con-
figured’ and only afterwards proved against the real world, corrected and altered 
in such a way that the real world matches them.18 An inherited ‘sense of order’ 
leads man in perceiving the world and man imaged and formed the world for 
himself as a rule, and thus any ‘natural regularities’ surprise the man, who thinks 
he is the one who orders and controls the world. But the distinct touches the 
indistinct and order touches dis-order – and Nancy knows that this happens only 
in the clarity of dawn, which is, in its evidence, itself labile and dispersed by 
touches, because: the “dawn is the drawing of a line, a presentation of place. 
Dawn is the sole medium for bodies, which subsist neither in fire nor in ice (solar 
thinking sacrifices bodies, lunar thinking phantasmagorizes them […])”19. In 
dawn, our faculty of imagination becomes tensed and ex-tensed and thus it in-
tends to figure and expands to con-figure the ‘trait’ or edge of their touch, their 
coming towards each other and their trans- or sur-passing between each other 
without becoming interlinked. The faculty of imagination is itself a ‘trait’ that 
touches, a limit at the limit; it is what is between the faculty of understanding and 
perception, between the intelligible and the sensible. Imagination is the touch that 
creates continuity between the distinct – it contours, outlines or adumbrates, that 
is it ‘it casts the shadow’. It is what traces continuity as a passage between the 
sensible outside and the intelligible inside (and between the intelligible outside 
and the sensible inside – in the context of materialistic existence), between the 
Idea and its sensible appearance; and also between actuality and possibility, 
between purpose and chance. Still, the faculty of imagination – and this will 
concern us more in detail later in this text – is not only the passive waiting for 
stimuli to be reproduced, but also the active look or aspect that traces, con-figures 
and des-figures its limits, its outline, its shadow. It is what causes both, rationality 
and creativity to take place, being that that orders and opens possibilities for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 E. H. Gombrich, The Sense of Order. A Study in the Psychology of Decorative Art, London: 
Phaidon Press Limited, 2nd edition, 2006, p. 5 
19 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 
p. 47 
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understanding to legislates towards a principle of unity. The imagination creates 
and performs the unity of fleeting instants, a ‘principle of an elastic unity in 
diversity. It is what makes ‘delight’ possible, because ‘delight’ lies somewhere 
between ‘boredom’ and ‘confusion’.  
Delight – a word that echoes opulence and extravagance, bedazzlement and 
indulgence, playful irrationality and sensuality, revelation, and most of all 
seductive manifestations radiating in force the warmth and beauty of things in 
their multiple dissimilar but intertwining heterogeneity. Delight is the inability to 
decide and to renounce – undecidability, “the sameness of the same produced by 
the same as its alteration”20. Delight is not the absolute alterity that causes nausea, 
but the sameness in difference that enables the absolute experience of the “whole 
that only will be itself when each thing will already have reached its plenitude”21.    
And this delight as ‘fascination’ or ‘seduction’, we will see later, plays an 
important role in the image. Of this “making and matching” we are not aware in 
our everydayness, in the familiarity of a too long ago internalized routine that 
escapes as such our awareness. But should the making fail to match, our 
awareness would awaken and open for the touch of that that is every thing without 
restriction, not yet sketched, formed, traced, designed. It is in this moment that 
‘sense’ touches without representation, directly and without mediation. The 
harmonic rhythm of “schema and modification” has to be brought out of balance, 
interrupted, ruptured and made porous in order to disturb the monotone aware-
ness that comes with it and that stopped “seeing”. A rhythmical discharge should 
balance the tension between being and nothingness, without taking anything 
away, without naming and visualising any thing from nothingness. Seduction, 
bedazzlement, deceit, fallacy, the shadow of light escape existence as ‘existentia’, 
reality and rationality, and open a chance for something else, some thing that is 
not-a-thing.     
   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Discourse of the Syncope. Logodaedalus, edit. by Werner Hamacher, 
trans. by Saul Anton, Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2008, p. 9  
21 Cf. Jean-Paul Sarte, Nausea, trans. Robert Baldick, London: Penguin Classics, 2000, and also: 
Cf. María Zambrano, Philosophy and Poetry, trans. D. Ohmans, 2008, in: 
http://www.webshells.com, September 2008  
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 J. L. Nancy’s philosophical writings form a heterogeneous oeuvre, a multiple and 
fragmented corpus that evolves itself from his thinking and exposure to 
fragmentation and multiplicity. Nevertheless, in his thinking, there are also 
notable continuities like, for example, his interest in art and literature, in 
aesthetics in general. Two of his most original thoughts on aesthetics are, on the 
one hand, the fact, that he consistently unties the existence of the artwork from 
any logic of representation and on the other hand, the fact, that through his turn 
towards an immediate materiality, he is emphasizing the issue of realism and the 
relation of works of art to the real of worldly existence and to the sense of the 
world. 
The ‘real’ is for Nancy “pure and simple reality […] detached from any use, 
impracticable, untreatable, even untouchable, dense, and porous, opaque and 
diaphanous”. A “faint reality of a ‘ground’ ”, substance, matter or subject. The 
‘real’ is what is drawn and separated from the ground (on the wall in Plato’s cave) 
by the trait, the tracing line that divides and sets out the form. It is not presence, 
but trace, ‘trait’, vestige and monster, the displacement of presence, the reverse 
side of presence, manifestation and birth or “coming into the world of what has no 
place (because it is not presence) in the world”.22 The real, Nancy explains in 
“Corpus” is the whole areal. Areality is  “the nature and the specificity of an aire 
(“area”)23 that suggests in a sense also some kind of lack of reality or a suspended, 
undecided reality. But only through this ‘faint reality’ the areal becomes real. The 
real is, for Nancy, where the architectonical orchestration of bodies in their 
structures of ‘partes extra partes’ allows them to articulate and to space 
themselves. The real as the whole areal “ merely reunites the infinity of the 
maximal existence  (quo magis cogitari non potest) with the finite absolute of an 
areal horizon”. What ‘unites the infinite and the finite is an unmediated tension or 
extension of a body and as the touch in the distance of a body.      
In chapter “§ 43. Dasein, Weltlichkeit und Realität” from “Sein und Zeit”, 
Heidegger speaks of the real and of the notion of reality. He applies the term 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 75-76  
23 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 
p. 43 
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‘reality’ to a mode of being of ‘beings’ or ‘entities’ (’innerweltliches Seiendes’) 
that are either present-at-hand, available (‘zuhanden’) or objectively present in the 
world (vorhanden); we encounter entities in the world (‘innerweltliches 
Seiendes’) by way of reality in the two modes of being as “Vorhandenheit ” or 
“Zuhandenheit”24. Entity (‘Seiendes’) here is what is in general, it does not say 
anything about or give any reference if it refers to an object that is a mental 
representation or to a ‘thing’, as that that gathers in itself, if it refers to a 
phenomenon in its different meanings of that, ‘that shows itself’ or to an   
‘appearance’ that designates a relationship between entities. It is what is ‘being-
there’ (but not in terms of Da-sein’s being-there that is always a being elsewhere). 
Reality in itself does not adequately apply to either Being or to the world. Reality 
is only a mode of being for entities in the world among other modes and all of 
these modes of being are ontologically grounded in the way world ‘worlds’ and 
thus in the phenomenon of “being-in-the-world”. Reality is ontologically 
grounded in Being25’s being as “being-in-the-world”. But the way Being is, is as 
being-out-in-front-of-itself in-the-world and being-with upcoming beings. 
Heidegger calls this mode of being of Being ‘care’, or “Sorge”26. Therefore, 
reality is remitted on the phenomenon of ‘care’. On the other hand, the real is the 
mode of being of Dasein in its completed ek-sistence. But Dasein, is always an 
ecstatic being there in being elsewhere with other beings, thus in order to access 
the real one has to engage with Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Dasein is always 
incomplete, always lacking something and due to this, the real cannot be known in 
itself, but only through engaging with Being’s unfolding in the world and in 
reality, we can try to access it. The real is for reality, what earth is for the world: 
the real is the earth that in its withdrawal from the world, shows and unveils in its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001, 18. Aufl.: “Realität ist 
als ontologischer Titel auf innerweltliches Seiendes bezogen. Dient er zur Bezeichnung dieser 
Seinsart überhaupt, dann fungieren Zuhandenheit und Vorhandenheit als Modi der Realität. Läßt 
man aber diesem Wort seine überlieferte Bedeutung, dann meint es das Sein im Sinne der puren 
Dingvorhandenheit. Aber nicht jede Vorhandenheit ist Dingvorhandenheit.”  
25 I am using Being with capital ‘B’ as the English word for ‘Dasein’, but I will keep the original 
spelling in direct and indirect quotations.  
26 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001, 18. Aufl.: “Das Sein 
des Daseins besagt: Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich 
begegnendem Seiendem). Dieses Sein erfüllt die Bedeutung des Titels Sorge, der rein ontologisch-
existential gebraucht wird. Ausgeschlossen bleibt aus der Bedeutung jede ontisch gemeinte 
Seinstendenz wie Besorgnis, bzw. Sorglosigkeit.” (Die Hervorhebung ist Heidegger’s) 
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withdrawal the remainder, the sur-plus and ex-cess of this world. “Erde durchragt 
nur die Welt, Welt gründet sich nur auf die Erde, sofern Wahrheit als der Urstreit 
von Lichtung und Verbergung geschieht.”27     
The real is for Nancy groundless and bottomless “imminence infinitely suspended 
over itself”.28 It is “the presence that is par excellence not present: the one that is 
not there. The one whose being-there is a being [être] […] exposed to the 
elsewhere of this very place”.29 The real can be understood as what stretches in 
between (or beyond) and what expands in retreating itself in the ambivalence and 
the twofold possibility of the world: that of language’s negativity, (the ‘being 
there’ and being named and split from the indistinct), and that of the absolute and 
eternal “Being beyond”, the irreducible residue of Being. We can thus try to 
access the real, Nancy writes, as Heidegger did by engaging with ‘Dasein’, or by 
thinking the ‘différance’ with Derrida and Deleuze’s ‘becoming-imperceptible’ or 
through engaging with the image the way Nancy understands it. And we shall 
keep in mind that both, ‘Da-sein’ and the image are ways of ‘being-there’ in being 
actually also elsewhere.          
Nancy wrote important readings on Descartes, Kant or Hegel and engaged with 
the thinking of Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Bataille, Merleau-Ponty and 
Derrida. His philosophy persistently and insistently turns towards a thinking of 
being in which any possibility of unity and identity has withdrawn, a thinking in 
which the demand of the multiple and the fragmentary allows no reference to any 
overarching unity, totality or ground. His thought requires moving beyond figures 
of subjectivity and stable identity formations and unfolds as a ceaseless 
preoccupation with or reworking of the thinking of other philosophers. In his 
philosophical reflections, Nancy is actively engaging with his experience of 
physical and embodied existence and with an exposure of existence to an 
originary heterogeneity or “exteriority”. A persistent thought in Nancy’s work is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Martin Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, S. 1-74, in: Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 8te Aufl., 2003 
28 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 26 
29 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 123 
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that “the truth of the subject is its exteriority and its excessiveness: its infinite 
exposition”30. The exteriority of existence is the ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ of presence, 
the infinite, obscure and dense presence that is not named and that is not distinct.  
Nancy’s writings follow closely the Heideggerian thinking of Being, which will 
be radically transformed and exceeded while reworking Heidegger’s ideas, in 
relation to his own thoughts on multiplicity and fragmentation. Furthermore, 
Nancy refuses to shift towards a “poetic saying” and chooses to absorb himself in 
the philosophical discourse of the and in the ‘syncope’31. His belief is that “there 
is no point in doing philosophy if it isn’t to try to accompany this exhaustion of 
discourse to its limit”32. If with Nietzsche and Heidegger, philosophy started to 
question the sense of philosophy itself, then Nancy believes that the task of 
philosophy is to think the sense of its exhaustion and he emphasizes the necessity 
of taking the responsibility of thinking its limit as its limit. Following this path, 
Nancy comes to the conclusion that what we have to think differently is ‘sense’ 
itself. 
Sense for Nancy does not belong to the symbolic order or to the relation of 
signifier to signified. Sense is an excess of signification that makes meaning and 
signification only now possible. I will refer to this more in detail in one of the 
next chapters. With this new understanding of sense, Nancy will rethink not only 
the ‘community’ and the political, but also art. He will turn towards a realism 
within art confronting with his thoughts those theories (e.g. R. Barthes) that 
acknowledged the impossibility of realism in literature, since they claimed that 
literary meaning was only received via a signification theory. What Nancy puts 
forward is that art has some kind of direct relation with worldly existence and 
with the ‘real’. He always emphasizes the plurality and multiplicity of our shared 
worldly existence, and argues that the image, be it literary, artistic or musical, has 
the potential to open itself to the ‘real’, to that realm that is prior to the symbolic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Quotation after: Ian James, The Fragmentary Demand. An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Jean Luc Nancy, Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 5; J.-L. Nancy, L’Intrus, 
Paris: Galilée, 2000, p. 42 
31 Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Discourse of the Syncope. Logodaedalus, trans. Saul Anton, edit. 
Werner Hamacher, Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2008 
32 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Discourse of the Syncope. Logodaedalus, trans. Saul Anton, edit. Werner 
Hamacher, Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2008, p. 15 
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order, to language, and to the primacy of the subject. However, the question that 
arises, is to what extent, this prior stage to the symbolic order, can only be 
attained and accessed only as a sur-passing or a going beyond language, that is 
only through language at limit – limit that is necessary and that we also need to 
surpass at the same time.      
Nancy’s thinking of aesthetics is closely linked to the French literary theory of the 
1960s and 1970s and poststructuralist critiques of representation. Nancy, like 
Barthes, Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze and others, is very sceptical of forms of 
representation. He insists that the logic of representation is unable to capture and 
to deal with the diffuse multiplicity and complexity of shared worldly experience. 
The logic of representation can only reduce and codify in a violent way the shared 
worldly experience to restrictive frames of determinate meaning. At the same 
time, Nancy fully re-engages with and recovers the material, the embodied 
sensory dimension of our shared world of perception experience.  
  
   
In the course of my research for writing this text, I encountered the suggestion, 
that one could address this compilation of nine essays by arranging them in three 
groups. Four essays explore the structure of the image by distinguishing the image 
from other modes of communication. These essays would be: “The Image – the 
Distinct”, “Image and Violence”, “Forbidden Representation” and “Distinct 
Oscillation”.  Several other essays would engage in a direct way with painting 
choosing to discuss specific works of art like Pontormo’s “Visitation”, Pierro 
della Francesca’s “Madonna del Parto” or Artemisia Gentileschi’s “Cleopatra”. 
This group of essays would include: “Uncanny Landscape”, “Visitation: On 
Christian Painting”, and “The Sovereign Woman in Painting”. Last two essays, 
“Masked Imagination” and “Nous Autres” would form a separate group because 
they take explicitly account of the structure of the image as an ontological 
structure of ‘being-with’.  
However, I don’t necessarily agree with this approach. Primarily, because it 
appears to me, that in all these essays Nancy’s main concern remains the same: to 
think the image that unfolds the primal monstration of the pure image and the way 
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it touches the real of the world, claiming its ontological status, more precise its 
place in a ‘body ontology’. Thus what Nancy attempts to think is an access to the 
inaccessible via and in the image, as an ‘(in)carnation of mystery’.  The image for 
Nancy is not, primarily, a mode of communication –it is not of the order of 
representation. Image is for Nancy a body and painting is the ‘art of bodies’33, 
‘carnation’ of bodies. What Nancy proposes is thus an ontological analysis of the 
image and not a characterisation of the image in relation to other modes and 
means of communication. 
Since my first encounter with Nancy’s texts on painting, I always felt that his 
writings are reverberations coming from a painter’s painter, very different from 
other writings about painting. They happen amidst the event of painting, in the 
matter and body of painting, (in his own words:) “in the local color”, in the “local 
existence” tracing an ontology of foreign and estranged bodies. In her reflection 
on painting, Cixous on her side, also figures the secret: “Thought is not the 
weighty thinker seated. It passes, inside, distracted, travelling, it is the foreigner, 
the stranger. He paints the stranger in me, in you. The times when […] we 
suddenly become the stranger, the foreigner in ourselves. We separate ourselves 
from ourselves. We lose ourselves. From sight also”34 […] in the “carnation plain 
and simple, referring to the vibration, color, frequency, and nuance of a place, of 
an event of existence”35.    
I should find a way to talk or write in and with this kind of ‘voice’. I should also 
look at Nancy’s texts, the way I would approach the whiteness of a canvas – 
intuitively, without expectance and without plan, but full of energy, delighted, in 
force, violently, in full speed. With the gesture of the first single line that is for 
Nancy already a ‘becoming’, the opening for a passage, for an image. Hope in a 
moment, agony the next. The touch of my eyes, the scent of oil and turpentine, the 
stickiness of paint on my clothes is already this line even before it is imprinted on 
the blankness of the canvas. But once imprinted, marked – I am not alone in doing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 
p. 15  
34 Hélène Cixous, Stigmata, London: Routledge Classics, 2005, p. 9   
35 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 
p. 17 
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anymore. A mark follows the other, a line will make space for the next one; a 
blotch of colour will clear its place, while the stain will retreat in the white light of 
the ground. It is not only me who is painting, but the paint itself paints the image 
and it paints me – my fingers, my clothes, sometimes even my face and my hair. It 
impregnates and presences its scent in my body. At any minute, I can destroy it – 
what it, the paint does - without return, but I am not allowed to fear this moment – 
‘the imminence of’ is my only hope. I am moving forth and back, towards and 
away from the ‘work’, from this freeze-frame (Nancy) that cuts in the weave of 
sense the field of force in which the image threatens to either emerge or to abstain 
from it. Such is the way I should follow: making and matching36, weaving and 
cutting, looking and writing, writing and reading, reading and following. I would 
jump from Nancy to Benjamin, to Blanchot to Bachelard to a movie, to James...to 
Kant or Heidegger, intertwining several debates, and hoping that their collision 
will ‘open’ them for each other, and for me. What brings all these debates in 
contact is the critique of the metaphysical presence and an understanding of the 
image as something that exceeds representation, or that open at least the 
possibility for this.       
2. “Behind the Canvas: Philosophical Painters”37 
“Behind the Canvas: Philosophical Painters” was the title of a seminar that 
gathered together three essays that argued: “Just as philosophy cannot ignore its 
literary dimensions, it also cannot ignore its visual and plastic dimension. Put 
differently, these papers argue that there are many painters who have considered 
themselves thinkers who communicate by means of paint, and who thus require 
philosophical exegesis and engagement”.38 One of the papers dealt with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 E. H. Gombrich, The Sense of Order. A Study in the Psychology of Decorative Art, London: 
Phaidon Press Limited, 2nd edition, 2006, p. 4 
37 Lecture held during the IAPL (The International Association for Philosophy and Literature) 
2009: “Double Edges. Rhetorics. Rhizomes. Regions”, Brunel University West London, UK, 1-7 
June 2009 
38 I believe that ‘exegesis’ here is used in the classical phenomenological meaning of revealing the 
meaning of something and not in the sense of taking account and becoming aware of the 
“ekphanes” of presence, of its event of ‘becoming’. It is used with the meaning of an unveiling and 
disclosure of meaning and intention and not of the proffering of simply ‘being there’. This would 
thus imply that the “philosophical exegesis and engagement” with painting would take the form of 
a series of tautological affirmations or descriptions.    
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connection between the American painter Philipp Guston and the French 
philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas, the second presented Rene Magritte’s paintings 
in relation to Michel Foucault’s essay “Ceci n’est pas une pipe”39 and the last 
essay, interpreted Fernando Botero’s40 series of Abu Ghraib paintings in 
embracing Michel Foucault’s ideas. 
My intention here is not to discuss the ideas presented during this seminar with 
which I can agree only partially. But, I do believe, that some of the thoughts 
regarding these issues, are a good way to set in motion my own reflections on the 
image. At the same time, this seminar deepened my reasons for acknowledging 
the importance of Nancy’s thoughts. One is, as I have previously mentioned, 
Nancy’s most original thought on ‘arts’ in his turn towards matter and materiality 
of being and of sense that allowed him to untie the image and ‘arts’ from the logic 
of representation and to utter the non-reflective demand towards images. His 
proposition is to stop trying “to seek to go behind a canvas” and to stop trying “to 
see behind the visible”, as there is no ‘behind’ to be lighted. We should only 
accept the “brief immobilization of the oil”, and the fact that “we have already 
entered”. We are exposed to seeing and it is only ‘seeing’ that we are asked to do, 
that we are permitted and promised. ‘The invisible’ lies not behind, nor beyond, 
nor inside and nor outside the visible, which is the canvas’ surface. It is rather 
what is right in front of us: its very oil, its weave, and its pigment. Here and now. 
So, what Nancy prompts us to do, is to leave off representation and interpretation: 
“one must remain right at the surface of the canvas, glued to it, on its threshold”.41 
This is Nancy’s main call with regard to the artistic image. The encounter with the 
image is not encounter with meaning and with presence of vision, but an 
encounter with something that dislocates time. Painting imposes its sovereignty in 
the moment when it unfolds itself in the excess of its own fragility, in the ground 
without depth, which is skin, the flesh and light and the gaze that is not directed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Michel Foucault, This is not a Pipe, trans. and edit. James Harkness, London: University of 
California Press, 2nd edition, 2008  
40 Fernando Botero is a contemporary Columbian painter and sculptor. 
41 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 59-62 
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and controlled by any ideality.42 It is an encounter with the resolute disclosedness 
(the Heideggerian ‘Entschlossenheit’) of the swiftness of an instant, Dasein’s 
transparent repetition of itself in the realm of genuine praxis.  
In its factical existence as subjective lived body, the ego’s main aim, its only aim, 
is to save us from appearances, to bring everything under a transparent and 
structured unity of an ‘I’. The ego is slow and tied up directly in the net of unity. 
But painting’s surface is shadowed and scattered between seductive appearances, 
between multiplicity and the heterogeneity of the things in the world; between the 
curves of its own heavily scented and painfully engraved skin, “variously folded, 
refolded, unfolded, multiplied, invaginated, exogastrulated, orificed, evasive, 
invaded, stretched, relaxed, excited, distressed, tied, untied”.43 Dispersed in mad 
speed between instants and “the imminence of”. It is H. Cixous who wrote that 
the greatest lesson painting gives us, is “flinging oneself beyond the ego” and 
that: 
“At the moment, when the ego no longer weighs him down, the painter 
becomes permeable, becomes immense and virgin, becomes a woman. He 
lets light work in him. Submission to the process. He becomes tender, he 
becomes plant, he becomes earth, the sun impregnates him. Tanta 
masidão, such gentleness…”  (The italics are Cixous’.)44 
In such moments the passion for our own material existence becomes 
ontologically articulated opening beings not only for intersubjectivity, but also for 
interobjectivity. Not only a world is opened, but also an earth that shines in the 
dawn of this threshold.     
        
   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Nancy cites also Hantaï’s remarks: “What hides itself, shows itself – folded into a reserve….The 
canvas ceases to be a projection screen, becomes material, cutting through itself, etc. – the 
invaginated – the involuted – the flattened mountain – the painted and the hidden – folding and 
unfolding…void that separates and binds…there is nothing behind.” (The Ground of the Image, p. 
121). Some of his paintings are on show in the Centre Pompidou in Paris. 
43 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 
p. 15 
44 Hélène Cixous, The Last Painting or the Portrait of God, p. 583-597, in: The Continental 
Aesthetics Reader, edit. Clive Cazeaux, London: Routledge, 2008, 4th edition 
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Rene Magritte, the surrealist painter, claimed “the ascendency of poetry over 
painting”45 and in disliking to be addressed as an artist, he preferred to be 
“considered a thinker who communicated by means of paint”.46 “A thinker who 
communicated by means of paint”: this is, I will argue, someone who uses paint 
as a means of, as a tool to communicate, to express, to bring forward his thoughts 
or ideas already ‘completed’ and ‘finalised’ before the act of painting had not 
even started.  
Painting cannot be understood as a later composition and ‘translation’ of pre-
painting experiences and thoughts or ideas to which the painting would remain 
faithful and will give a visual appearance. For me painting is rather the experience 
itself. Before painting there is nothing. As the materials are assembled, com-
posed, con-figured, trans-formed or de-formed the image is born – and the imager 
of the image as well. Both at the same time. The imager/artist images/paints the 
image and the image images the imager/artist. The artistic image in the instant of 
its becoming, is not an object of reflection and of knowledge. The painted image 
is the same that undecides itself. It is the simultaneous production and 
expanditure, the superimposition of the blind spot and the centre of vision. 
Syncope. You know nothing, you decide nothing, and yet every single act is a 
decision taken. Explained the artistic image is reduced to concepts, elucidated it is 
exalted in idolatry or in memorials. The artistic image as a present reality, as 
being or entity, on which thought and discourses can be plausibly constructed and 
established (“her-gestellt’) is placed in the secure place of something that is 
known, comprehended, usable, available, secured and which presents no risks, 
which is not at risk. The image is not a matter of what existed ‘before’, but the 
power that makes it into what it is ‘after’ – an ‘after’ that is nevertheless always a 
‘becoming’, always another one and always in movement.  
In spite of this, there exists however an intense and obsessive desire to work with 
words in painting, with the painting of words and with writing as painting. Nancy 
mentions in relation to this Apollinaire’s “Calligrammes”, Burroughs’s cut-ups 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Magritte’s preference for poetry over painting hints already at the fact that he failed to see the 
painted image outside transcendental representation and independently from resemblance.  
46 James Harkness, in: Michel Foucault, This is not a pipe, Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2008, p. 2  
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and forms of “concrete poetry”, Schwitters’ or Hantaï‘s attempts, acknowledging, 
at the same time, that this desire and obsession to embed words within painting, 
and to bring out their form and materiality, happens at he expense of their 
incorporeal value.    
In calling himself a “thinker…” I intend to believe, that Magritte refused right 
from the beginning to experience paint’s materiality, which implies, in Blanchot’s 
words, an experience as thinking that doesn’t know anymore, but which remains 
nevertheless a form of thinking. This doesn’t refer to a thinking experience, but to 
an experience that challenges both the limit of thinking and of experience. 
Experience is what cannot be thought, because what is thought is already and 
always ideality. His thoughts had been “thought” or formed previously to the act 
of painting, which means that paint is used, in this case, as a depiction mode. In 
his case painting, better the body of painting is the corpse of painting, the cadaver 
of a dead body without a body. But this was, what he tried to avoid in language. 
The idea (of the visual critique on language) precedes and governs his 
communication, which transports precisely this idea.  Self-conscious about the 
philosophical ideas that interested him – Magritte read especially Hegel, 
Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault, he was aware of the discourse 
around a non-representative language and engaged himself in a visual critique of 
language that followed closely Ferdinand de Saussure’s ideas regarding the 
arbitrariness of the sign and “the essentially circumstantial, conventional, 
historical nature of the bond between the signifier and the signified”.47 The 
strategy and programme employed in this respect, was to paint familiar, easy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Michel Foucault, This is not a pipe, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008, p. 5. 
Already for Hegel language was ‘naming’ and conceptualizing, negativity that revealed Being to 
man only half tone. For Heidegger, poetry was the place in which language simultaneously 
revealed and withdrawn itself, a possible way to truth as ‘aletheia’. Both these two views position 
language either on the side of Non-Being or on the side of Being.  Kojeve’s reading of Hegel and 
his ideas on language, as a recombination of linguistic elements and the absence of reference, 
influenced the context of the French philosophy from the 1960s onwards. Discourse and language 
became the main focus of the French thinkers like Foucault, Barthes and others. With Maurice 
Blanchot, Emmanuel Lévinas, Jaques Derrida, Georges Bataille and others, language will be 
thought on its own and not in relation to Being or Non-Being anymore. Language in this case will 
freed itself from the primacy of the subject and will become a ‘neutral and anonymous exteriority’ 
that neither negates nor creates Being.   
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recognisable, objects or scenes and to subvert them immediately, fact that made 
them appear either “impossible” or “irrational”, strange and foreign.   
What preoccupied Magritte was to banish resemblance and its implicit discourse 
from language, and, I argue, only secondarily or not at all, from the painted 
image. By concentrating himself on the relation between language and vision, 
between language that is representing, revealing, and thinking and language that 
accommodates invisibility, and non-knowledge, or even better a ‘beyond-
knowledge’, Magritte obliterates his ‘senses’, from my point of view, and fails to 
sense directly the materiality of paint as it exists in front of him. He is not painting 
from within the painting experience, but he seems to use paint from an external 
position of the painting practice. He criticises how language is used, but employs 
paint in a similar manner. Considering this, he was not able to see that the visual 
field offers itself as a perfect example, because it stands for the domain of 
immobility as such, for immutability and impassability. However, the image also 
never stops “tightening and condensing” into itself. The image is “self-coincident” 
and “self-fitted” with itself, which is that it resembles itself and gathers itself 
together, being a totality that fits and coincides with itself. The image is sur-face, 
ex-position and ex-pression.   
Magritte worked mainly with the literal meaning of words, as he wanted to reveal 
the representational anchor in resemblance. “What we see is never what we say”, 
wrote Foucault in “Les mots and les chose”, and this is what Magritte illustrated. 
“And it is in vain that we attempt to show, by the use of images, metaphors, or 
similes, what we are saying; the space where they achieve their splendour is not 
that deployed by our eyes but defined by the sequential elements of syntax.”48 But 
the ‘sense’ (in Nancy’s terms now) on which his paintings are touching is not a 
‘becoming’ of being and of the sensuous materiality of paint, not syntax of matter, 
of paint and colours, of marks and gestures, but a sense that comes from the realm 
of concepts. They are not sense, they make visible what linguistic meaning is not. 
(Foucault differentiates between resemblance – that prescribes, classes (through 
imposing the priviledged status of the ‘model’ over the ‘copy’), and copies (on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Michel Foucault, in: Les mots and les choses, cited after: James Harkness, in: Michel Foucault, 
This is not a pipe, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2nd edition 2008 
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basis of a mimetic relation that is dominated by representation) – and similitude, 
in which case, things are spaced in lateral and not hierarchical relations to each 
other. “Similitude circulates the simulacrum as the indefinite and reversible 
relation of the similar to the similar.”49 In this case, for Foucault, painting would 
become “an endless series of repetitions, variations set free from a theme”50.)  
Magritte’s paintings question and aim to disturb the ‘normal’ relationship between 
language and image, which was influenced traditionally by the metaphysics of 
presence and by the privilege given to vision, followed from the fact that ‘seeing’ 
meant ‘presence’.51  Heidegger writes: “Seeing, or having or keeping something 
in view, is indeed the predominant, most obvious, most direct and indeed most 
impressive and extensive way of having something present. On account of its 
exceptional way of making-present, sensible vision attains the role of the 
exemplary model for knowing, knowing taken as an apprehending of entities.”52 
‘Erkennen’53 understood as the cognitive relation between the subject that 
disposes over the ability to understand and to percept, to know and to ‘see’ that 
what faces it, the object, made of ‘seeing’ and presence a precondition of 
knowing. This in turn established the privilege of form over matter. For 
Heidegger, both these prejudices favoured the metaphysics of presence. In this 
context then, the sign was the representation of an idea, which in turn was a 
representation of the perceived object. Used as such, language allowed the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Michel Foucault, This is not a pipe, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2nd edition 
2008 p. 10 
50James Harkness, in Forward for: Michel Foucault, This is not a Pipe, London: University of 
California Press, 2nd edition 2008  
51 Outi Alanko-Kahiluoto, Writing otherwise than Seeing. Writing and Exteriority in Maurice 
Blanchot, 2007, p.16 (PDF), http://ethesis.helsinki.fi., July 2009 
52 Quotation after: Outi Alanko-Kahiluoto, Writing Otherwise than Seeing. Writing and Exteriority 
in Maurice Blanchot, 2007, p.16 (PDF) http://ethesis.helsinki.fi., July 2009; Cf. § 36 “Die 
Neugier”, in: Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001, 18. Aufl, 
170-173 
53 Heidegger suggested that the etymology of knowing has it roots in ‘seeing’. “Eidenai” in its 
roots means ‘to see’ and Heidegger connects it to “eidos”. In this, Heidegger believes, lies the 
central thought in the Western philosophy, that is: “Primordial and genuine truth lies in the pure 
beholding.” (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macqarrie and Edward Robinson, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980 (1962), p. 215; Original text: “Sein ist, was im reinen 
anschauenden Vernehmen sich zeigt, und nur dieses Sehen entdeckt das Sein. Ursprüngliche und 
echte Wahrheit liegt in der reinen Anschauung.” (Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, Max 
Niemeyer Verlag, 2001, 18. Aufl, p. 171) 
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objectification of the world and gave the subject the ability to control its objects 
with its gaze. Heidegger refers to this gaze as a mere looking-at, a fixed starring at 
something that is purely present-at-hand.54 In the traditional context language is 
understood as representational, constative and affirmative. The guarantee for 
meaning is presence, the clear form in the light of the idea. Similarly, the image is 
also approached from a representational or mimetic point of view. The image 
represents or copies the perceived thing. Magritte’s painting(s) confront us with 
“figures in the shape of words” and “extend the writing more than it illustrate it or 
it fill its void”(M. Foucault). According to Foucault, Magritte is denying ‘naming’ 
and revealing of meaning. Foucault writes, that Magritte’s paintings question the 
intersection, within the same medium, of representation by resemblance (plastic 
representation) and representation by signs (linguistic reference that excludes 
resemblance). This allows him to exemplify “the penetration of discourse into the 
form of things” and to reveal “the discourse’s ambiguous power to deny and to 
redouble”.55  
 In “The Ground of the Image”, J. L. Nancy himself refers to Magritte’s painting 
“Ceci n’est pas une pipe” and explains that the painting seems to enunciate at first 
sight “a banal paradox of representation as imitation”, but that the “truth” of the 
image is actually to be found in the inverse affirmation, which would be the image 
accompanied by “Ceci est une pipe”, because, Nancy writes:  
“a thing presents itself only inasmuch as it resembles itself and says 
(mutely) of itself: I am this thing. The image is the non-linguistic saying or 
the showing of the thing in its sameness: but this sameness is not only not 
said, or ‘said’ otherwise, it is an other sameness than that of language and 
the concept, a sameness that does not belong to identification or 
signification (that of ‘a pipe’, for example), but that is supported only by 
itself in the image and as an image.”56   
What Nancy (and Foucault) is emphasizing here, is that the thing as an image is 
always different from the thing as “vorhanden”, as being-there and also different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 or: “[…] Naivität eines zufälligen, »unmittelbaren« und unbedachten »Schauens«.” (Martin 
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001, 18. Aufl., p. 37) 
55 Michel Foucault, This is Not a Pipe, trans. James Harkness, London: University California 
Press, 208 (1982), p. 37 
56 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 9 
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from the thing as the word. “Being-image” is the being “not here, but over there, 
in the distance, in a distance”. The image is an ‘image of’ by being a dissimilar 
resemblance. The resemblance of the image is a resemblance of force and passion: 
“Resemblance gathers together in force and gathers itself as force of the same – 
the same differing in itself from itself […]”. Thus the image allows us to touch on 
the same and “on the power that affirms this: I am indeed what I am, and I am this 
well beyond or well on this side of what I am for you, for your aims and your 
manipulations.”57 The image is participation and dwelling, taking part in and 
being possessed by it. The image is  “mimesis”, representation and resemblance, 
but only inasmuch as it also is “methexis”, sharing and participation. The image 
gives itself to the view. It is existence as a form of presence - or rather absence 
made present - that is drawn out of absence and imagination is the force capable 
of doing this. Imagination is not only representation for the subject, but also 
manifestation and figuring of being as ‘coming into presence’, as ‘becoming’ and 
as the ‘coming of a stranger’ and “a birth into a world of what has no place in the 
world”.58  
3. “The Effect of Strangeness” 
A painting is a call and is an invitation for admiration and not for adoration; it is a 
visitation that is according to its Latin etymology a “procedure for becoming 
aware of something, for examining and experiencing something”. Our gaze 
follows its light and we desire its flesh and skin.59 We desire its passage60. Access 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 9 
58 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 76 
59 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 136 
60 M. Merleau-Ponty writes in “The Visible and the Invisible”:  “The flesh is not matter, is not 
mind, is not substance. To designate it, we should need the old term “element”, in the sense […] of 
a general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate 
principle (…) Not a fact or a sum of facts, and yet adherent to location and to the now. Much 
more: inauguration of the where and the when, the possibility and exigency for the fact; in a word: 
facticity, what makes the fact to be a fact. And at the same time, what makes the facts have 
meaning, makes the fragmentary facts dispose themselves about “something”.” (The italics are 
Merleau-Ponty’s) (M. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, Edit Claude Lefort, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968, p. 139-140)	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is given to us only to the fact that we do not accede. Light is not a phenomenon, 
but the limit-speed of a world, the expanse of a world. The image is the visitation 
of the “immense rising of depth into surface […] always-already-there, therefore 
always to come again like the return of a past more ancient than any past”.61 
Dieter Mersch speaks about the ‘out of self’ (“Aus-sich”) force that affirms its 
“ex-sisting-effectiveness” that cannot be neglected, but that is nothing more than 
this impossibility of undeniability.62 It is the visitation of the groundless-ground 
that hollows-up and presses against its surface. The painted image, every image, 
gives itself to us, to our gaze and to our “jouissance” of meaning of the 
inexhaustible distinction and of entering a world and being there. In doing this, 
the image lies bare and images the mystery of being-a-world, and the mystery of 
power and passion coming together. “[…] In its withdrawal and from its 
withdrawal, it (the image) is an attraction and a drawing toward itself.”63 (The 
italics are Nancy’s.) The image is not a thing facing the spectator and it is not an 
“idea”: the image is not sensible and not intelligible form. It is more the 
experience of a force that forces form to touch itself. In this case, the image is 
participation and participation as ‘entering’, better as ‘expanding’ and not as 
‘facing’, participation as penetration and being penetrated by the endless and 
continuous “metamorphic flux” of the image. It is touching with eyes, hands, 
belly, body, and reason. The painted image is flesh, “amorous flesh” in which 
case the penetration can only be reciprocal. It is fidelity, because it pays equal 
respect for the being and the non-being, for the beautiful and the ugly, for the light 
and the shadow. The image demands trust. Trusting the threshold. Trust to give. 
Trust to invest. 
Painting made flesh, reversibility of carnations and étoffes64, writes Nancy. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, ‘flesh’ is the common existential ground for both 	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62 Dieter Mersch, Negative Präsenz, S. 99-117, in: Arno Böhler, Susanne Granzer (Hg), Ereignis 
Denken. TheatRealität, Performanz, Ereignis, Passage Verlag, 2009	  
63 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
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the body and the world. Thus, in their material being the subjective lived body 
and the objective world do not stay in opposition to each other, they do not face 
each other, but as against this, they are intertwined with each other. Flesh is thus 
the structure of reversibility in which the subject and the object are not assigned 
fixed rigid position. The outside and the inside, the subject and the object, the 
outside of the inside and the inside of the outside are in a continuous 
interchangeability with each other. Body and the world share a common condition 
of embodied sense. If the subjective lived body is actively devoted to the 
enfolding of the world’s and to it’s own objectivity, then it, the subjective lived 
body experiences its sensual and sensible expansion, this means, that its 
awareness of what is to be a material body is enhanced. A primordial pre-
reflective material sense-ability can be engaged through our passion for the 
world’s enfolding and our own materiality. Image – which can be artistic, poetic, 
tactile, olfactory, musical, and so on - is the appearance and presentation of the 
stranger, the foreign body. Painting is a body. It is a mode of being other than 
objectified reality, because as “a prodigious force-sign of an improbable 
presence”, “the image is outside the common sphere of presence”.65 Blind falling 
in love, passion for the ‘out-of-place’, for ‘ek-stasis’ and for our material being.   
   
What is characteristic for Bertolt Brecht’s poetic images on stage is the sublime of 
their simplicity, and the fact that they continuously and directly remind us of and 
lay bare their  ‘normal’ and usual artificiality, their fabrication. Displaying and 
presenting their fabrication, they bother our habit ‘to see’ things and the way they 
appear to us. We can no longer sympathetically and immediately merge our 
sensibilities with the actors who “incarnate our hopes and actualize our dreams in 
order to satisfy us passionately” (Blanchot), because we become aware of the 
event’s theatricality. 
A certain kind of strangeness Nancy insists, characterizes also man’s humanity. 
Man’s self-knowledge, the self-knowledge of the ‘I’ that is confronted, put face to 
face with his own self, his own ‘I’, is the knowledge of his presence as the 	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presence of “the stranger, monstrously similar [semblable] […] The similar came 
before the self, and this is what it, the self, was.”66 The self outside self, the 
outside standing for self is the image, the schema of man’s monstration, of his 
exhibiting and bringing to light. Imitation of this strangeness is man’s own 
intimation.67  
What Brecht’s theatre (and we should understand theatre here as “embodied text, 
text in flesh and blood with breath and postures”68) aims to expose by employing 
the effect of strangeness is an identity that is not an identity, but “alterity” right 
from the beginning and up till the end. This is very similar to what happens in 
photography: the photography metamorphoses everything into “alterity” 
(referring to a constructed distinct identity), being all the more altered, as this 
‘everything’ is close to us and it refers to our familiar immediacy.69 The 
photograph appropriates “[…] a brief difference. An imperceptible alteration that 
thus becomes perceptible, present, indubitable”.70 And this is also something that 
Brecht intended to achieve in his audience – a distinct identity: not idolatry, but a 
“we” that becomes “nous autres”, a “we” that constructs its “alterity” and that 
exposes “the totality of humans in the fragility of their finitude”.71  
His stage images confront us with the obviousness of the invisible, with an arisen 
anticipation. Being aware of what actually happens between the audience and the 
stage and its actors, aware of “this participation and sympathy, this almost 
revolting contact between emerged sensibilities, these immediate relations in 
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Press, 2005, p. 65 
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which nothing is in relation, this manner of loving without love”72, of this 
negative presence as something that is not, Brecht expected from his audience not 
to lose themselves in dreams and idolatry, but ‘to look at’ and to ‘see’ actively 
speech, to start and think about it through the participation in and the experience 
of ‘making sense’ and of ‘being sense’. His, by now well-known 
“Verfremdungseffekt” is what allowed things to distance themselves and to 
appear strange, blurred and foreign, but which nevertheless demanded their 
existence and called for a ‘fresh gaze’, another gaze, that would shake, scatter 
certitudes, customs and frozen appearances. In this way, he allowed for the 
invisible to be present in the visible. The newly perceived image that produced 
this effect of strangeness not only represented things, but it also allowed things to 
present themselves from a dissimilar distance. It is not re-staging and description, 
but ‘bringing-out’. Participation is not a form of idolatry, is not listening without 
hearing and not watching without seeing. Participation is actively imaging, it is 
‘relation’ and ‘rapport’, a bouncing toward and leaping into it, but not an 
interlinking; participation is the attraction and the drawing towards the withdrawal 
and the distancing of the image. It is an investigation from the Latin ‘vestigare’ 
and ‘vestigium’, a following back of the traces; the footprints that threaten to 
disappear any minute. An investment at risk – the risk of the blind man gone mad. 
As someone, who continuously devoted his thinking to the untying of the work of 
art from representation, claiming its ontological status and, at the same time, to 
the emphasis of the tied relationship between the issue of realism and the artwork, 
Nancy looks more in depth on the problematic that arose from the link between 
image, representation, copy, truth and presence. Alongside other poststructuralist 
thinkers, he engaged in the critique of vision, the questioning of the image as 
finitude, and the primacy of the subject and its omnipresent gaze. In following 
Heidegger’s thoughts, he moves forward from the realm of imagination 
(Vorstellung) and representation, of making things “present to the material realm 
of imaging, figuring and expositing” ( to Darstellung), the realm of “exhibition”. 
From the availability of the things present-at-hand (das Zuhandene) set out 
(‘stellen vor/ ‘Entgegenstehendes’) before the subject, that is the realm of the 	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perceived objects by a controlling subject, to the realm of the image as subject 
that presents itself and is dissimilar. The meaning of the image is not that of 
mimetic representation anymore, but the image is now meaning. For Nancy the 
problem of “representation” has to be carefully analysed in its “alliance”, which is 
constitutive for the Western history, between the image, the principle of 
monotheism and the Greek problematic of the copy, of the artifice and the 
simulacrum. In this alliance, Nancy discovers the reason for the ‘mistrust’ toward 
images.   
In “Forbidden Representation”, one of the essays from “The Ground of the 
Image”, Nancy thinks the difference, between an ‘image of’, that is 
representation, and an ‘idol’. Whereas the ‘image of’, which, in the traditional 
sense of representation, might be regarded as the copy or the imitation of an 
original (and to which Nancy will soon oppose his own understanding of it), the 
‘idol’ is a fabricated God, “an image to be valued for itself and not for what it 
represents”, an image that claims to be itself a divine presence and that asserts to 
be a pure and “heavy presence from which nothing departs or withdraws”; “the 
idol does not move, does not see, does not speak […] and the idolater, facing the 
idol, also does not see and does not understand.”73 Idols are the ‘forbidden 
representations’ and not images, Nancy asserts, precisely because they claim to be 
something that they cannot be, they claim to be God, the ‘real God’, when God is 
“only word (addressed to his people), vision (of the heart of man), and movement 
(in order to accompany his man)”.74 Nancy thinks concomitantly, on the one hand, 
of the problematic of the biblical prohibition and on the other hand, of the Greek 
problematic of the copy in relation to the absence of the original. He explains, that 
the biblical prohibition is the prohibition of the idol and not of the image as a 
representation of God, because God “gives his truth only through the retreat of his 
presence – a presence whose sense is an absense “75 (the italics are Nancy’s) and 	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it therefore never challenges the image. The image attracts the gaze, it seduces 
and it demands to be admired, but not adored. 
In “The Ground of the Image” Nancy does not refer directly and explicitly to the 
different types of images and how one has to discern them – however, in the first 
chapter, he distinguishes between images as the obviousness of the distinct, which 
are images of the invisible, and the others, where there is no such obviousness 
given, and which he calls: decoration, illustration, the support of signification, 
mere images. A thorough investigation in the different types of images needs still 
to be done. As we know, there is decoration and decoration – the mosaics and 
frescoes in the monasteries in Ravenna, for example, show the obviousness of the 
distinct, but were nevertheless intended as decoration. What is the relation 
between appearances in their traditional metaphysical meaning and décor-ation in 
its old meaning? What is the relation between ‘being-image’ and ‘being-
decoration’ in an ontological context? Here I will only mention another way, to 
distinguish between artistic images among themselves, proposed by Hélène 
Cixous in a context in which she refers to works of art and to the fact that painting 
helped her to appropriate and to work “on ultimate phrases full of being”. Cixous 
acknowledges that she might have arbitrarily distinguished between “works of 
art” and “works of being”. Whereas  “works of art” are for her works of 
seduction, magnificent works destined to make themselves seen (such as 
Leonardo da Vinci’s paintings), “works of being” are precisely those paintings in 
no need to proclaim their glory or their magisterial origin (such as Rembrandt’s 
paintings). Whereas “works of art” turn their gaze at us, catch hold on us and 
search us out with their sight, “works of being” turn their gaze to their inside 
towards the infinitum76. “Works of being” are death masks.           
  
   
It is not the literary dimension of philosophy, already a visual and a plastic 
dimension? And are not all painters – that is: all those who fully, intimately, 
continuously and passionately engage with painting at the limit, risking the limit, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Hélène Cixous, The Last Painting or the Portrait of God, p. 583-597, in: The Continental 
Aesthetics Reader, edit. Clive Cazeaux, London: Routledge, 2008, 4th edition 
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in a practical, theoretical, ethical and moral way – thinkers? As I have already 
mentioned, thinking here should not be understood in opposition to experience, 
but as a type of experience that challenges the limit of thinking and of experience. 
Limit, which is also the limit of speech and of words that are always recessively 
licking in painting and in the limit of experience. Is it possible to be a painter 
without being a thinker? And is there not an alternative to thinking as knowledge 
and cognition? And is not this alternative, a thought as an actual “praxis of sense 
that renounces “theoria” as the imposition of an object” and that houses and 
dwells on the image as “the there of the beyond”, “a thinking there, thinking as 
effectivity of a place opening itself to presence”; a beyond coming to open the 
there, giving it its being-there in this very opening.77 (The italics are Nancy’s.)  
Is not painting for the painter a reiteration without repetition and, what Heidegger 
addresses in the following excerpt from his essay “Was heißt Denken”78:  
“Der Denker braucht nur einen einzigen Gedanken. Und die Schwierigkeit 
für den Denker ist, diesen einzigen, diesen einen Gedanken als das einzig 
für ihn zu-Denkende festzuhalten, dieses Eine als das Selbe zu denken und 
von diesem Selben in der gemäßen Weise zu sagen. Vom Selben sprechen 
wir jedoch nur dann in der ihm gemäßen Weise, wenn wir vom Selben 
immer das Selbe sagen und zwar so, daß wir dabei selbst vom Selben in 
den Anspruch genommen werden. Für das Denken ist daher das 
Grenzenlose des Selben die schärfste Grenze.”  
Is not this, what motivates Frenhofer’s agonized search for the absolute meaning 
(in the masterpiece) that is adamant in not taking place, because it absconds itself 
from the “violent justice of the subject”?79 How many painters have not agonized 
in the stray current of an endless number of series of the same paintings? 
Frenhofer is painting over and over and over the same canvas for ten years. But 
even if painted each time on a new canvas, each time with a fresh and new hope - 
as if one could direct one’s hope to a new beginning in the same old body - one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 125 
78 Martin Heidegger, Was heißt Denken?, Stuttgart: Reclam jun. Stuttgart, 4te Auflage, 1992, p. 
31-32 
79 Frenhofer is the main character, an artist, from Honoré de Balzac’s story “The Unknown 
Masterpiece” from 1832. In my text, I am writing from the point of view of the painter and of the 
image. Giorgio Agamben interprets the chiasm between the point of view of the artist and that of 
the spectator in: § 2 Frenhofer and His Double, p. 8-12, in: Giorgio Agamben, The Man Without 
Content, trans. Georgia Albert, Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1999   
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still paints always the one same painting, the one that, one always knows, will 
never be accomplished, because this is what painting is. Frenhofer’s paining –that 
he explains is not painting, but feeling, a passion – is the living reality of his 
thoughts and imagination exposed in their own excessive presence, their absence 
in presence. Painting exceeds itself, is never complete, never accomplished, but 
always an endless delight and bedazzlement of the surface without depth, always 
jouissance of endless marks and colors and lines, of matter and body, of body and 
the world. Is not this, what provokes the continuous dissatisfaction with my 
paintings, and what spaces the habit of my fingers, my arms and body, this trained 
and agitated, repetitive movement that keeps the tracks of my addiction to paint 
and to its transformative contingency that always eludes my consciousness? Is not 
this the promise for the exhaustion of the excess of a process that folds into and 
unfolds infinitely? Without this “roundabout route of destruction” (Emil Cioran80) 
would it be any painting at all, any arts? Does a painter really know to paint? Is 
she/he not always defeated by, always prepared to fight against itself, its own ego 
and against the (factical) world? The painter’s only aim is to speed up, to 
accelerate to the limit-speed, to sur-plus expansion.  And, what is important to 
address, for both the painter and the thinker, is the question of how to write or to 
paint, how to create without representing, commenting, without condemnation or 
interpretation. How can one pay equal respect to every thing, to the beings and to 
not-a-thing-ness? In “Pathmarks” (“Wegmarken”) Heidegger asks: “Is 
objectifying thinking and speaking a particular kind of thinking, or does all 
thinking as thinking, all speaking as speaking, necessarily have to be 
objectifying?”81 And we shall explore later in this text, to what extent the 
possibility of a thinking and a speaking and of the image that does not represent is 
given already in the Kantian schema-image and in an aesthetical encounter.   
If the painting, as we said, refuses to obey to the primacy of the subject’s 
consciousness, being more itself a presence as subject rather than an object, than 
we have to understand the painters’ tireless and constant search for forms, not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Emil Cioran (1911-1995), Romanian philosopher and essayist. After 1937, with the exception of 
one short visit in 1944 in Romania he lived in Paris until his death. He wrote mainly in French. 
81 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, edit. William McNeill, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, 8th printing 2007, p.55 
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primarily as an attempt to paint forms, but rather as an attempt to trace or to figure 
“the force that takes hold on forms and carries them away in a pres-ence”, the 
force that is “the unity woven from a sensory diversity”82. It is this force that 
allows forms to form, deform and to transform themselves. The image is always a 
constant flux of metamorphosis that comes from before and that goes beyond 
forms. Painting is this “metamorphic force”. The painted image is more than 
aspect and representation and form; it exceeds them all. It is an excessive power 
that extracts presence out of absence, rather than representing absence. (Thus 
Poussin’s indignation that Frenhofer cannot see, that there is nothing on his 
canvas comes from the point of view of the spectator, whereas Frenhofer’s 
passion and feeling spaces an infinity of simultaneous instants, a presence out of 
absense.) It is the affirmative power that asserts that there is something that 
cannot be neglected, but that escapes and withdraws simultaneously from any 
naming or conceptualisation. Every painting is an attempt and a chance, a 
possibility for the one painting, the last painting that one never paints, a chance 
and an ability to be an image.    
   
Why should an image require a philosophical exegesis83? A philosophical 
engagement? Does philosophy provide the necessary tools for the exegesis of a 
painting? What does it mean here ‘philosophical exegesis’ and in what form 
should it take place? Is not the image already an exposition, an exegesis? What is 
the image/figure of philosophy?  Shall we deal then with the transformation of an 
exegesis into another exegesis? Which painting requires a philosophical exegesis 
and which not and who is to decide to which of the two categories a painting 
belongs to? What do we expect to gain and what shall we hope not to lose? 
I already fear, that once again, even in the good will, to give some painters (to 
those painters who are ‘philosophical painters’) and painting the weight of a 
philosophical ground or origin (as if painting is not enough in and for itself) – fact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. by Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p.22 
83 New Latin, from Greek ‘exēgēsis’, from ‘exēgeisthai’, meaning to explain, to interpret, from ex- 
+ ‘hēgeisthai’, to lead, in: www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/, September 2009 
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which would affirm already the illustrative and representational character of 
painting - or maybe even in the good will, of pointing out the aesthetic and 
aisthetic possibilities opened in the space of painting, this path lead instead only 
to the re-enforcement of a specific view on the painting practice as illustrative to 
concepts, as something that takes place in the field of and that works with 
concepts. This might be the case, no doubt, but it is a very limiting and closed 
view on the painting practice and its sense.  
The etymology of ‘paint’ leads us back in the 13th century in the Middle English 
form of ‘paint’ coming from the Anglo-French ‘peint’, the past participle of 
‘peindre’. The word comes from the Latin ‘pingere’ meaning to tattoo, to 
embroider. In Greek ‘poikilos’ meant variegated, and ‘pikros’ sharp, bitter.84 
There is not the place here to elaborate on the interconnection between painting 
and decoration/ décor/ adornments/ pattern/ motive/ symbol/ stigma/ the 
Apollonian or the Dionysian, but I mentioned the etymology of the verb ‘to paint’, 
as I wanted to point out, the sharpness and painfulness of this matter that cuts 
trough and marks, stains, impregnates and manifests itself on the thin surface of a 
skin, at the limit of the sense of the world and of a world of bodies. 
Let’s not forget, what is the painted images demand, because what they demand is 
everything – labour, pain, passion, looking are not enough. These are 
requirements for decoration and craft and are as such not allowed to be sensed, to 
be part of the image – labour diminishes an artwork to craftwork, at the utmost an 
exquisite and virtuous decoration. Understandable. With patience, practice and 
endurance a student can exhale its master. But the pure image cannot be learnt, it 
cannot be taught. The fear of reaching joy, the fear of allowing oneself to be 
carried away by exaltation, to be seduced by it, by paint and gild, by the material 
and its flesh, the fear of trusting flesh is every painter’s torment. It is the torment 
of the painter’s ego. But this is what we have to do, to face the fear of enjoyment 
and bedazzlement, to indulge in the material, to consume it towards the ego’s 
painful blindness that forces it to look.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paint. Nancy writes: ”pingo means above all “to 
embroider with threads of color”, or else “to tattoo”, this mixes weaving, incision, and delineation 
with tinting and coloration. The woven thread and the puddle, or the line and the covered surface.” 
(The Ground of the Image, p. 74) 
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   
What is the space behind the canvas? In the context of the seminar mentioned 
before, the space “behind the canvas’ seems to rightly imply, that the space taking 
over by a painting is much vaster than the space stretched out in between the four 
stretchers bars.  However, at the same time, I also sense, that “behind the canvas” 
wrongly implies that there, ‘behind the canvas’, there lie hidden all those 
philosophical thoughts that, if I would be to know them, would give me the key to 
the ‘truth’ of the painting, and that will decipher a hidden meaning of the image 
and what it actually represents. There is space, behind, but also in front of, above 
and at the bottom of a painting. Nevertheless, it is within this loophole frame 
where the field of force is condensed and tensed and there should, however, be no 
‘behind the canvas’-space as a causal philosophical ground or essence for the 
image. In order for the painted image to suddenly irrupt from the bottom, to be 
presence rather than representation, in order for the image to aim to touch the 
sense of the world, there cannot exist any direct causal relationship to any 
philosophical concept. The painting is the Idea before it became idealized. 
Painting is the threshold of existence and there is no passage between the outside 
and the inside.  
The space inhabited and ‘ex-panded’ by a painting was always vaster than the 
painting’s actual surface and, in the art historical context, there were various 
physical and theoretical attempts to cross over, to open up the frame of the 
painting, to occupy a three dimensional space, to literally inhabit a painting, to 
expand it and to fast forwarded it even in time or dissected it in several frames. 
All these attempts, besides other things, they show that the frame is not the frame 
that the painting is the flat skin of the canvas; it is that and more then that, it is its 
exposed abyss. Even, the exposed abyss of Being.  
What we need to think of, is the painter as someone who practically and 
theoretically investigates and invests in images that happen in the act of making, 
in the here and now, in the event of painting and not images that visually 
enunciate a ‘before’ or something that took place previously.  We also need to 
analyse and appropriate the different types of images that emerge in the various 
contexts of art, of philosophical discourses, in the poetic reverie (G. Bachelard), 
in everyday life or elsewhere, even if our main concern will remain the pure 
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image, the image of all images. We need to think of the open, transgressive and 
dissimilar relation between all these images, between the productive and 
reproductive power imagination and yet again, the relation between the faculty of 
imagination and the faculty of understanding. Only in following this path, I do 
believe, that the rare ‘companionship’ between painting, and actually art in 
general, and philosophy can delicately irrupt on the surface.   
4. Marks, Signs and Violence. Benjamin and Nancy 
In the context of the tension between language and vision, the relation between 
the two is very complex and it is closely linked to the dialogue between the 
‘graphic line’ and marks on the one hand, and between thinking (‘naming’) and 
imagination on the other. Judith Butler’s essay from “The Life and Death of 
Images. Ethics and Aesthetics” takes on Walter Benjamin’s ideas on marks and 
signs, which helps us to appropriate the event of painting. In his late twenties, 
Benjamin wrote few fragments reflecting on painting, especially on Kandinsky’s85 
works. In relation to Kandinsky’s pictures he wrote: “the simultaneous occurrence 
of conjuring and manifesting”.86 And Butler explains, that what is “conjured” is 
what would be brought forward and invoked subjectively and what is 
“manifested” is what would emerge from the object itself. That is from matter or 
from the free materials of nature that overwhelm the understanding and give him 
food for thought. In other words, and in relation to Kant, we could also say, that 
what conjures is the schematism, the imagination under the constraint of the 
understanding, whereas what manifests itself is either the free (and beautiful) 
materials of nature or the imagination that freed itself being now able to reflect 
form freely. “Conjuring” comes from the intentionality and consciousness of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Michel Foucault in: “This is not a Pipe” ascribes to Kandinsky’s paintings the rupture and 
dissociation of resemblance from affirmation. For Foucault, what happens in Kandinsky’s 
paintings is a “double effacement simultaneously of resemblance and of the representative bond, 
by the increasingly insistent affirmation of the lines, the colors that Kandinsky called “things”, 
neither more or less objects than the church, the bridge, or the knight with his bow. Kandinsky’s 
works are a naked affirmation clutching at no resemblance. When asked what they were, he could 
only reply by referring himself to the gesture that formed them: an “improvisation”, a 
“composition”; or to what it is found there: “a red shape”, “triangle”, “purple orange”; or to 
tensions or internal relations: “a determinant pink”, “upwards”, “a yellow milieu”, “a rosy 
balance”. (M. Foucault, “This is not a Pipe”, p. 34)  
86 After Judith Butler in: the Life and Death of Images. Ethics and Aesthetics, edit. Diarmuid 
Costello and Dominic Willsdon, Tate Publishing, London, 2008, p. 64-81, from Walter Benjamin: 
Selected Writings, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, Vol. I, 1913-26, Harvard 1996  
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subjectivity engaging with perception and intuition, and “manifesting” comes 
from the neutral, anonymous exteriority of the matter that exists in itself and for 
itself and not as a “present-at-hand” and available thing for a controlling 
subjectivity; from the material that acts on its own when imagination is free and 
reason withdrawn, when the subjectly lived body opens for the objectly lived 
body and vice versa. The subject is the one that has the ability to foresee and to 
“in-image” (Nancy), who is inspired and who claims to have access to the divine 
insight. What manifests itself is what is and what shows itself as what it is in also 
showing what it is not. In “Painting, or Signs and Marks”, Benjamin defines a 
painting as “a set of marks”, writing that, what distinguishes a painting as a 
painting is precisely this con-figuration or “set of marks”. He also emphasizes that 
marks are different from signs and they are not to be confused with each other. 
Benjamin states that a painting  “is a medium, a mark, since it has neither 
background or graphic line”87. This painting is what is before or beyond naming, 
it is the areal ground itself. The mark sets the distinct apart and in Benjamin’s 
terms, this led to the mark’s performativity in establishing the guilty subject. A 
mark is a branding mark, a “stigma”, a tattoo or an incision, a “trait”. The mark is 
the “trait” that draws the withdrawal, the “retrait” (Nancy) of the distinct.  Marks 
and signs house among themselves “the absolute mark” and “the absolute sign”. 
These absolutes are not found separated from, but are buried in the various signs 
and marks. Butler explains, that each mark and each sign contain in themselves 
the “absolute mark” or the “absolute sign”. A mark is its own manifestation and it 
does not represent or resemble anything else. The mark emerges usually on a 
living body – as blush or stigmata - and is always therefore the absolute mark. On 
the other hand, the sign appears predominantly on the inanimate. For him a mark 
is a dunning sign of guilt, and we will see how this will come to be defining for a 
picture. The absolute mark is mythical, as it indicates an archaic mythical 
meaning of guilt and atonement. The (absolute) sign is magical, because it is a 
means of and it sustains representation and semblance. A mark transports no 
semblance and is individuating the living being who bears it.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 After Judith Butler in: the Life and Death of Images. Ethics and Aesthetics, edit. Diarmuid 
Costello and Dominic Willsdon, Tate Publishing, London, 2008, p. 64-81, from Walter Benjamin: 
Selected Writings, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, Vol. I, 1913-26, Harvard 1996 
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A painting demands to be looked at and, to see and understand a painting is to 
deal with seduction, beauty, life and guilt. To get ‘to see’ a painting and not only 
to gaze at it intentionally, one needs to accept seduction and to get involved, to 
participate and to enter in the lifeless (which refers to those aspects that are not 
named and are thus not beings yet) aspects of what appears. It involves revenge 
and retribution “in the name of a utopian possibility” and “the critical destruction 
of the work of art”.88  
In putting the mark forward, as the constitutive element of a painting, the picture 
is related thus for Benjamin to either guilt or innocence. In the theological past 
and in its tradition, the mark is stained on a living being because of a guilt, error 
or deed, and it is a sign of sin or punishment, a confession. Through the act of 
atonement, one might initially think that one can be relieved of guilt, but 
Benjamin explains that this cannot be the case, because this would be an outcome 
that would imply a causal relation, relation, which would therefore be magical. 
And, as we have seen above, the magical is the realm of signs and not of marks. 
Benjamin writes: “Since the link between guilt and atonement is a temporal and 
magical one, this temporal magic appears in the mark in the sense that the 
resistance of the present between past and the future is eliminated, and these, 
magically fused, descend together on the head of the sinner.”89 
The mark marks a living being as distinct, as bearer of the stigma, as the guilty 
one, whereas a sign distinguishes its bearer in a more positive way.  The archaic 
and mythical meaning of a mark can be understood, Benjamin tells us, only 
through painting. Painting is the medium of the mark in general and therefore, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 After Judith Butler in: the Life and Death of Images. Ethics and Aesthetics, edit. Diarmuid 
Costello and Dominic Willsdon, Tate Publishing, London, 2008, p. 64-81, from Walter Benjamin: 
Selected Writings, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, Vol. I, 1913-26, Harvard 1996 
89 After Judith Butler in: the Life and Death of Images. Ethics and Aesthetics, edit. Diarmuid 
Costello and Dominic Willsdon, Tate Publishing, London, 2008, pag. 64-81, from Walter 
Benjamin: Selected Writings, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, Vol. I, 1913-26, 
Harvard 1996. The original quotation is: “Insofern der Zusammenhang von Schuld und Sühnde ein 
zeitlich magischer ist, erscheint vorzüglich diese zeitliche Magie im Mal in dem Sinne, dass der 
Widerstand der Gegenwart zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft ausgeschaltet wird und diese auf 
magische Weise vereint über den Sünder hereinbrechen. Doch hat das Medium des Mals nicht 
allein diese zeitliche Bedeutung, sondern zugleich auch, wie es besonders im Erröten ganz 
erschütternd hervortritt, eine die Persöhnlichkeit in gewissem Urelemente auflösende.” (Walter 
Benjamin, Medienaesthetische Schriften, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002, S 272) 
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everything we can find out about the mark, can be discovered only through the 
observations on painting.  
“ Painting is a medium, a mark, since it has neither background nor graphic line”. 
If a painting is only mark, then how is it possible to be named? If, as we said 
previously, the painting is defined by marks and there are only marks that make a 
picture is true, then we are moving in a logical circularity. Benjamin’s move to 
solve this problem is by claiming that there is a “name” that gives these marks a 
unifying composition and that the painting is thus also connected to something 
that it is not as such. 
A medium that has neither background nor graphic line, is a medium that 
transmits nothing, no essence and no substance, the only thing transmitted is the 
emptiness of an ‘opening’, ‘a becoming of’ in an irremediable scattering in its 
inexhaustible advent, “a transgression and a being carried away beyond signs”.90 
Painting is not form and not sign; “a groundless unity”, the force that gathers itself 
in itself and presents and ‘forces’ itself before one’s eyes. Painting is not a 
question of a controlling and oriented gaze that freezes its objects, but rather a 
spreading out and flattening of vision (Nancy), not a matter of signs or of 
representation. Painting is force and passion and it is not a form and it is not 
formal. It is a manifestation of no use and of non-availability. A painting is a set 
of marks, and the existence of marks is its transcendental condition, its “material 
fact”91. This infinite finite materiality of the painting invokes the existence of 
several senses and not of one common sense. Painting as medium or mark doesn’t 
transmit anything; it doesn’t communicate anything, besides plurality and 
dissimilarity. “Painting is a modelling which does not rest on a model”.92   
The graphic line is the line of the absolute sign and has to be understood in 
opposition to the surface. The graphic line describes, it characterizes and affirms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. by Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 26 
91 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth To Presence, edit. Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery, 
Stanford: Stanford California Press, 1st edition, 2007, p.389 
92 Martta Heikkilä, Community, the Political, and the Indecidable: Jean-Luc Nancy and the Shared 
Origin of Art, p. 15, in: International Yearbook of Aesthetics, Vol. 9, 2005, edit. Arto Haapala, 
Helsinki: University of Helsinki 
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the surface and signs or traces the surface by subordinating itself as its 
ground/underground/background. For Benjamin, the realm of the absolute sign is 
not a medium, but “eine uns höchstwahrscheinlich zur Zeit gänzlich unbekannte 
Ordnung” – an order and organization that is still highly unknown for us at the 
time being.  The sign has more like a spatial relation and tie to the person, 
whereas the mark has a more temporal connection. The mark seems to even reject 
the personal.  
It is this “absolute sign” and not any sign or word that conjures and gives a 
painting a unifying intention. This ‘name’ (sign) signifies something that 
transcends marks, as it cannot be marked and it appears that this is the creative 
principle itself. “The picture may be connected with something that is not – that is 
to say, something that is not a set of marks – and this happens by naming the 
picture.”93 A painting is an infinite finitude, it is not a closed set of marks, but it is 
openness to its exteriority, into which it leaks and passes all the time without 
becoming interlinked with it. “That is why at the heart of painting […] an 
indefinite exchange is played out between representation and non-representation, 
between visible and non-visible, between art and the refusal of art”.94  
Nancy writes, that in the case of the artistic image – as painting, video, 
installation, sculpture, performance, architecture, music or dance – text, language, 
words may or may not be displayed, but the text will always proceed from the 
image itself, because somewhere, there will be a sign that announces the “work”, 
as what is simply and only the “work”. And by ”work” he means “a minimum of 
discourse”95, a designation or deictic or function that says nothing more than 
“freeze frame”. The “work” here is a “cut of the weave (of the material sense) in 
process, an immobilized needle, an eternalized movement”, and it is not “work” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 After Judith Butler in: the Life and Death of Images. Ethics and Aesthetics, edit. Diarmuid 
Costello and Dominic Willsdon, Tate Publishing, London, 2008, pag. 64-81 
94 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. By Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 124 
95 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 71 
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as the product of a “setting-into work” (Heidegger) and it is also not a particular 
work.96 ‘Work’ simply announces a singular but infinite field of force.  
The title as a sign is magical, conjuring, providing a unifying intention to a 
picture. That after which the image is named is, for Benjamin, the creating, 
organizing principle itself, which transcends marks and cannot be marked. What 
organizes these marks in a painting, organizes them through ‘naming’, through 
resemblance. It is resemblance as the force of the same that gathers itself as the 
same, which is also the same that differs in itself from itself – the distinction 
enforced by the dissimilarity that inhabits resemblance. It is not a conceptual 
naming, but the naming of the thing as “the being-image”. The name or the sign 
organizes and gives a composition to, it opens a passage for a set of marks that are 
manifestations withdrawn from this world. Signs and marks are working together 
in a painting, being in tension with each other. Signs and resemblance touch on 
the force of the same, its withdrawal and excess, its concentration and pressure of 
the surface. To name is to ex-tract things from the independent dark existence and 
to bring them in the light of concepts. The ‘nameless thing’ is the ‘lifeless thing’. 
Meaning embodied in an empirically existing form is a meaning that ‘lives’. 
Signification is the movement of language and it is like the life that maintains and 
endures death. 
Judith Butler explains Benjamin’s words: “The sign conjures through the 
resemblance at work between the particular word and the absolute sign to which it 
is related; the mark manifests, and these manifestations appear to be of a magical 
temporality that pertains to a moral universe of guilt and atonement.” 97 
Benjamin’s reflections announce that “the linguistic word” is at home, in an 
invisible way, in the medium of the language of painting, revealing itself in the 
composition. But what does Benjamin mean by “the linguistic word”? Butler 
explains that the ‘linguistic word” is something that cannot be expressed or 
communicated in any language. Benjamin refers to it in relation to what he calls 	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Press, 2005, p. 71 
97 Butler, Judith, Beyond Seduction and Morality: Benjamin’s early Aesthetics, in: The Life and 
Death of Images. Ethics and Aesthetics, edit. Diarmuid Costello and Dominic Willsdon, Tate 
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“a pure language”, a language that no longer means anything, “the expressionless” 
and “the creative word”. It is therefore, an organizational power that governs the 
tension between the sign and the mark; it is the compositional organization itself – 
the schema image itself.  
The ’expressionless’ is related to the ‘otherness’ of language, to its obscurity and 
exteriority that is due to the possibility of signs to become marks through their 
extraction from their initial context, but also due to the possibility of marks to be 
repeated and thus to become signs. It is the ‘otherness’ of language that is 
inclusive of its own materiality and repeatable marking potential. The 
‘expressionless’ is the presence of the ‘pure language’ in itself regardless of any 
subjectivity or any intentionality of an individual consciousness. It is the obscure 
exteriority that cannot be internalized by a subject and it is thus the exterior 
remainder that reminds itself of its immemorial past.     
In “Categories of Aesthetics”, Benjamin refers again to signs and marks 
distinguishing semblance from manifestation. Semblance is for him part of the 
realm of signs as it takes place in myth and it is a mere appearance. Semblance 
seduces us: “ The seductive nature of beauty is based on the shamelessness, the 
nakedness, of the semblance that arms it”. Nancy, as well, refers to the power of 
seduction of semblance and he explains that: “the pleasure men take in mimesis is 
made up of the troubling feeling that comes over them in the face of recognizable 
strangeness, or in the excitement that comes from a recognition that one would 
have to say is estranged”.98 The seductive nature of beauty comes from the desire 
and pleasure of the sublime.  
Benjamin comments in a footnote of his essay “Über einige Motive bei 
Baudelaire” on how one can define beauty99. For him one has to understand 
beauty in relation to the realms of nature and history.  In both cases the 
appearance, the ‘apporetic’ in beauty will play a role. In its historical being, 
beauty is the call to gather oneself together with those who admired and adored it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 69-70 
99 Cf. Elaine Scarry, On Beauty And Being Just, London: Duckworth & CO. Ltd., 2006 (2000) 
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in time, in the past. Beauty is for him similar to death100, as we cannot encounter 
in the identical object the initial object of admiration that is missing and long 
already dead. He quotes here Goethe, who said that, everything that had already a 
great impact is outside our critical investigation.  In relation to nature, beauty is 
defined as that which is identical with itself in disguise. As explanation, he cites 
Paul Valery, who wrote that the beauty’s call is to imitate that what is indefinable 
in things. We have to bring forward the insufficient and unsatisfactory “here” in 
things (even if and precisely because we are completely ‘satisfied’). Benjamin 
calls this “the expressionless”101. Thought that shows similarities with that of the 
inadequacy in the presentation of the sublime.   
Heidegger understands the beautiful as that what in its self-showing brings forth 
the man’s state of feeling, the hidden part of ‘techné’ and the irreducible and deep 
truth of man’s fate. For him the beautiful is the artwork and the artwork is a 
manifestation of man’s state of wonder before its presence and opening up in the 
world.  The beautiful is the “ekphanestaton”, that what shows itself properly and 
is most radiant. In the artwork is manifested, ‘gelichtet’, ‘offenbart’, Being in its 
entirety of the world and the earth – “Dergestalt ist das sich verbergende Sein 
gelichtet.”102 
We could even recall here the Hegelian Idea. The Hegelian Idea is different from 
the thing as the product of a notion, and from the projection or the ideal of a thing: 
a gathering in itself and for itself of being’s determination. Nancy writes that we 
could even call it truth, sense, or being itself. The Hegelian Idea is “the thing itself 
as vision/ envisioned [entant que vue] (…)” It is the thing grasped in its form from 
within itself. And from here Nancy concludes, that art is precisely the “sensible 
visibility’ of this intelligible, thus invisible visibility. The Idea is in this case the 	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self-imitation of Being, “its transcendental miming”. The thinking around the 
‘invisible form’, which is also Plato’s ‘eidos’, is concomitantly, Nancy writes, a 
thinking of imitation or a thinking of the Image or a thinking of the Idea. 
Moreover, every thinking of the Idea is thus a thinking of the image or of 
imitation. Put together all these discourses formed around these issues are in 
effect a theological thinking reflecting on “the visible image of the invisible God”. 
The visibility of the invisible, the ideality made present (even as paradoxical and 
absent presence) is what makes or leads to “the beautiful”. Nancy writes that for 
Plotinus, the access to beauty “is a question of becoming oneself pure light and 
vision, in beauty’s intimacy, and thus becoming “the only eye capable of seeing 
supreme beauty”.103 The relation of the image to the Idea, or the relation of the 
image to the unimaginable, determines the division between ‘the beautiful’ and 
‘the Sublime’.    
Semblance is beautiful and is armed with beauty’s armour and with life. Through 
semblance an artwork becomes alive, because semblance ”communicates life”. 
But as a living and thus as semblance, a work of art stops being a work of art. A 
work of art becomes an artwork and may reach one’s completion only through 
passing and overcoming semblance and by life’s withdrawal. By destroying life, a 
work of art comes into being and to understand its truth and organizing principle 
means to accept this violence against life. These were Benjamin thoughts.  
In citing Thomas Aquinas, Nancy attempts to look at the difference between “the 
image” and “the vestige”, and he writes: “the vestige is an effect that ‘represents 
only the causality of the cause, but not its form’.”104  Aquinas also referred to the 
meaning of the word ‘vestigium’: as the sole of a shoe or the sole of a foot, a trace 
or a footprint. The difference lies therefore in the fact that “a vestige shows that 
someone has passed by but not who it is”; “the vestige does not identify its cause 
or its model, unlike the way (…) a statue of Mercury represents Mercury, which is 
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an image.”105  What is important for Nancy in ‘the vestige’ is the ‘ek-sistence’ of 
the ‘vestigial presence’ as the remainder without inside, as exteriority, not as 
absence, but as a “path of presence”, as in the meaning of the word ‘vestigare’, 
“to follow on the traces”. And this is what happens in sense and with sense as well 
– “do not let the sense get set down any more than the foot of a passerby”.106 
Sense is the imprint of the other face, the sole of the subjective lived body in the 
anonym singularity of the ‘any one matter’.   
A painting is beautiful, seductive, believable and alive trough semblance. And it is 
precisely this beauty and life achieved through semblance that it must lose in 
order to become “utopian perception” and to stop being visual perception or to 
reach the “moral nature of creation”. The work of art should stop being seductive 
and alive and it should become “expressionless” – the neutral, anonymous 
exteriority of the other that is independent from any controlling subjectivity. 
Walter Benjamin understands “the expressionless” as the critical violence, the 
Critique that is unable to differentiate between semblance and the truth of the 
artwork and therefore stops them to interfere. It is the critical violence that 
separates the beauty of life (the objectified Being) from the beauty of the death 
(nothingness, matter, the absence of beings, “presentia in absentia”), beauty by 
semblance from truth. He describes this violence as a “moral dictum”, a violence 
that holds truth separately from beauty. (Benjamin is here very close to the way 
Nancy interprets Kant’s decision to choose a style without style as presentation 
for the legality of reason and the foundation of reason’s autonomy. For Nancy 
(and Kant) the simple but elegant presentation is for pure reason its ethics, that is, 
the morality of its ethos.) The beautiful based on semblance is separated and made 
distinct from beautiful that is its own death and arrest, and that is the violence of 
“the expressionless” who performs this separation, this setting apart. The truth107 	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107 Truth of the work of art for Benjamin is very similar to Nancy’s understanding of truth, which 
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   45	  
of the artwork is for Benjamin on the side of violence and of the Sublime: the 
sublime violence of the true appears for Benjamin in “the expressionless”. 
Without life and ‘beauty’s armour’, the work of art is shattered in various 
fragments that disclose the in-tention, ex-tension and at-tention, behind their 
organisation and composition and causes the withdrawal of this tension, this force. 
The destruction achieved by a work of art becomes then the destruction of the 
traces of guilt through forgiveness and gives us, as a result, an alternative to the 
act of atonement. The work of art is completed by the destruction and self-
effacement of its marks, that is: the painting completes itself by destroying itself 
in the sense that it falls apart, it shatters itself in several fragments. It makes its 
own disparity and dissimilarity visible. It stops claiming to be an identity and 
becomes the unity of the different – which, we will see later on, is the image of all 
images, the pure image, the schema. The work of art is the image that touches on 
the primal monstration of the pure image, the schema. The work of art is the 
vestigial presence of that immemorial past of Plato’s cave, always ‘already-there’ 
cutting the wall and separating and touching the real. 
Nancy writes that violence is always in excess of signs, because it wants to be its 
own sign, and it always makes an image of itself. It is the image that authorizes 
violence. An image in order to be an image, even a mimetic one, but not a 
reflection or a shadow, it has to be something more than only ‘like’; it has to go 
outside of itself, to count for more than only an image. Violence is the 
manifestation, the imprint of a mark, the excess of force that imprints an image by 
force in its effect, and as its effect.108 Violence is “monstrative”, because it wants 
to show itself and its effect and violence goes hand in hand with truth: violence 
has its truth and truth has its violence and both are showing or demonstrating 
themselves, realizing themselves in an image that is, in being in an essentially 
way “monstrative”.  
 What is monstrative about the image or in the image is the unity of the image, the 
force of the image to emerge from ‘the groundless ground’, to gather in itself and 
to present itself, the force that brings forms into ‘pre-sence’ and joints the parts of 
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the figure, that forms and de-forms and exceeds in the end all form. Through this 
force, the image opens a beyond of the aspect, of the form and of the surface of 
representation. But in order to achieve this, the image must first be imaged. This 
is, the image must condense itself in its own unity, re-tract and con-tract itself in 
order to ex-tract the tension and power of the unity of a thing that is not initially 
present in the thing ‘present-at-hand’, in the thing in its availability. This 
excessive power of unity of the image is what draws “the form of presence out of 
absence”, which is “the form of self-presenting”. In the next chapters, we will 
show that this is actually the Kantian ‘schema’ that is the image of imagination 
and therefore ‘the self-imagining’ and ‘self-representing’. The excessive power 
that forms the self-presenting is the power of the schema, of the pure image, that 
makes it possible to speak of a presence of the world and of a presence in the 
world. It is the power that images the subject and the object, and its own 
knowledge in and the knowledge of the world. The image is “ the fore-sign of 
unity without which there would be neither thing, nor presence, nor subject”.109 
The unity of the thing needs to irrupt, to tear it (the thing, the entity) from the 
manifold, to resist multiplicity, to press against the surface, to gather and grasp 
itself – all actions that imply a violent force that is contained in the thing’s being. 
Unity is violent because it must relate itself to itself in itself and for itself, and to 
present itself, to bring itself forward to the exterior and to mark itself against and 
as distinct from the exterior. The dispersed exterior gathers its “partes extra 
partes” into a body as a unified110 partes extra partes” that shows itself to the 
exterior. Philosophical unity is exclusive, selective and imperative. Poetic unity, 
on the other hand, embraces it all – “the a posteriori “whole” that only will be 
itself when each thing will already have reached its plenitude”.111   
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In his “Critique of Pure Reason”, Kant shows that ‘time’ is what synthesises the 
production of unity, because: “time is the very unity that anticipates itself and 
succeeds itself in projecting itself endlessly in advance to itself, grasping at each 
moment – in this ungraspable instant – the present in which the totality of space 
presents itself, in which its curving expanse is surveyed in a single view, from a 
perspective in which time is both the blind spot and the obscure vanishing 
point.”112 The pure image, is the unity that con-tracts and con-centrates the 
dissimilar exterior, but at the same time, this unity and its power is what dis-tracts 
and dis-rupts the continuity of extension and expansion of the “dismembered 
exterior”. Therefore the schema is con-tracting and ex-tracting at the same time, it 
is unity and disunity. The image is what tears being away from being and it is 
marked and set apart by this tearing away. The image bears the mark of guilt, the 
stigma of being the one, who forces the ‘slit’ of being. The image bears in itself 
its ground “monstrously opened to its very bottom […] to the depthless underside 
of its presentation”.113 ‘The death mask’ – and I will engage with this example 
used by Heidegger to analyse the Kantian schema and to ‘extract the secret of the 
schematism’ in a separate chapter – shows death, that is its image, and it also 
shows its ‘look’, its ‘Bild’ and its ‘Sicht’. The death mask shows how death 
appears and the aspect of death in general. Heidegger showed that each image, 
each ‘Bild’ or reproduction of an image, each ‘Abbild’ or ‘Nachbild’, they all 
contain and show the primary monstration of the pure image, of the schema – the 
‘look’ in which there can be seen the ‘unlooking face’ of someone who can no 
longer see. The schema is “the ‘Gesicht’ of the one without ‘Sicht’ (sight)”.114  
The image in being ‘monstrative’, in being the monster that opens the possibility 
for the presentation of presence, can as well be the monster that prevents from any 
presence to presents itself. The monster that holds the look back, embedded in the 
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dense unity of its ground, or the monster that projects presence ahead of itself, “a 
presence always too singular to be merely self-identical”.115                   
5. G. Bachelard – The Poetic Image 
Nancy affirms that the image is not only imitating a thing, in the sense that it 
reproduces the thing, or that it “aemulates” it, that is, it rivals the thing and 
competes against it for presence and disputes the presence of the thing. The image 
shows that the thing is and how it is. It takes the thing out of its simple presence-
at-hand and brings it fore to “praes-entia”, to “being-out-in-front-of-itself”, it 
takes the thing from a general “Vorhandenheit” to “Gegenwärtigkeit” (Heidegger) 
and makes it “monstrative” by presenting it. Therefore, the only thing we have to 
do for grasping an image is to: “exhaust your looks until your eyes close, until 
your hands are raised over them, until your faces fall upon your knees and see the 
invincible right at it”!116  Before we grasp something our hands have to grab first. 
Against the same discourse that criticises vision and that positions the image at 
the intersection between the visible and the invisible, Nancy argues that the image 
is not objectified presence “for a subject” or normal representation in this sense, 
but the image (and only through the image the thing, as either a thing or a person), 
is posited as a subject that presents itself. The truth of the image in this sense 
cannot be the metaphysical truth of the knowable as visible and present. The truth 
(or the sense of the image in Nancy’s concept of sense) of the image is display of 
presence not as appearance, but as an event of exhibiting, of an advent. The image 
challenges the visible in “implanting” (Nancy) itself with the mystery of ‘real 
presence’ as absence and withdrawal.        
In the case of the artistic image, as in the case of the poetic image, we have to be 
“receptive, receptive to the image at the moment it appears: if there be a 
philosophy of poetry, it must appear and re-appear through a significant verse, in 
total adherence to an isolated image: to be exact, in the very ecstasy of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p.25 
116 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 59 
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newness (it takes place in the moment you read it) of the image.”117 In his book, 
“The Poetics of Space. The Classical Look at How We Experience Intimate 
Places”, Gaston Bachelard studies the direct ontology of the poetic image by 
employing Minkowki’s phenomenological method.118 For him, in order to ‘hear’ 
the poetic image in its whole resonance, one has to leave behind causality and a 
rigorous and rigid philosophical and scientific method and to allow the 
reverberation (Bachelard from Minkowski) to touch one’s senses, to listen to the 
sound of being (Minkowski) in its reverberation. For Bachelard the 
phenomenology of imagination, which is “the study of the poetic image when it 
emerges into the consciousness as a direct product of the heart, soul, and being of 
man, apprehended in its actuality”119, is the only way to expose the problem of the 
poetic image philosophically, and to fully engage in its immediate and short-lived 
dynamics presenting “the flare-up of being in imagination” (Bachelard). The 
consciousness in which the poetic image emerges is a consciousness that is only 
aware of its own withdrawal.  
Bachelard writes, that whereas the concept is ‘constitutive’, the poetic image is 
‘variational’. The poetic image is reacting, despite its sudden and short 
appearance, its unusual and conflicting form at times, in the heart and mind of 
other subjects, and sometimes it possesses us entirely; the poetic image is 
characterized by its transsubjectivity (and one should also add a transobjectivity) 
that cannot be fully determined. The phenomenology of the poetic imagination is 
the task to look at the specific and singular presence of a poetic image. Far from 
being an object, the poetic image “places us at the origin of the speaking being” 
and “ through its exuberance, awakens new depths in us”. The subject and the 
object are in the poetic image in a continuous tension with each other, allowing 
and producing endless inversions. In this case, one has to look at the “onset of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space. The Classical Look at How We Experience Intimate 
Places, Boston: Beacon Press, 1994, p. xv 
118 Bachelard refers here to Eugene Mikowski and to chapter IX from his book “Vers une 
Cosmologie”. In the English version of Bachelard’s book, the editor gives a detailed presentation 
on Minkowski’s ideas and cites a long passage in full length for a better understanding of what 
Bachelard is referring to. (Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space. The Classical Look at How 
We Experience Intimate Places, Boston:Beacon Press, 1994, p. xvi-xvii) 
119 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space. The Classical Look at How We Experience Intimate 
Places, Boston:Beacon Press, 1994, p. xviii  
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image” in its singular, short and simple appearance that bears no consequences for 
the future and no weights of the past, that is regardless of all the school of 
thoughts and scholarship of the cultural past. The language of poetic images is so 
new, that it cannot be looked at, by employing correlations between the past and 
the present. We are always unprepared, both in the literary and in the 
psychological sense for the spontaneous, innovative and piercing force of the 
poetic image. It always takes us by surprise and stays with us afterwards, allowing 
us to feel that we possess it, even if, we know that it is not ours, allowing us the 
joy of taking part in the creative performance – “a jouissance of meaning”: for a 
moment, we become poets. And Bachelard writes, “the poetic image is an 
emergence from language, it is always a little above the language of signification 
[…] poetry puts language in a state of emergence, in which life becomes manifest 
trough its vivacity”120 and he cites J. H. Van den Berg who wrote that: “poets and 
painters are born phenomenologists. […] We are continually living a solution of 
problems that reflection cannot hope to solve.”121  
However, Nancy would argue in relation to this, that phenomenology comes here 
with regard to the image, at its limit, because here it is a matter of ‘the appearing 
of appearing’, or of ‘appearing as coming into presence’, a ‘coming of the world’, 
rather than ‘a coming in the world’ and an appearing as a showing itself of 
entities. It is precisely this on which Nancy is focusing his attention: on the limit 
of thought and signification and on the limit of the phenomenological account of 
the disclosure of the world. What is at stake in the image is an opening, a passage, 
a touch on the sense of the world and for Nancy, sense is always offered at the 
limit of signification. The order of signification marks a rupturing of presence, 
because it divides and orders presence according to ‘clear-cut forms’ and 
concepts. What is thus problematic about the phenomenological method is that it 
maintains the primacy of the subject and of an origin. And Nancy concludes that it 
is not a matter of phenomenology, but of ontology. However, the phenomenology 
of the imagination is not to be understood as a ‘light’ that reveals and makes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space. The Classical Look at How We Experience Intimate 
Places, Boston: Beacon Press, 1994, p. xxvii 
121 Quotation after: G. Bachelard in: Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space. The Classical Look 
at How We Experience Intimate Places, Boston: Beacon Press, 1994, p. xxviii 
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things visible, evident and lucid. It is more acceptance and experience of a force 
that ‘opens up’ subjects for Bachelard and bodies for Nancy and makes them 
intertwine. It is a light that is too white, that is penetrative and violent – it cuts the 
contour. It is not demarcation and separation, but limit that touches. Non-
knowledge, or better a beyond-knowledge, as we will see later with Blanchot, is 
the primal condition for the positive receptivity, better participation, for poetic 
imagination. The naïvité of wonderment. Wonder opens our senses for poetic 
images. 
For Blanchot it is “fascination” what challenges seeing as intentionality and 
making present. It is ”fascination” or “wonderment” that challenge also the 
classical phenomenological understanding of the image as seeing and thinking. It 
is not the case anymore of the consciousness of a subject, but a consciousness that 
becomes affection and the case of a perception that becomes “fascination’ or 
“wonderment”. It is not either ‘seeing’ or ‘not-seeing’, but it is a seeing of what is 
neither ‘seeing’ or ’not-seeing’, but the ‘in-between’ of the radical punctuality of 
the now – the surprise of the new that forces the intentional ideality of the artist. 
The image exercises its force so that being is caught up in the fascination of the 
image – being is caught up in “there-is” and estranged from every “I can”. The 
experience of the “there-is”, of “es gibt” is the experience of an offering that 
simply offers itself, a simply “is” or “gibt” without the taking part of any subject 
that offers nor any object that is being offered. Ian James quotes Nancy: 
“ The singular transmission of art, neither lost nor saved, would be the 
offering [offrande] of an offering, and perhaps the offering of offering 
itself, absolutely. Or indeed, the presentation of presentation itself. Art is 
presented, by itself in sum for itself, or for the presentation that it 
forms.”122  
The sensible and sensuous form of art is a proffering, a gift, “Gabe” or 
“Gegebenheit”. Dieter Mersch explains (in following Jean Luc Marion’s 
thoughts) that what offers itself, “the proffering”, is what gives up itself in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Quotation after: Ian James, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy. The 
Fragmentary Demand, Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 213 
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presence and gives up thinking. The proffering is the duality that stretches 
between a “giving up for something” and a “giving in something”.123 
This idea of the artwork as a proffering is close to Heidegger’s concern with a 
“thinking in something”, a thinking as happening and affection.  The image exerts 
a fascination that deprives doing from its power and opens a presence that is never 
tangible, but always and nevertheless present.124 Blanchot makes here an 
important call that pushes Heidegger’s thought further. We will see in one of the 
next chapters how Heidegger analysed the creative imagination as the possibility 
to “think” against the world’s becoming a mere image and to free thinking from 
the metaphysics of presence. Similar to this, Blanchot demands an even more 
radical and resolute resistance against the “mere image” in the space of literature 
– in art, I would say. Whereas Heidegger claims that art is the “setting-to-work” 
of truth, Blanchot claims that the truth in art is the experience of errancy, of 
wandering and being lost in exteriority. Poetry, literature and arts in general do 
not contain any image (representation); rather the world becomes an image in art. 
Blanchot thus distinguishes between “an image of language (and not a pictorial 
language)” and “an imaged language […] that no one speaks”. It is the second, the 
“imaged language”, in which the ‘otherness’ of language speaks, the language of 
shadows, of vestiges (Nancy), of the ‘aura’ (Benjamin) or of ‘éléments’ 
(Lévinas125). The image is never ‘resonance’, which is the echo of the known, but 
a ‘resounding’, a stepping outside of itself.   
 Possessed by the poetic image, the poet’s consciousness expands and relaxes and 
promises to be written. The other is allowed to take part in this poetic 
intentionality (Bachelard). “It is through the intentionality of poetic imagination 
that the poet’s soul discovers the opening of consciousness common to all true 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Dieter Mersch, Negative Präsenz, S. 99-117, in: Arno Böhler, Susanne Granzer (Hg), Ereignis 
Denken. TheatRealität, Performanz, Ereignis, Passage Verlag, 2009	  
124 Cf. Emanuel Alloa, Bare Exteriority: Philosophy of the Image and the Image of Philosophy in 
Martin Heidegger and Maurice Blanchot, trans. Millay Hyatt, 
http://colloquy.monash.edu.au/issue010/index.htm, July 2009  
125 E. Lévinas refers to the “élément” as: what it does not give itself as an object of vision, it is 
more like an environment for the experience that no longer represents.  
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poetry.”126 The intentionality of poetic imagination comes from or is the 
intentional, creative, indecidable synthesis of the faculty of imagination freed 
from the faculty of understanding and the faculty of reason, as its tension and  
(violent) power to trace the ‘figure’, to ‘con-figure’. Reverie, poetic reverie, is for 
Bachelard, “lived in a relaxed time which has no linking force […], it is a flight 
out of the real that does not always find a consistent unreal world […]”, a 
“constantly downhill path” in which “the consciousness relaxes and wanders and 
consequently becomes clouded” (the italics are Bachelard’s).  
“This reverie is written, or, at least, promises to be written. It is already 
facing the great universe of the blank page. Then images begin to com-
pose and fall into place. The dreamer is already hearing the sounds of 
written words. […] all the senses awaken and fall into harmony in poetic 
reverie. Poetic reverie listens to this polyphony of senses, and the poetic 
consciousness must record it.”127 
Reverie, even if it has its roots in the soul of a dreamer, it is more than an oneiric 
phenomenon. Reverie is more than passive dreaming, because of the possible 
intervention of consciousness in the tranquillity and the peace of repose of reverie. 
But also because it implies an act of creation and innovation, activity rather than 
receptivity. However this intervention allows no more than to make sure that one 
is conscious of the reverie and that one does obey to the oblivion of thinking. It is 
a solitary act, “the very force (puissance) of the being at rest”, a state of the mind 
(soul), an opening into the world of words, free from any logical structuring and 
any systematic development of thoughts. “How can one dream while writing? It is 
the pen which dreams. The blank page gives the right to dream. If only one could 
write for himself alone.”128 
Antonin Artaud129, in speaking about theatre, left us a treatise on poetics 
exploring things that are true for every creative act. He refused to recognize the 
limitations of a genre and searched for the language of an immemorial past. 	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Becon Press, 2004, p.5 
127 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Reverie. Childhood, Language and the Cosmos”, Boston: 
Becon Press, 2004, p.6 
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Artaud writes that poetry is becoming and it is “a poetry in space”, because 
language “aims at encompassing and using expanse, that is, space, and by using it, 
making it speak.” The stage, poetry, or art present us not the real space but the 
“space that is other”, which is a more expressive, more abstract, more concrete, 
“the very space prior to all languages”.  Poetry is understood as space, not as the 
space of words, but as the space of the relations between words, the space of 
“their moving suspension, the appearance of their disappearance; […] space as 
pure becoming; the idea of image and shadow, of the double and of an absence 
‘more real than presence’; that is, the experience of being that is image before it 
is object, and the experience of an art that is gripped by the violent difference that 
is prior to all representation and all knowledge […]”130 Artaud writes: 
 “The intellectual space, the play of the physical and the silence, molded 
by thoughts, which exists between the members of a written sentence are 
traced [in the theatre] in the scenic air between the members, the air, and 
the perspectives of a certain number of cries, colours, and movements.”131  
For Artaud, poetry emerges from “the need for speech” and not from “speech 
already formed” and he emphasizes that the theatre, poetry and art, they are all 
moving in the philosophical realm of a becoming. The theatre, poetry or art in 
general, they do not speak about reality, but about its shadow (aura or vestige), the 
darkening and deepening shadow through which something announces itself 
without revealing itself, the mystery in things. The experience of the poetic 
thought is a lack and an excessive, overwhelming suffering for Artaud.  
The experience of ‘exteriority’ challenges one’s capacity to perceive, one’s 
intentional consciousness to see and to know. The ability to see and to objectify 
with the intentional gaze of the subject is the subject’s condition to secure its own 
identity. The encounter with the ‘outside’, the ‘exterior’ of the horizon opened by 
the “eyes of the mind” is an impossible encounter with the “nothingness”, with 
Being as such, with the “noth-a-thing” (Heidegger). And it is also a facing of the 
subject’s own embeddedness in the intentionality of consciousness. To stop 	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‘seeing’ is a terrifying experience, the experience of a lost sight that cannot gaze 
into nothingness either – one cannot look, but one cannot stop looking either.132 
To deal with this encounter is to admit the fact, that what would enable to see, 
would also prevent from seeing.  
“I have come to the conclusion that it is impossible to write” (the italic’s are 
Flaubert’s) wrote Gustave Flaubert years before Artaud. Impossible to write, how 
shall we understand this? Flaubert fought a similar battle to Artaud’s. He wanted 
to give a new meaning to the word ‘writing’, he wanted to make books as a sole 
matter of writing sentences and to explore the intransitive work that is at work in 
the word writing. “One writes sentences so that the sentence’s visibility will cover 
up and preserve the privilege of invisibility and the power to disclaim and efface 
that do not allow, “writing” to be anything but neutral word.” 133 Nancy explains 
in “Multiple Arts. Muses II”, that what Flaubert dreamed of was to write in a 
profane form a Holy Script measuring himself at the same time against the fact 
that literature excludes always the Holy Script. Literature does not reveal any 
transcendent world.134 
Both text and image are present and manifest, and in the metaphysics of presence 
they would also claim to reveal something transcendental. A text usually 
confronts us with significations and the image with forms. For Nancy, the image 
and the text are like body and soul,  
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133 Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson, London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2008, p.336 
134 Cf. § 8 On Writing: Which Reveals Nothing, in: Jean-Luc Nancy, Multiple Arts. Muses II, edit. 
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“each is the limit of the other, its horizon of interpretation. The horizon of 
the image is the text, with which it opens an indefinite power to imagine, 
before which the image is only a closure, a closed contour. But the horizon 
of the text is the image, with which it opens an indefinite power to 
imagine, before which the text is only an impotency, a permanent 
postponement of images.”135  
Every image and every text can be each other’s image and text, but also image 
and text in itself. “Text is textile; it is the material of sense.”136 Text is interlinking 
and meshing and weaving together without material, without fibers and without 
consistency the infinite space of sense. Text in this case is liberated from “the 
primacy of speech over writing, of thought over language” and of the promise of 
direct and transparent communication; and becomes a text without identity that 
traces lapses and circles, turns and detours, “a roundabout route of destruction”, a 
text devoted to itself, a text that refuses to develop, that sinks in the  
“movement of attraction and withdrawal, of affirmation and recession, of 
folding back in and exhibition through which something (but what?) 
timidly advances and immediately withdraws, appears and disappears, 
then again disappearing when it reappears and nonetheless maintaining 
itself in its disappearance”137. 
 In this sense, ‘the image gives presence to the text’, the image is the image of the 
text, the meta-phor, the trans-port and movement of the text, its displacement, the 
image images the presence of the text, which lies in its absence of matter, in its 
immateriality; the image exposes, ‘places into view’, ‘makes distinct’ and 
‘monstrative’ the absence, the lack of the text and of the written word, “the image 
is the web of a threadless weave.”138 It is the image that allows sense to emerge, to 
gather together and to press up against, to irrupt and transpire from out of the 
immateriality, invisibility and inaudibility of words and “to show us a fleeting 
circumstance that had escaped our attention”, because sound, line and figure, the 
words’ poetic reverberations are what grasp and touch on “the abstract and 	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fugitive movement of a needle through the stitches of a piece of lace” and 
interrupt and distract “the lace of sense that fails at every moment to abolish itself 
in the doubt of its embroidery”139. The image “draws sense out of absence, by 
making absense a presense” (The italics are Nancy’s). The image presents and 
imprints something that is absent, allowing in this way for the absent to be 
presence. “The empty place of the absent as a place that is not empty: that is the 
image.”140  The image is the place of displacement, of the meta-phor. “The image 
calls out: Make way! [Place!] Make way for displacement, make way for 
transport.”141 But let’s not be mistaken, the kind of image we spoke about above, 
is not a simple metaphor! It is not an image that we see, or reproduce or retain in 
our memory; it is the product of a creative and free faculty of imagination. It is 
not only displacement, it is rather the emergence and touch of an intensity and an 
intentionality, it is withdrawal and passage, “shock, confrontation, tête-a-tête, […] 
less a transport than a rapport (the italics are Nancy’s), or relation”, it is an 
intimate ex-traction, a schema. This image is the forceful, intentional and tensed 
product of an active and productive imagination. It is not of the order and unity of 
signification, but of poetry, it is receptive for becoming, for the becoming of 
expression for the coming of a figure and a becoming of our being. It is the 
figural142 expression that figures being, which is what opens the inter-subjectivity 
and inter-objectivity of being and of sense. And it is the same in all its forms, 
poetic, musical, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, kinaesthetic and so on. 
If absence is what characterizes sense, Nancy writes, then sense “does not have 
any single mode of existing”, because only complete presence by being identical 
with itself has a single form of existing. Therefore, “sense exists, or rather it is the 
movement and flight of existing: of ex-ire, of going outside oneself, exceeding, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 67 
140 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 68 
141 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 68 
142 On the distinction between ‘figural’ and ‘figurative’: cf. “The Image as Rend and the Death of 
God Incarnate”, p. 139-227, in: Georges Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images. Questioning the 
Ends of a Certain History of Art, trans. John Goodman, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2005  
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exiling. Sense essentially disidentifies.”143 Sense ex-cribes. “The relation of the 
image to sense is the eternal return of the same. The same sense always imaged144 
otherwise.”145 And Heidegger’s words resound in my ear: “dieses Eine als das 
Selbe zu denken und von diesem Selben in der gemässen Weise zu sagen.” and 
Gertrude Stein’s verse echoes from beneath: “Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose”… 
and Magritte’s painting of the pipe with the text that Nancy intentionally read as 
“This is a pipe” strolls in my head… There is no image without text – even if we 
are not confronted immediately with a sonorous voice announcing its speech, this 
voice will soon and shortly, as if it didn’t take place, come out of the image and 
return to it. Each artistic and poetic image ‘murmurs’ “no text[pas de texte]” and 
you hear “the text step by step [pas a pas le texte].”146  
“Text calls Image: perhaps it says nothing other than this call. Image 
illustrates Text: it dazzles it and us with it, and perhaps does nothing else.” 
[…] What Image shows, Text de-monstrates. It withdraws it in justifying it. 
What Text exposes, Image posits and deposits. What Image configures, Text 
disfigures. What the latter envisages, the former faces down [dévisage]. What 
one paints, the other depicts. But precisely that, their common cause and their 
common thing [chose], oscillates distinctly between the two in a paper-thin 
space: recto the text, verso the image, or vice (image) – versa (text).”147  
In the paper-thin space of the ‘kant’ of the Critique. We will come back to this. 
6. Sense, Body, Subject, Space, Art 
In engaging with Jean-Luc Nancy’s book “The Ground of the Image”, I believe, 
that it is also necessary to mention, if not to analyse properly, those ‘figures’ that 
Nancy had developed in his very diverse body of essays and that he is often using 
and working with in “The Ground of the Image”. “Sense”, “Body”, “Subject”, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 68 
144 Nancy prefers to use the verb to image, rather then to imagine: “allow me to use this verb in a 
sense that is neither ‘to illustrate” nor “to imagine”. “To image” must be heard as a transitive verb 
whose action, however, cannot act as an object.” (The Ground of the Image, p.67)  
145 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 71 
146 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 71 
147 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 78 
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“Space” and “Art” have to be looked at, in so far as the purpose of this project 
allows us, in such a way that we can understand, how they operate in Nancy’s 
thinking in general, because in most cases, Nancy’s understanding and the way he 
employs them differs completely from their traditional meaning. This will also 
allow us to follow much easier Nancy’s frequent shift between the order of 
imagining and imagination. It is also important to think these notions, with Nancy, 
as figures – a thought that operates in figures and not in concepts, because there is 
no fixed presence or identity left for the concept to comprehend or to re-present. 
These notions are not fixed and rigid symbolic structures, they are rather 
belonging to the multiple and fragmented horizon of sense, a shared worldly 
existence. 
In “The Muses”, Nancy reflects on the ‘figure’ and he writes: “A figure that does 
not represent, that does not identify, that is not exemplary, that is only what it is: 
the infinitely singular manner in which a traced line configures by virtue of no 
other essence than the inimitable existence of its singularity. An existence 
immediately lost, a model abandoned, a mold overturned”.148 The ‘figure’ is not 
for the attention or the intention of the subject and is therefore not representation. 
The ‘figure’ is “syncopation, trajectory and interruption, gait and gap, phrase and 
spasm”.149 The ‘figure’ is not image, if we are to understand the image 
metaphysically in relation to presence and if the image “remains caught in the 
ontotheological schema of the image of the invisible”.150 The ‘figure’ is not image 
understood as ideality. The step of the figure is its tracing and its spacing, the 
touch right at the ground, its vestige. ‘Figure’ is “the going-on-of-coming-to-
presence”151. It is the ‘trait’ of the strangeness that characterizes man’s humanity 
and that shows itself as an ‘open intimacy’. The traced line is what ‘con-figures’ 
by virtue of no other essence than the inimitable existence of its singularity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 64 
149 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p.85 
150 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 93 
151 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 64 
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Nancy also explains how the relation of the Idea to the form (the figure) is to be 
understood. The Idea is the form of forms because the Idea is what forms all 
forms, what spaces forms and what causes their free ‘con-figuration’, which is a 
‘con-figuration’ achieved by ordering out of surprise and not an operational 
ordering – a ‘con-figuration’ that is making before matching.152 And Nancy 
argues, that if this is accepted, then the Idea is the gesture of painting; it is the first 
painting. This implies then that the painting in no way, can it be the copy of the 
Idea. For Nancy, the Idea is the gesture, the ‘monster’ that is monstrative in giving 
or in being the sign that warns. In this case, the Idea is neither beautiful, nor ugly, 
nor true or false, because, the Idea becomes all this only after its idealization. At 
first, the Idea is only gesture, only that what “comes forward here”153. But this 
gesture is never the same and the line that it traces, the ‘trait’, is always different. 
They are always different, always singularly different, always unique and always 
the traits of a different ‘monster’. In relation to each other, all these tracings of 
traces are the “tekhné mimetike” of the infinite finite gesture, the showing of its 
own manner, a con-figuration in the absence of any figure.154 
Nancy’s idea of the image as acceding to infinity and to exteriority challenges 
both Hegel’s concept of ‘naming’ (in the sense of forming) as conceptualizing 
sensible forms into intelligible forms, and Heidegger’s concept of the work of art 
and language as ways to truth, to ‘aletheia’. However, Nancy observes, that in 
1929, when he wrote “Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics”, Heidegger does 
not mention yet ‘aletheia’. He speaks however of the Idea that seems to sit in for 
‘aletheia’, the term that will be used later on. In this case, the Idea or ‘eidos’ plays 
in first place the role of the veiling/unveiling, of the appearance of 
seeing/showing. In “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” (1931/32, 1940)155, Heidegger 
explains that Greek meaning of ‘eidos’ or Idea was that of ‘visible form’, but not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 E. H. Gombrich, The Sense of Order. A Study in the Psychology of Decorative Art, London: 
Phaidon Press Limited, 2006, p. 5: “the minimal schema is first constructed before it is modified 
or corrected by matching it against reality”  
153 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 79 
154 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 79 
155 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, edit. William McNeill, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007, 8th printing, p. 155-182 
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with the meaning of a mere aspect. The Idea as a visible form had also something 
of a “stepping forth” whereby a thing presented itself. This visible form was the 
way being itself showed itself. In its original meaning, the Idea was the visible 
form of something that provided a look at what a being is in each case. In Greek 
thinking Ideas enabled things to appear in their whatness and to be present in their 
constancy. “The ideas are what is in everything that is. Therefore, what makes 
every idea be capable as an idea – in Plato’s expression: the idea of all ideas – 
consists in making possible the appearing, in all its visibility, of everything 
present. The essence of every idea certainly consists in making possible and 
enabling the shining that allows a view of the visible form.”156 The thing as its 
own image remains thus veiled, but at the same time, in being its own image it 
also shows or unveils itself. This however implies the fact that at least in the 
beginning Heidegger went for the possibility of truth as Idea in the image, and 
changed it later to ‘aletheia’, as the truth that forms its path across Lethe, the river 
of forgetting, that forces its way out of the dark in the light (‘phos’) of the 
revealed phenomenon (‘phainasthai’). The Idea that, at least at the beginning, 
belongs to ‘aletheia’ is the ‘eidos’ as the ‘showing-itself’, “the carrying-itself-
outwardly of every aspect” and this can implie and demand, that there must be an 
‘eidos’ of ‘aletheia’, which is: there must be a self-showing of the unshowable.  
“However, idea is not subordinate to unhiddenness in the sense of serving 
what is unhidden by bringing it to appearance. Rather, the opposite is the 
case: it is the shining (the self-showing) that, within its essence and in a 
singular self-relatedness, may yet be called unhiddenness. The idea is not 
some foreground that aletheia puts out there to present things; rather, the 
idea is the ground that makes aletheia possible. But even as such the idea 
still lays claim to something of the original but unacknowledged essence 
of aletheia.”157 
 Nancy mentions, that the Platonic idea is for Heidegger (as he refers to it in 
“Plato’s Doctrine of Truth”) a yoke imposed on aletheia, a ground of presence that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, edit. William McNeill, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007, 8th printing, p. 155-182 
157 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, edit. William McNeill, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007, 8th printing, p. 155-182, in: Pathmarks, edit. William McNeill, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, 8th printing, p. 173 
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makes this movement of unveiling and withdrawal to shift into a veiling-unveiling 
of presence as “Anwesen and not Vorhanden”.158 
Heidegger writes there: “Unhiddenness” now means: the unhidden always as what 
is accessible thanks to the idea’s ability to shine. But insofar as the access is 
necessarily carried out through “seeing”, unhiddenness is yoked into a “relation” 
with seeing, it becomes “relative” to seeing. Thus toward the end of Book VI of 
the Republic Plato develops the question: What makes the thing seen and the act 
of seeing be what they are in their relation? What spans the space between them? 
What yoke […] holds the two together? The “allegory of the cave” was written in 
order to illustrate the answer, which is set forth in the image: the sun as source of 
light lends visibility to whatever is seen. […]”159    
Nancy focuses his thinking on that which is the “remainder”, exteriority, that 
which resists becoming visible and knowable – that remains always in a form of 
becoming and that resists ‘naming’, but which nevertheless is not anything that 
can be neglected and which we have to keep trying to attain. In this case, we 
speak of presence not as presence of something – “als-etwas” (Mersch) – but of a 
presence of withdrawal and absence, a delayed and deferred presence that exposes 
itself as such and as a becoming. Dieter Mersch (in following Heidegger) refers to 
this “remainder” or excess or surplus as the presence that comprises the four 
moments of: ‘ek-sistence’, ‘ek-cedence’, ‘ek-stasis’ and ek-phanes. It is in the 
prefix ‘ek-‘, where we encounter (in its withdrawal already) the indefiniteness and 
indetermination, indescribability and irreducibility of this excess and surplus of 
meaning in its movement of irruption and emergence.160  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 88 
159 Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, 155-182, in: Pathmarks, edit. William McNeill, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 8th printing, p. 173 
160 Dieter Mersch, Negative Präsenz, S. 99-117, in: Arno Böhler, Susanne Granzer (Hg), Ereignis 
Denken. TheatRealität, Performanz, Ereignis, Passage Verlag, 2009: “ […] die Exposition einer 
doppelten Erfahrung, einmal von Präsenz als einer nicht ausreichbaren, nicht negierbaren 
Erfahrung, zum anderen aber als eines Überschlusses, einer “Ex-zedenz”, wie man sagen könnte, 
die nichts anderes beschreibt als Erfahrung jener bereits erwähnten Existenz – einer “Ex-sistenz” 
freilich, wie man präzisieren müsste, die den Wortsinn des “Ex-“ herausstreicht und sowohl dessen 
Unbestimmbarkeit oder Undarstellbarkeit betont als auch seine reflexive Unverzichtbarkeit oder 
Notwendigkeit. Durch das “Ex-”, die Exposition, vermag die Erfahrung der Existenz darin – und 
das bezeichnet die entscheidende “Wende” der Argumentation – ihrerseits in eine ekstatische 
Positivität umzuschlagen, wobei “Ex-sistenz”, mit einem Bindestrich, sowie “Ek-stasis”, ebenfalls 
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6.1.  Subject 
Nancy’s early writings can and have to be seen in the context of the shared sense 
of the shift that started in the 20th century, in the Western philosophical tradition, 
from the tendency to anchor the philosophical thought in a fixed point of origin to 
“the loss of any founding or transcendental signifier which centers philosophical 
or epistemological systems on a point of origin or moment of presence”161. This 
is: the decentering of the concept of structure and the loss of any foundation or 
origin, the surpassing of metaphysics and the overturning of its foundations. 
Nancy reflects on and analyses this shift through the complex engagement with 
the writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger and their specific attempts to overcome 
this tradition. For Nancy this means the fundamental reworking of the 
foundational concepts of philosophy itself, especially the concept of subjectivity 
and the relation between philosophy and literature, between philosophical thought 
and the language of fiction, including its aspects of style, form, exposition or 
presentation. For Nancy, the subject is not an autonomous self-grounding entity 
and he attempts to overturn this traditional understanding of the subject. He also 
aims to overthrow the ultimately subjective essence of perception. He questions 
the foundations and grounding of philosophy through engaging with the fact that 
philosophy and literature cannot allow a rigid separation between them. He 
believes that philosophical discourse is embedded in the contingencies of 
language and emphasizes that style, form or other literary devices are part of the 
thought itself. The philosophical language is itself fiction or fable and is thus 
bound inevitably to its own metaphors, figures, tropes and style. This 
displacement of the categories of literature and philosophy implies two things: the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mit einem Bindestrich, das Gleiche meinen: das Moment des Heraustretens, das die Kraft besitzt, 
den Bezug zu “wenden” und den Blick zu fesseln und anzusprechen, das heißt überhaupt erst 
unsere Handlungen und Denkakte als Antworten hervorzubringen. In seinem Aufsatz Was heißt 
Denken? ist Martin Heidegger einer ähnlichen Überlegung nachgegangen, die die Inversion der 
Bedeutung des Denkens zu dem einschloss, was “ins” Denken “heißt” oder “ruft”, mithin den 
Bezug erst stiftet. Mit dem dreifachen Präfix des “Ex-“ oder “Ek-” von Ex-sistenz, Ex-zedenz, oder 
Ek-stasis, dem noch die Ek-phanes als viertes Moment hinzuzufügen sein wird, ist, so die These, 
jene Unverneinbarkeit oder Irreduzibilität angezeigt, die diese ursprüngliche Stiftung 
apostrophiert, welche den Kern eines nicht metaphysisch oder substantialistisch prätendierten 
Präsenzbegriffs im Sinne des ästhetischen beziehungsweise “aisthetischen” Erscheinens oder 
Ereignens ausmacht.” (p.101)  
161 Ian James, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy. The Fragmentary Demand, 
Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2006  
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overcoming of metaphysics, as already mentioned, and the pushing of the 
boundary between the two to the limit, which implies again the rethinking of the 
limits imposed by metaphysics. For Nancy, philosophical thought is a process and 
a pathway and not the laying of foundations, as it was the case in the tradition of 
philosophical discourse from Plato to Kant. The way Nancy thinks the subject, 
allows the subject to persist only “in being-outside-of-itself”, in its radical 
exteriority that is irreducible to any order of the symbolic or to any logic of a 
‘sub-iectum’, of a ground. For him the philosophical subject persists, but only in 
an exposure to the absence and the withdrawal of any kind of ground. The subject 
is infinitely exposed to its own excess and exceeds any possibilities of description 
or theoretical thinking. The thought of the thinking subject is held ‘syncopated’ 
within the repetition of this paradoxical moment. This thought is also radically 
different from the traditional understanding of thought as the work of concepts, 
since there is no presence or identity, which the concept aims to comprehend and 
to re-present. This thought operates in figures, as figures do not coincide with and 
are not identical to what they speak about. The logic of the figure is of a 
nonidentity in which the difference to what is figured is part of the figure itself. 
“The figure figures the unfigurable”.162 Terms, like sense, community, 
corpus/body, being or art, used by Nancy in his writings never refer or signify an 
identity, they always “excribe” a certain excess of signification and existence and 
function in the paradoxical logic of a ‘Dardichtung’ of presentation and 
withdrawal.  
6.2. Sense 
Both, ‘sense’ and ‘sens’, the English and the French word are polysemantic 
concepts. Sense can refer to direction, intuition, reason, the five senses, or to 
meaning. Nancy is making use in his thinking of the whole semantic field of the 
word ‘sense’, fact that gives the word sometimes an ambiguous meaning. He also 
prefers to use ‘sense’ in order to make a difference from ‘meaning’ or 
‘signification’, which would relate to a rather fixed and rigid structure. In Nancy’s 
concept ‘sense’ is before and beyond signification, it takes place before the 	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separation between the sensible and the intelligible. ‘Sense’ for Nancy is also a 
mater of the five senses or ‘singular senses’. ‘Sense’ in Nancy’s thinking is the 
sense of being as being with. “We” are the sense, not in terms of signifying 
something or having a meaning, but as sense that takes place in our sharing of a 
simultaneous time-space.163  
Nancy’s account of ‘sense’ is that sense is the stuff of shared sensible/intelligible 
worldly existence and takes thus an ontological status. Sense is the sense of a 
worldly and material existence, which always already ‘makes sense’. In the usual 
account of sense our human world has meaning or makes sense, but for Nancy, 
our human world only ever exists as sense. Sense is that which appears in the 
phenomenon and exceeds the phenomenon164. Sense is excess, surplus of the 
being in being itself.  Sense is the ‘real’ of the world, the multiple, fragmented, 
and shared worldly existence. And, therefore, he believes that philosophy is 
exposed to an offering of sense at the limit of signification. Nancy writes: “the 
sense of existence, that is or that makes sense, the existence without which sense 
would not exist; equally, the sense that exists or produces existing, without which 
there would be no sense”165. This is, that sense is being and existence of the 
world. Sense is that, that can be touched, sensed. Nancy thinks sense as the 
immediate way of making sense and in relation to an embodied sensory 
materiality and not, as already said, in relation to the symbolic order. Sense is pre-
linguistic; it is a sensible, intelligible, touchable immediacy. A body. This 
thinking of sense lead to a rethinking of the political, of the community as a being 
together of bodies that make sense of the world. For Nancy, sense exists, takes 
place only in/as and between singular bodies that come in contact with each other 
and are exposed to each other and to themselves. Sense is always singular and 
local and happens in a certain place and a certain time and he calls a singular and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Martta Heikkilä, Community, the Political, and the Indecidable: Jean-Luc Nancy and the 
Shared Origin of Art, p. 1- 18, in: International Yearbook of Aesthetics, Vol. 9, 2005, Ed. Arto 
Haapala, Helsinki: University of Helsinki 
164 Jean-Luc Nancy, A Finite Thinking, p. 3-30, in: A Finite Thinking, edit. Simon Sparks, 
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165 Jean-Luc Nancy, A Finite Thinking, p. 3-30, in: A Finite Thinking, edit. Simon Sparks, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003 
	   66	  
local taking place of sense  “corpus”.166  In Nancy’s concept, community is a 
”being-in-common” and “being-with”. Being has not other sense than this sense 
that is being in community and sense that happens “between us”. Nancy’s “being-
with” is a radicalization of Heidegger’s “Mitsein”, it is the absolute value of 
being, its “transcendental condition” that precedes any consciousness and 
intentionality and presence. The opening of sense takes place and is “between-us”. 
We are sense and our existence presents itself as sense; we expose ourselves to 
ourselves. “We co-appear” (comparaissons), and this appearing (partition) is 
sense”.167   
6.3. Body 
Traditionally, the body is understood as a signifying or symbolic entity and a way 
to express and articulate cultural identity and meaning, and not in terms of a 
material or corporeal being. In opposing this view, Nancy’s thinking of the body 
turns towards its materiality, its matter in relation to a certain technicity or to a 
technical apparatus.  
Nancy’s figure of the ‘body’ is similar and related to Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’. In 
both cases, ‘body’ and ‘Dasein’ have no pre-existing signification, because they 
are always already in an excess of signification, and both are used for naming or 
referring also to ‘sense’ or ‘being’. They ‘make’ sense and sense ‘takes place’ in 
both in a singular way. However, Nancy sees ‘Dasein’ as a corporeal materiality, 
so he uses ‘body’ with the aim to stress and to expose its bodily aspects, the 
embodied materiality of existence. In his reworking of the “body” concept, he 
refers to and reflects again on the limit of signification and sense. The way Nancy 
looks at the body is in a manner of engaging with its immediate materiality, in a 
manner of touching or contact at the limit, in which sense and signification and 
the material are thought together. There are two key ideas that characterizes his 
understanding of the body: on the one hand he aims to overturn the traditional 
thinking of the body that resulted from the Christian tradition and from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Martta Keikkilä, Jean-Luc Nancy and the Intimate Distance of Art, in: www.corpus-
aesthetics.net/, June 2009. Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, 2008 
167 Martta Heikkilä, Community, the Political, and the Indecidable: Jean-Luc Nancy and the 
Shared Origin of Art, p. 1- 18, in: International Yearbook of Aesthetics, Vol. 9, 2005, Ed. Arto 
Haapala, Helsinki: University of Helsinki 
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concepts of the mind/body relation, and, on the other hand, Nancy’s close link to 
the phenomenological thought. In his attempt to think the body, Nancy makes use 
of the figure of “touch”, which has been analysed by Derrida in his book “On 
Touching, Jean-Luc Nancy” (2000) as a key player around which Nancy’s 
thinking turns. 
Body is for Nancy the place, which is “the taking place of sense” – in and as 
matter, in the middle of matter - and bodies are those who articulate at first hand 
place. The body is the limit, the touching point where sense and matter touch and 
come into contact. At this limit and touching point, occurs the opening of a world 
and of the event of being (‘Ereignis’). The body discloses existence at the point of 
contact between discourse and matter, but Nancy insists, they “take place neither 
in discourse nor in matter”.168 Bodies take place at the limit, as the limit at the 
intersection of the unknown/unseen/untouchable to the continuity of sense within 
the continuity of matter. The body as the corporeal is thought as an event at the 
limit of sense and, at the same time, also as a rupture and discontinuity within the 
continuity of sense and within the continuity of matter. Body for Nancy is a finite 
corporeal existence that is and makes sense and discloses a world not through 
gathering of its own identity and self-identity, but through a movement of 
dispersal and dissemination, of passage. 
Bodies touch each other and, at the same time, they touch the limit of signification 
and make sense in terms of and as a ‘transgression’: they cross each other while 
keeping the distinction and by not establishing continuity; they leap into each 
other without being interlinked. As Nancy writes in relation to the image, bodies’ 
touch is a “shock”, a “confrontation”, a “tête-a-tête” and a “rapport”. Bodies are 
distinct and heterogeneous, the “unbindable just at the distance of touch”.169 He 
writes: “ The body is the extension of the soul to the extremities of the world and 
to the confines of the self, each intricated [intriqué] with the other and indistinctly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 
p. 17 
169 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 4 
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distinct, extended, stretched [étendue tendue] to the point of rupture.”170 Thus Ian 
James explains: “The spatial temporal event of being, as the extension or exposure 
of sense to impenetrable matter, (that is the body) does not permit the world to be 
seen in terms of substances, or of the presence and self-presence of things, rather 
it must always be seen in terms of this separation and distancing of sense, which 
is also an event of touch, spacing, sharing, position, and disposition.”171  
Bodies are “finite bodily sense” that ‘make’ sense. On the one hand, ‘Being’ is for 
Nancy in following Heidegger’s thinking, not to be thought as a constant 
presence, but rather as “coming into presence” or “presentation”. The “event of 
being” is always a “coming” and a “borne into presence”. And, on the other hand, 
“Being” is for Nancy always a radicalisation of Heidegger’s “Mitsein”: it is 
always a “being-with”, as the transcendental condition of “Being”. Being is or 
makes sense only as “being-with”, which is, that sense is or makes sense only as a 
“sharing of a simultaneous time-space”.172 Sense may take place only “in” and 
“between” us and it takes place in bodies only ‘in’ and ‘between’ a community of 
bodies that are exposed to themselves, sharing and making this sense.  
6.3.1. Body as “partes extra partes” (parts outside parts) 
As we have seen by now, what preoccupies Nancy is the event of appearance,  
when it forges ahead and discloses a world, a moment of creation without ground 
and without purpose. In this context, body or bodies and sense space themselves 
in a total exposure to each other, by remaining in contact with each other, while at 
the same time keeping a distance from each other. There is no overall structure to 
support them into subjects or other identities. The relation between these parts 
outside parts is thus a relation of exteriority and ‘effraction’ – the elements of a 
material body exist always also outside of each other and are never in the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Quotation after: Ian James, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy. The 
Fragmentary Demand, Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 138, from: Jean-
Luc Nancy, Poesie 99, 2002, p. 83 
171 Ian James, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy. The Fragmentary Demand, 
Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 138 
172 Martta Heikkilä, Community, the Political and the Indecidable: Jean-Luc Nancy and the Shared 
Origin of Art, p.1-18, in: International Yearbook of Aesthetics. Ontology, Art, and Experience: 
Perspectives from West and East, Vol. 9, 2005, edit. Arto Haapala, in: 
www2.eur.nl/fw/hyper/IAA/Yearbook/iaa9/Yearbook9.pdf, June 2009 
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place. Bodies are of impenetrable matter and they gain their meaning only from 
the outside – they are touched, seen, sensed from this exterioriority from which 
they are in touch and at the same time at distance.  
Nancy borrows the notion of the “partes extra partes” from Merleau-Ponty, who 
invoked this phrase in his book: “Phenomenology of Perception”. Merleau-Ponty 
explains the structure of the “partes extra partes” as an object that takes up only 
an exterior and mechanical relation between his parts and in connection to other 
objects. This relation can either be transmitted or received or it can be a variable 
relation or function. So, for Merleau-Ponty this relation is an exterior and 
mechanical one. However, Nancy will adopt the phrase, but at the same time he 
will develop it in relation to the Greek term “tekhné”, which refers to a know how 
and practical labor, to craft.  For Nancy, the ‘original technicity’ of our world is 
the sharing of embodied existence that opens thus a world. The ‘partes extra 
partes’ is the technical-mechanical relation of sense between material bodies that 
exposes material bodies in their ‘contact-separation’ relation between matter and 
sense. Material bodies exist as ‘techné’, as the interconnection and ‘co-
articulation’ of a technical apparatus. The structure of “partes extra partes” is not 
anymore thought as a pre-theoretical or pre-scientific dimension of experience (as 
it was the case in other phenomenological attempts), and in relation to the 
opposition between an original disclosure of the world and the realm of the 
scientific and technical knowledge of the world. It is more an originary technicity 
that is an embodied ‘effraction’ that takes place as a touch in the distance of sense 
and matter.      
6.3.2.  Touch 
With Nancy we have to see ‘touch’ as the touch of sense in general and of all 
senses. Touch is “the proper moment of sensible exteriority, it presents it as such 
and as sensible”. Touch makes one feel and sense what is to be sensed – “the 
proximity of the distant, the approximation of the intimate” (Nancy). Touch is 
“the general extension and particular extraposition of sensing [sentir]”.  It forms 
one body with sensing or it makes of sensing a body; it is the corpus of the senses. 
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Touch is what opens continuity in distinct places and contrasted values. It is what 
figures the figure that offers itself now to our gaze.173 
Touch is the figure of that unique place or point of contact between the body in its 
materiality and the soul, mind or thought. And Derrida argues that Nancy employs 
the figure of touch in order to “resist, in the name of touch, all idealism and all 
subjectivism, whether it be transcendental or psychoanalytic”174 and emphasizes 
Nancy’s turn towards the real: “ touch remains for Nancy the motif of a kind of 
absolute realism, irredentist and postdeconstructive […] An absolute realism, but 
irreducible to all traditional forms of realism”.175 Touch is a way for Nancy to 
engage with the experience of embodiment and material existence and to move 
beyond the inherited traditional concept of the body. In doing this, Nancy 
privileges presence, immediacy, the instant, the ‘here-and-now’, in the 
imminence-of, but he also understands touching in terms of punctuality, 
discontinuity, fragmentation, partition and sharing. Touching is a contact that 
nevertheless interrupts itself in the act of self-touching. Therefore, touch is also an 
affirmation of that which seeks to exceed. However, Derrida’s critique here is that 
even if the touch invoked by Nancy might be discontinuous and fragmented 
interrupting itself as itself, it still remains in a certain way anchored in the horizon 
of an origin. 
6.4. Space 
In order to understand Nancy’s notion of space and how it evolved from and 
exceeded the traditional concept, we would have to look back and follow the 
thinking of space in Aristotle, Descartes, Newton, Leibnitz or Kant to name only a 
few, after which we would have to go over to the phenomenological account of 
space in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. However this is not the place to 
engage with this kind of complex analysis (and this is the case for all other 
figures, for ‘subjectivity’, ‘body’, or ‘art’), so I will allow myself to only mention 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 79  
174 Quotation after: Ian James, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy. The 
Fragmentary Demand, Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 118  
175 Jaques Derrida, On Touching. Jean-Luc Nancy, Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 
2005, p. 118 
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those characteristics that are necessary and helpful for the reading of “The Ground 
of the Image”.  
Space is thought in relation to “embodiment” – we experience space in 
embodying it in a spatio-temporal occurrence. Thus space for Nancy is not a 
geometrical space; moreover, it is something that is prior to the traditional 
understanding of space. It is space as spacing and exteriority; it is expansion, 
display, deconvolution, unfolding. Surface: ‘sur-face’, as an "outermost boundary 
of anything, outside part”, where we trace back a ‘face’176 from the Latin meaning 
of “facere” and the prefix ‘sur-‘ to the Latin ‘super’. This would thus refer to a 
beyond or surplus of a ‘making’ and therefore of ‘tekhne’. ‘Sur-’‘s meaning from 
above might also refer to Nancy’s notion of a ground out of layers of layers on 
layers, but not only in terms of one ‘above’ the other or a accumulation of layers 
covering each other, but of an ‘above all’ as the one that retreats in a singular 
distinct occurrence. An ‘above’ that spaces itself in between like the Latin 
‘cumulus’ or the Greek ‘kyein’, that swells and gathers – or provokes a gathering. 
Our experience of space is closely linked to ‘sense’, since an intelligible world 
occurs only through a spatial-temporal disclosure for Nancy from which we then 
experience ‘world-hood’. Existence is sense and sense happens in, between and as 
bodies and thus sense is thought from Nancy’s point of view as, “a bodily 
ontology”. Heidegger’s notion of the event of appropriation, as “Ereignis” 
influenced Nancy’s understanding of space – who thinks the world in terms of a 
common ‘being-in-the-world’ and as a sharing of sense. Thus space is for Nancy 
an opening or an event that opens time as space as such. Space becomes thus the 
spacing of space. It is more an ungraspable ‘coming’ that is ‘infinitely 
presupposed’. Space occurs in Nancy’s thinking as position, dis-position, spacing, 
touch, tact, or contact. Space is an ‘unfolding’, an expansion, a ‘pace’ in the 
course of which time and space are made distinct. It is the originary (and co-
originary) ‘spatializing-temporalizing’ event of appropriation, similar to an 
“Ereignis” in Heideggerian terms. However, space in Nancy doesn’t allow any 
possibility of ‘sheltering’. It is radical opening and exteriority of existence that is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 In Muses, Nancy explains ‘vestigium’, which is a trace or the sole of a foot as the most 
dissimulated ‘face’ (or surface of the body), word that comes “from a root that means “to pose, to 
set”: to pose, present, expose without reference to anything. (The Muses, p. 97) 
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always already outside of itself and thus ‘ek-sistence’. It is the opening of 
something that cannot be appropriated. Always in movement – mobile, adaptable, 
versatile, migratory, voluble, rolled-out, wrapped, fluent, portable: sense-space 
rolls and wraps itself in the body and as the body; body carries space and sense 
with it and sense is carried, trans-ported in the body from body to body. “A 
mobile extension, spacings, geological and cosmological displacements, drifts, 
sutures and fractures in archi-continents of sense, in immemorial tectonic plates 
under our feet, under our history. The body is the architectonics of sense.” (The 
italics are Nancy’s.)177 
The body is for Nancy the opening of space, of a shared space and of the space 
between the bodies and the body is what spaces and separates. In this sense, space 
is concrete, corporeal material, a “place of existence”. The sense of spacing is 
what constitutes the world and its beings in their discreteness and distance from 
each other, which is also the “absolute difference of appearance”.178  Being is 
what comes as a surprise, as a birth to presence and as the spacing of its figure or 
form. This ‘coming-into-presence’ is the infinite arrival of being.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 
p. 25  
178Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 19  
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(Still images of “a copy of a copy of a copy …of the original version provided by the artists 
Marina Abramovic and Ulay of their performance “Expanding in space”, 32 minutes, Documenta 
6, Kassel, 1977) 
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6.5. Art and the Artwork 
In art and in the image, we have to distinguish – and this counts for every work – 
between the image and the ‘vestige’. In each work there is something that operates 
in relation to and calls for the identification of the model or a cause, however 
there is also something that only proposes or exposes merely ‘some thing’. What 
it exposes can be anything – ‘merely a thing’ – but the way it exposes it, is the 
very precise mode of the vestigial presence. This is to say, that every artwork is “a 
singular concept, lodged as a foreign body”179, that oscillates between the absence 
of naming and its material presence and matter, between the Idea and the image. 
Between ‘Dichtung’180 and ‘Darstellung.  
The ‘vestigium’ is the sensible itself in its being created, Nancy explains, and it is 
in the sensible or as the sensible the way in which the image effaces and 
withdraws. Here, in the ‘vestigium’, the Idea leaves only its trace, the mark of its 
disappearance. The Idea in the vestigial presence is neither imprint of its form nor 
self-imitation, but that which is or that remains when there was no self-imitation 
taken place. Nancy also claims that all theories around the issue of imitation are 
indeed theories of imitation, but also theories of the image and of the Idea, which 
is understood as the self-imitation of being. In reversing this thought, Nancy 
concludes that all thinking about the Idea is also thinking about the image. In this 
sense, what is at stake in all this debates, Nancy asserts, is that they are all to a 
certain extent theological, since they reflect on the visibility of the invisible as 
such, or on the “ideality made present”.         
For Plato, the work of art is beautiful in so far as it is “ekphanestaton”, that what 
is most shining. The shining is the shining of the “true face” of nature that is 
exhibited, presented in the work of art. The true face is the “eidos” and the most 
beautiful is truth itself. For Plato, beauty is the manifestation of truth. The “eidos” 
at its most visible presence is Idea, the concept of all concepts. Art can provide an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
1996 
180 For an analysis of the word “Dichtung” and the problems of its translation cf. also: Jacques 
Derrida, Demeure. Fiction and Testimony, p. 15-103, in: Maurice Blanchot, The Instant of My 
Death, Jacques Derrida, Demeure. Fiction and Testimony, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford 
California: Stanford University Press, 2000  
	   75	  
image of truth, but because truth appears here through something else, trough the 
image, the work of art remains always incomplete. The work of art is an 
incomplete presentation of truth, as the imitation of truth. The work of art is the 
sensuous presentation of truth. In the historical context of Western philosophy, 
this was the moment when the work of art was related to the concepts of truth and 
imitation. In his “Aesthetics”, Hegel re-inscribed the Platonic conception of art as 
imitation of truth, voicing beauty as ‘the sensuous shining of the Idea.  
In all these cases, the beautiful is a metaphysical concept and it was Heidegger 
who tried to think of the work of art outside Metaphysics.  Art remains the 
production of beautiful things, but he asks, what does the work of art reveal more 
that its own process of production? He questions, if that, what is revealed in the 
work, is not “aletheuein” – the truth in the Aristotelian sense of establishing 
oneself in the world, the sate of revealing the revealing181. The work of art is for 
Heidegger the truth at work, the occurrence of truth. But what kind of truth?  
Heidegger speaks of the essence or Wesen of truth in several places in his 
writings and his understanding of it changed in relation to the way he shifted the 
meaning of ‘essence’ or Wesen from its traditional meaning of possibility, ground 
or existence to the meaning of ‘to linger, to dwell in a place’. In the course of his 
lecture, “On the Essence of Truth”, Heidegger developed his understanding of the 
essence of truth not from the Latin word, but from the German word ‘wesan’. 
‘Wesen’ or ‘Wesenheit’ refers in its old sense to something that is ongoing, 
unfolding, that is taken it’s time, dwelling – similar to Heidegger’s understanding 
of Dasein as ‘being-in-the-world’, an ‘in’ coming from the old Germanic world 
‘innan’, to dwell. Thus the new way to understand it brings essence very close to 
‘ousia’, the Greek world that refers to a dwelling place. Thus existence is the 
essence of truth insofar as it operates in terms of veiling and disclosure. In this 
sense, truth is ‘aletheia’, the veiling-unveiling. However, existence discloses the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Heidegger writes: “ Eine dieser Weisen, wie Wahrheit geschieht, ist das Werksein des Werkes. 
Aufstellen eine Welt und herstellend die Erde ist das Werk die Bestreitung jenes Steites, in dem 
die Unverborgenheit des Seiendem im Ganzen, die Wahrheit, erstritten wird. […] Im Offenbaren 
des Zeugseins des Schuhzeuges gelangt das Seiende im Ganzen, Welt und Erde in ihrem 
Widerspiel, in die Unverborgenheit. Im Werk ist die Wahrheit am Werk […] Das ins Werk 
gefügte Scheinen ist das Schöne. Schönheit ist eine Weise, wie Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit 
west.” (The italic’s are Heidegger’s), Martin Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, in: 
Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main: Viitorio Klostermann, 2003, 8. Aufl., p. 42-43 
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world as ‘ek-sistence’, ek-stasis and ek-phanes that is from a particular 
perspective and in a certain way. The very moment ek-sistence uncovers an aspect 
of the world, it also, at the same time hides and shelters, it veils another or an 
other aspect. Because of Being’s ecstatic essence, a being always conceals it’s 
own essence as an existent being that is. Being operates in a doubling way of 
veiling and unveiling, of truth and un-truth or non-truth. Truth is thus not 
transparent clarity. Truth and untruth are not in opposition to each other, on the 
contrary, truth an untruth are different ways of being for truth (‘Wesensarten der 
Wahrheit’). ‘Un-truth’ is for Heidegger the ‘Un-wesen’ of truth. ‘Un-‘ or ‘Non-’ 
is not a negation, but a primordial mode of being older than truth itself, an ‘Ab-
grund’, an abyss, the withdrawal of any ground. Thus essence and non-essence 
belong equally to truth and are different modes of being for truth. Truth will never 
be full and complete presence. Truth is only possible, if it is, at the same time, 
also impossible. “The essence of truth”, Heidegger writes in “Wegmarken”182, “is 
the truth of essence.” Truth is for Heidegger always the truth of Being and it has 
to be analyzed only in its relation to un-truth, because they are closely interlinked 
and intertwined with each other, in tension, balancing the present and presence in 
the world. What is manifested in the world, what manifests itself is only the 
visible side of the invisible side of the essence of truth. For the metaphysical gaze, 
the essence of truth sheltered in its concealment remains ‘out of sight’, outshined 
by that that shines amidst of visible truth. 
As we know, with Nancy we can speak of a ‘truth’ only insofar this truth is the 
taking place of sense. Truth in Nancy is a truth of taking part in ‘sharing’ and in 
the spatial-temporal ‘partage’ of ‘sense’. Truth is thought as a ‘co-belonging’ and 
‘co-distancing’, as ‘punctuality’ that is the existence as ‘punct’ or puncture. 
Nancy explains that whereas truth punctuates, sense enchains. Truth is determined 
and presented as a piercing in and of exteriority. Thus truth for Nancy is not only 
fixed by, but also opened for the enchainment of sense.  
The work of art is captivation and rapture, withdrawal and self-seclusion of truth. 
It is the danger that exposes the saving power. The work of art is produced and as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Martin Heidegger, On the Essence of Truth, p.136-154, in : Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, edit. 
William McNeill, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 8th printing, p. 153 
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such it marks the end of a process. However, Heidegger follows his thought, the 
work of art seems to be also the starting point for something new, the work’s 
ability to disclose and to manifest. In this sense, the work of art becomes a Da-
sein, a being there that is elsewhere. In “The Origin of the Work of Art” he writes: 
“The singular artwork is always also the production of an artist, yet this being-
produced of the work does not constitute its work-character (Werksein).”183 The 
cause for the origin of the artwork is not to be found in a context outside the work 
of art, but in the artwork itself and in the way it works, in the ‘work-character of 
the work’, “das Werksein des Werkes”. The being of the artwork is its ability to 
put something into and to bring it in the work to work. The artwork is taking place 
of something and is thus not a thing, but an event. And Heidegger claims that the 
artwork is an event of truth, however it is a truth that is developed in the artwork 
for which the artwork opens its space. Thus truth is the play between the 
“Lichtung’ and “Verbergung”, between concealing and revealing. It is truth as 
“aletheia”, as the veiling-unveiling, between manifestation and sheltering. For 
Heidegger, art is the mode in which truth happens, “truth’s own setting in to 
work”. The work of art presents something and opens something that it is not 
reducible to the materiality of the artwork. It presents a gathering of a world that 
is not otherwise given.184     
Nancy rejects any definition of art as only imitation or mimesis and also any 
belief that art could be thought in the sense that it gives “an image of some 
determinate and determinable pre-existing reality”. Art exists for Nancy in 
relation to the world, to the shared finite existence of the world and it opens up 
world-hood in its singular-plurality. Art is and exposes a finite, concrete worldly 
existence; it touches and exposes the passage of sense. The artwork is never 
posited as an object of any kind – it is an event that manifests itself. The work of 
art is ‘needlework’ of “inscribing and encrypting glances and gazes”185, and not 
the representation of some thing that exists before or independent from the work 	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of art. Any form of artwork, any painted image, presents to us a world, an 
experience that makes sense, but this sense cannot be reduced to any form of 
signification. Artworks affect us, they stimulate our senses, and they touch us in a 
specific way, in a way that cannot be achieved through the discourses of 
signification. Art not only touches existence and sense, but it makes sense. Sense 
is here a density, thickness or mass, a passage or site of material and bodily 
existence. The artwork exposes both in a sensible and in an intelligible way 
physicality and materiality as such.  
Ian James argues186, that Nancy gained his understanding of art also from his 
specific reading of Hegel’s ideas about art. In the work of art the universal spirit is 
presented in “an individualized and sensuously particularized configuration”. For 
Hegel, art is the unity between the ideal content and the material, the sensuous 
form. Art has a continuation in history and it traverses different periods, periods in 
which the spirit emerges in different configurations. For Hegel, art is closely 
linked to the realm of the five senses, with a privilege for the senses of sight and 
hearing. Hegel’s philosophy embraces the dialectical method through which the 
human mind gains its freedom from its contingent material environment and 
becomes absolute knowledge or spirit. The human understanding is able to 
differentiate between different concepts and categories and to reflect on them. The 
result of this reflection is the discovery of the contradictions contained in them 
and the production of new and higher categories that absorb the previous ones and 
thus resolve their contradictions. In relation to this, art is for Hegel also this 
conciliation of opposites. These opposites are firstly, the ideal content, the Idea 
and secondly, the form in which the ideal content is presented or presents itself. 
The human mind progresses in its rational and practical activities and overreaches 
itself through the idealization of everything around the spirit. Hegel differentiates 
various stages in which the mind relates itself to the objective world and 
progresses towards becoming the pure spirit. The contradictions of each stage are 
overcome in the next stage. Art in his historical movement has three phases: the 
symbolic art, the classical art, and the romantic art. The stage of the symbolic art 
is for Hegel the art of the ancient Egypt and of the East. Architecture was the 	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main form of art of this period. In this stage the spirit is confused and 
undeveloped and has difficulties in finding the “right” sensuous form to present 
itself. In the classical period, which was the period of the Greek art with sculpture 
as is main form, the spirit manifests itself in the perfect form of the figure of the 
Greek Gods, as these figures were already the harmonic and perfect unity between 
an ideal content and form. The stage of the romantic art period begins with the 
incarnation of God in the figure of Christ; which is the beginning of the Christian 
era. In this stage, art knows already, so Hegel, a regress, as it loses the perfect, 
harmonic unity of ideal content and form.  But, at the same time, it seeks to 
express a spirituality that is far more developed than the one expressed in the 
figures of the Greek Gods. The romantic art deals with a “free-concrete 
spirituality”, as an excess of “a spirituality toward the spiritually inward”. The 
most important art form is now poetry – “the universal art of the spirit which has 
become free in itself and which is not tied down for its realization to external 
sensuous material.”187 Poetry is now the universal art of the spirit and it 
symbolises the end of art as a key element in the development of the spirit. The 
inherent limitation of art is its form and this is the contradiction of art that can be 
solved, according to Hegel, only by a new and higher category – philosophy as 
speculative idealism and dialectical method. 
In “Le Portrait de l’art en jeune femme” and in “The Muses” Nancy takes a closer 
look on Hegel’s ideas about art, especially on the progression of art to philosophy 
and on the notion of art as the conciliation of opposites, stating that the dialectical 
movement in art poses more problems than Hegel will allow himself to think of. 
Hegel claims, as we have already seen, that the task of the artwork is to create the 
harmonic unity of the ideal content and the sensuous form, of the Idea and its 
manifestation. And Nancy, following Hegel’s thought in every step, concludes 
that the artistic beauty is the concrete presentation of the absolute and thus the 
absolute is of the order of a ‘concrete’ concept and not an abstraction of a thought. 
From this, Nancy draws the conclusion that the artistic beauty is belonging to 
realm of speculative knowledge, which for Hegel would be the realm of absolute 	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knowledge, of philosophy. Here Nancy forces the Hegelian text and through an 
inversion he comes to the conclusion that, “speculative knowledge is, effectively 
and necessarily, of the same order of presentation as art”.188 
In his next step, Nancy states that the contradiction of art, which Hegel thought to 
be surpassed in poetry, has remained unresolved and it persists not only in poetry 
but also in philosophy. Nancy preoccupied himself with the question of 
presentation (Darstellung) in regard to Kant’s  “Critique of Pure Reason” and he 
looked very closely in his book “The Discourse of the Syncope. Logodaedalus” to 
the relation between “Darstellung” and “Dichtung” emphasizing their distinctive 
rapport characterized simultaneously by distance and by proximity.  
“ We are thus brought back to the partition between the philosophical and 
the mathematical… in the guise of their surreptitious identification. The 
renunciation of elegance and the critical position it forces Kant to occupy 
– or the reverse: the critical position and the renunciation of elegance it 
demands – repeats itself with a desire for elegance. Elegance is the term 
substituted for the presentation of the mathematical opus, and the desire 
for it is the desire to write a book. “Literature” will be name of the object 
of desire of the lost opus. […] a philosopher wishes to be, as a 
philosopher, an author. Or philosophy obliges a philosopher to wish to be 
an author. […] Nothing allows one to distinguish literature, on the one 
hand, from philosophy, on the other.” 189   
For Nancy philosophy and poetry/literature are both at distance and in the 
proximity of each other, because philosophy is unable to draw on its own terms a 
clear line between its language and the language of literature. Nancy agrees with 
Hegel on the inadequacy of presentation in the romantic stage of the art, but he 
doesn’t agree with regard to the contradiction between ideal content and form, 
which for Hegel seemed to be resolved in speculative thinking. For Nancy, both 
art and philosophy are deficient forms for the content they aim to present, because 
this content exceeds any possibility of presentation.  
“Defending philosophical language consists in defending a Dichtung 
which, in itself, has nothing to do with poetry – but which derives from 
Darstellung itself. Darstellung demands a Dichtung, because as 
exposition, it has already been deprived of pure and direct Darstellung. It 	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is therefore exposition that demands, for its Darstellung or by way of its 
Darstellung, a Dichtung. The latter must be the palliative, the cloak of a 
naked and mutilated presentation.“190  
Thus Nancy is asking: 
“In art an immemorial past does not cease to be born anew…This 
immemorial past, whose ’passage’ repeats itself, could this be the repeated 
moment of a coming to presence? Of an arrival that Hegel’s knowledge 
cannot and does not want to know-and yet cannot avoid?” 191 (The italics 
are Nancy’s) 
Nancy is interested in the ontological sense of Hegel’s thinking and he believes 
that the dialectical unfolding of the spirit toward absolute knowledge is 
fundamentally linked to the objective world, to how human reality manifests 
itself. Truth in Hegelian sense has a meaning only in relation to its manifestation, 
presentation and appearance. Truth appears and presents itself always for 
someone, for itself and for the spirit in general. In the introduction to Aesthetics, 
Hegel writes: “Art liberates the true content of phenomena from the pure 
appearance and deception of this bad, transitory world, and gives them a higher 
actuality, born of the spirit”.192 For Nancy, Hegel’s concept of history, as the 
history of the unfolding of the spirit toward absolute knowledge, is also history 
understood as the history of the different possibilities of understanding the 
worldly reality and the various manifestations and appearances of the world. Art 
reveals in this history the truth of the world and its understanding. The dialectic is 
for Nancy revelation, it is the appearance of what it makes itself to appear and art 
is the suspension of the dialectical operation, as art is not itself revealing and is 
not revelation. Art is suspended “in-between” poetry and speculative thought; art 
is left “syncopated” (Nancy)193 and as such, it cannot show the development in the 
revelation of truth or spirit. Art is the suspension of the dialectic. It is therefore 	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only pure presentation of pure presentation, the presentation of that what exceeds 
presentation. The sensuous form of the artwork is for Nancy an “offering”: “ the 
singular transmission of art […] would be the offering [offrande] of an offering 
[…]”. The presentation in art is “neither an impresentable, nor a present, neither a 
transcendence, nor an immanence, but the arrival [la venue] or the happening 
[l’advenue] of presentation”.194 
Moreover, Nancy thinks the plural as the origin of art. Whereas Hegel explained 
the existence of different art forms in relation to our different senses, Nancy 
suggests that the plural origin of art is to be tracked backed to the plurality of 
sense. This plurality of sense is “a plurality of the singular instances of sense 
irreducible to any governing principle or unity”.195 Nancy writes: “ The singular-
plural is the law and the problem of ‘art’ as it is of ‘sense’, or of the sense of the 
senses, of the meaningful [sensé] sense of their sensible difference”.196 The plural 
origin of art is the irreducible singular plurality of the senses and not the five 
senses condensed in a higher unity of sense.    
7. The Limit-Experience 
Let us now move to M. Blanchot’s reading of G. Bataille’s “interior-experience” 
or “limit-experience”. Blanchot’s gives us another attempt to appropriate this ‘ex-
cess” and surplus of being and sense. Blanchot (with Bataille) embraces the 
question of the possibility of ek-sistence, of the ek-sistence that includes a 
‘beyond’, the ‘ek-‘, a ‘going-outside’ of being and knowledge, and questions its 
role for the universal man and his life.    
‘The limit-experience’ occurs in man, in the moment when man puts himself 
radically in question. This means that he questions radically those things that he 
himself ordered: the primacy of the subject, its absolute knowledge and its beings. 
This is also the moment when man gives himself entirely to his passion and 	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affirmation of the ‘negative thought’. “Man is already everything”, Blanchot 
writes, because he is “the master of all knowledge, he is capable of everything and 
has the answer for everything”197. The action for and of the future is this 
“negativity” through which man negates nature and negates itself. Blanchot 
writes, that even if man appears to be exhausting this negativity in his actions, he 
is not doing this. He doesn’t engage with all the nothingness he is, he does not 
transform it all in power. Man’s passion is a ‘more’ for the ‘negative thought’ and 
not (or a ‘less’) for the absolute he might reach in the case, he becomes conscious 
of this ‘whole’ and equals the whole himself. The ‘negative thought’ has the 
power to suspend man’s knowledge and in thinking ‘the infinite’ to contest the 
‘whole’.  
It was Hegel who first pointed out the ontological character of ‘the negative 
thought’ or of ‘negativity’. The negative thought, Hegel claims, is an energy that 
disengages the meaning from Being by separating essence from existence. It is the 
energy of “the pure ‘abstract-Ego’ engendering ‘thought’, that is the 
understanding and its discourse”.198  
If man is the ‘universal man’, we have to accept the supposition, that this man is 
‘essentially satisfied’ and that “ as universal man he has nothing more to do […] 
he is without need”.199 Blanchot explains, that the ‘limit-experience’ is the 
experience of the ‘universal man’ who refuses to stop at the sufficiency he has 
attained: “the desire of he who is without desire, the dissatisfaction of he who is 
“wholly” satisfied, pure lack, where there is nonetheless accomplishment of 
being. It is the experience of what is outside the whole when the whole excludes 
every outside”200. The ‘ limit-experience’ is the experience of the “unknown” and 
the “inaccessible”, of that what is to be attained when everything has been 
attained already, and of that that is still to be known when everything is known 	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already. This impossible lack belongs essentially to man and it is what makes him 
unsatisfied, when he is fully satisfied, unknowledgeable when he mastered 
already everything with his knowledge. It is this ‘essential lack’ what makes man 
to always question himself. As man fails to exhaust his negativity, because he 
chooses to continue to put itself in question, he arrives or touches on a state that 
Bataille calls: “a state of negativity without employ”. But this state of “negativity 
without employ” can be also seen as an affirmation of the negation that is 
“without employ”, which is the negation that has nothing more to negate. In 
refusing the path of absolute knowledge, and in turning towards the ‘unknown and 
inaccessible’, man was lead by his desire to ‘sense’ this nothingness in surplus’. 
Through nature’s denial (which is the denial that takes place in every form of 
ideality), Blanchot writes, man “has constructed the world, had put himself to 
work, he has become a producer, a self-producer”. But all this is not enough for 
him, fully satisfied he is seeking for and seeing after the “impossible 
dissatisfaction”. Blanchot writes:  
“But should he come to sense this surplus of nothingness, this 
unemployable vacancy, should he discover himself to be bound to the 
movement that causes him, each time a man dies, to die infinitely, should 
he allow himself to be seized by the infinity of the end, then he must 
respond to another exigency – no longer that of producing but of spending, 
no longer that of succeeding but of failing, no longer that of turning out 
works and speaking usefully but of speaking in vain and reducing himself 
to worklessness: an exigency whose limit is given in the “interior 
experience”.201    
The passion for the ‘negative thought’ does not stop at God, Blanchot and Bataille 
write, it does not stop either at God’s absence, and it is not tempted by the 
principle of ‘unity’ – we can always represent things in another way “in the fire of 
Action and Discourse”. By affirming everything in relation to his existence, by 
comprehending the ‘whole of everything’ in himself and for himself, man created 
the circle and also closed this circle of knowledge. The absolute primacy of the 
subject and of presence made the absolute – understood as a totality of forms – 
knowledgeable and allowed it to be controlled and ordered. Thus the ‘universal 
man’ arrived at the point when he accomplished himself, accomplishing and 
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repeating himself in ‘Discourse’. But, ‘the universal man’ is drawn by the 
‘essential lack’, which relates to him in its withdrawal and which draws the trace, 
‘trait’ of the ‘universal man’, who is now confronted with its own strangeness, its 
own presence with no place in this world.  
For Blanchot, this ‘limit experience’ does what it does in making man to question 
itself and it insists on its questioning and on the possibility of a ‘beyond’ (not in 
theological terms). ‘The limit-experience affirms the ‘beyond’ of the absolute and 
self-sufficient state. It opens the place of and for a surplus, excess, an addition. 
Excess is therefore this possibility that still opens after all possibilities had been 
realized. Georges Bataille speaks here of “impossibility” and Blanchot explains 
this by pointing that “possibility is not the sole dimension of existence”. There are 
two ways in which existence takes place – the first one, is the one in which we 
“comprehend, grasp, bear, master […]” and we do this in relation to the principle 
of unity, and the second one, is the one in which we fail to undergo existence, and 
existence escapes “all employ and all end”. Existence is thus not ‘available’ and 
has no use in this second dimension.202 For Blanchot, this ‘essential lack’, that 
belongs to man and makes him to question himself in the moment in which he had 
accomplished everything and when he thus doesn’t lack anything, this 
“impossibility by which (he) is no longer able to be able, […] without ever falling 
short of what this surplus or addition, this surplus of emptiness, of “negativity”, 
this “essential lack’, is in us, “the infinite heart of the passion of thought”.203 Why 
should this lack belong essentially to man? With Nancy, I will argue that this 
comes from man’s presence as strangeness: ‘I’ is the “being-one-in-the-other”. It 
is the same that never returns to itself, the self outside of itself, that confronts 
itself with itself. The same identifies with itself by being outside of itself, “the 
same that is the same of an identity that alters itself from birth, thirsting after a 
self that has never been self […] who appropriates itself as this very alteration”.204 
The ‘essential lack’ in man is the love for the self one has lost in order to conquer 	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the world and the self. The importance of the ‘limit experience’ lies for Blanchot 
in the “ecstatic ‘loss’ of knowledge”, which is: “[…] the grasping seizure of 
contestation at the height of rupture and dispossession”, and he explains that: “the 
experience is not an outcome. It does not satisfy, it is without value, without 
sufficiency, and only such that it frees all human possibilities from their meaning: 
every knowledge, every speech, every silence, every end, and even this capacity-
for-dying from which we draw our last truths”.205 This excess of knowledge, of 
sense is not non-knowledge, it is not ecstasy understood as invalid knowledge, 
and it is not absurd knowledge. But, it is knowledge beyond an achieved 
knowledge, beyond any form of knowledge as a mode of understanding. It is 
knowledge as a mode of ‘relating’, where any relation is withdrawn and thus 
impossible.   
This excess is the affirmation of the radical negation that has nothing to negate. It 
is affirmation as affirmation and not as product that gets caught up in the 
dialectics of reason. It is the ‘affirmation of affirmation’, a ‘presence without 
anything being present’. It is affirmation without meaning that is without 
negation. This ‘affirmation of affirmation’ gives Being “the status of its new 
sovereignty: the sovereignty of Being without being in the becoming without end 
of a death impossible to die”.206 Being is not anymore pro-ject throwing itself 
ahead of itself towards a always postponed death, not “the discourse of being-
toward-Death, but the writing of the horizontality of the dead and the birth of all 
our bodies’ extension – of all our bodies being more than alive”; only existence as 
spaced bodies, the space of bodies that do not know the fantasy of abolished 
space, death, but space as existence that knows each “body as a dead one, as this 
dead one, sharing with us the extension of it here lies.”207 (The italics are 
Nancy’s.)   
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Thus the ‘limit experience’ is the experience itself. Experience is that which 
cannot be thought, it is thought that “thinks more than it is able by an affirmation 
that affirms more than can be affirmed”.208  Experience is this ‘more’ – an 
experience that affirms only by affirming a surplus, affirming without anything 
being affirmed, affirming therefore nothing. In this affirmation, everything 
escapes and escapes unity and the affirmation itself escapes and escapes unity. It 
is affirmation without unity and unicity. With Nancy, I will argue that this 
affirmation that affirms a surplus, that affirms without affirming and that therefore 
affirms nothingness, is the kind of affirmation that is affirmed in the image, the 
way Nancy figures it out. This affirmation, which in Nancy’s terms would be the 
‘sense’ “that is the world right at or right next to itself, this immanent sense of 
being there and nothing else, comes to show its transcendence there, which is to 
have no sense, to neither engage nor permit its assumption into any kind of Idea 
or End, but to present itself always as its own estrangement.”209 (The italics are 
Nancy’s.) Moreover, Nancy concludes, that if we regard a certain position in time 
and place for a subject as a condition for presence, than we can say that “world 
and man in the world” is “the presentation of a presence without presence, 
because the world itself has neither time, nor place, nor subject”. The world is 
“pure and simple monstrous presentation”210. This affirmation then, affirms being 
without being or essence that founds it. Being that exists there in its sovereignty. 
This affirmation intertwines in Bataille’s view with the ‘multiple’ and the 
‘chance’ and it is an affirmation that cannot maintain itself as an ‘experience of 
non-experience’, This is due to the fact, that it is threatened to become misused 
and to turn into a force that wants itself to be the truth and thus to turn into the 
‘intractable’ (Nancy) that affirms its domination. At the same time, it cannot be 
the sovereignty of the Hegelian Spirit that takes possession of the world in first 
place and grounds as such its domination. However, it is a sovereignty that has to 
be completely different from domination; it is sovereignty that is not exercised 	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over anything. It is sovereignty that remains unexercised because it is nothing else 
than absolute sovereignty that as an absolute exceeds itself. It is sovereignty 
absolutely detached from itself, without foundation and without presence; the 
sovereignty of distancing and detachment from its own ‘lack’, the presence that 
shows alienation sovereignly.211 For Nancy, what sovereignly withdraws itself 
from domination, the sense that eludes its imposition is art itself, the kind of art 
that it presences itself in Artemisia Gentileschi’ s painting of Cleopatra.   
Blanchot also asks, why should man desire “a desire that is without hope and 
without knowledge, making him a being without horizon” and what would happen 
if thought manages to affirms itself in this ’beyond’? He answers this by pointing 
at Bataille’s own texts and thoughts and to the “surprise of his language”, to 
Bataille’s “speech”. (In ‘Logodaedalus’ Nancy cites himself a remark made by 
Bataille on ‘speech’: “Only language reveals, at the limit, the sovereign moment 
when it no longer has currency. But in the end the one who speaks owns up to his 
impotence.”212) And Blanchot writes: “speech entertains what no existent being in 
the primacy of his own name can attain; what existence itself, with the seduction 
of its fortuitous particularity, with the play of its slipping universality, could never 
hold within itself”213. Nancy’s answer to this would lie in Plato’s cave, in the 
‘grotto’ that “is the world, where the drawing causes the impossible outside of the 
world to loom up, and causes it to loom up in its very impossibility”214. It is 
speech as image before it becomes concept and the Idea as painting’s and figure’s 
first gesture. “Friendship”, “friendship” for “the impossible that is man” and 
“friendship” as “the exigency that relates us infinitely and sovereignly to 
ourselves” – this is what Bataille called this experience of non-experience, the 
“interior experience”. As ex-cess and surplus of the being in being itself, sense 
can be reached out and shared (only) via an embodied image. Images of art may 	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engage with representation and the symbolic order, but, at the same time, every 
obvious image has also something that exceeds its symbolic meaning and 
signification, something that belongs or reaches at the diffuse order of sense. 
There is something in the material order of things that imposes itself on me, and 
with Nancy, this is belonging to the participatory sense of the world. Image is not 
always only mimesis, but ‘mimesis’ and ‘methexis’. Images of art generate a lot of 
meaning, but not any meaning and this is what makes the diffuse horizon of sense, 
the excess of signifying sense and of symbolic order, the horizon of the real, of 
the whole areality of bodies. Works of art go beyond representation and the 
symbolic order and escape the ideological, rigid and abstract construction of the 
world as representation. The experience of artistic images works at the limit and 
the arts215 respond to the exorbitant demand of sense.  
8. “Image – The Distinct” 
In this essay, which is the opening chapter in “The Ground of the Image”, Nancy 
writes about the image in relation to the notion of the distinct and the figures of 
distancing, separation and setting apart.  
 “The distinct, according to its etymology, is what is separated by marks […]: 
what is withdrawn or set apart by a line or trait, by being marked also as 
withdrawn.”216 “Trait” stays here for a line, stroke, dash, trait, characteristics, or a 
feature. The “distinct” is the different, other, separated, independent; that which 
does not allow itself to be confused with something that is neighbouring or 
analogous. The distinction of the image is also detachment, and separation. In the 
image takes place a threefold distancing: from the ground, from the perceiver and 
from that which is figured or imaged. The image is never characterized in terms of 
presence or proximity. 
 
Let’s remember the example given in the Gestalt theory, the vase-face image: if 
the vase shows itself as distinct emerging from the withdrawal of the ground, the 	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tracing of a line detaches the image from the ground and places it before my eyes, 
but at a distance. Nancy argues that the figuration or imaging (vs. imagining) of 
the vase is at a fundamental level not grounded in the identity or sameness with a 
concept, the signified or represented empirical vase. He emphasizes that the 
distancing, detachment and separation that is marked by the “distinctive trait” of 
the image/figure, is a fundamental order of dissimilarity and difference.  
As we have already seen, the image is a thing that is not a thing, so what appears 
in this example is the vase, which is not a vase. The vase is given to us in a 
fundamental withdrawal and distancing from the worldly object and the way we 
might encounter it. The ground is described in Gestalt Psychology as a force 
which allows the figure to distinguish itself from the background, to create unity 
of an image from a diversity of sensible appearance. Nancy argues that what 
makes the image distinct, what distinguishes the image as image and what makes 
it also meaningful, is the imposition of a certain force.  
“The image gives itself through a distinctive trait (every image declares itself or 
indicates itself as an “image” in some way). It is the imposition of a force, which 
gives form, which detaches, separates, distances in the tracing of the distinct line 
or trait of the image. The image is placed at distance in front of the seeing eye and 
it is also detached from the background.     
The ground appears thus to be contradictory: on the one hand it is withdrawn, and 
on the other hand, the ground exerts a certain force that imposes itself. The 
ground becomes the ground only in doubling itself. The ground, “it is the force of 
the image, its sky and its shadow”. This force exerts its pressure “in the ground” 
of the image, or, rather, it is the pressure that the ground exerts on the surface – 
that is, under this force, in this impalpable non-place that is not merely the 
‘support’ but the back or the underside of the image. The latter is not an “other 
side of the coin” […] but the insensible (intelligible) sense that is sensed as such, 
self-same with the image.217 We find here conjured Gestalt psychology’s notion 
of the ground, the notion of force and Nancy’s particular use and understanding of 
the term “sense”. 
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For Nancy, the ground of the image exerts a force even in its withdrawal and it is 
“insensible (intelligible) sense as such sensed directly on the image”. The force 
here, then, is the force of sense. That is, sense that forces the figure to detach itself 
from the ground and to emerge in or as a form and force that makes sense in its 
sensible appearance. But this ‘sense’ as the force of the image is not linguistic 
meaning, even if it ceaselessly touching on meaning. The ground is what is 
framed within the gaze, but outside of its attention. The objectifying gaze of the 
subject fixes the object in focus, whereas the gaze that ‘senses’ doesn’t fix 
anything because it responds to a continuous spatio-temporal pulsation. It doesn’t 
stay outside and controls the focus, but it ‘enters’ and is ‘entered’ and turns itself 
into movement. It is a gaze that withdraws “in the face of beings in order that they 
might reveal themselves”.218 
 
As already mentioned, the ideas presented in “The Ground of the Image” are 
related on the one side to the Kantian schematism and on the other to Gestalt 
psychology. Here, in relation to, but also differing from Kant’s understanding of 
the image and his idea of the systematic unity of reason, Nancy’s account of the 
image suggests, that the unity (the force of the being-one) of the image and its 
ability to assemble a meaningful figure from a potentially amorphous diversity or 
heterogeneity of sensory appearance comes from this exertion of force, the force 
of and as the ground itself. This ground is not in the consciousness of a subject, as 
the producer of the image, but it is in itself, in the event of coming of a figure, an 
image, the becoming and opening of a world – a force field. The ground 
withdraws in the throwing into relief of a figure and in the delineation or tracing 
of a separation of foreground from background. This force or ground is for Nancy 
an affective, pre-cognitive, pre-symbolic and pre-linguistic imposition of a diffuse 
horizon of sense itself. This marks then a return to Nancy’s thinking of sense as 
the stuff of shared sensible/intelligible worldly existence. For Nancy, sense needs 
to be understood as that embodied horizon of material and real referential 
implications and inscriptions, which constitutes the sensible-intelligible nature of 
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worldly sense perception and which is prior to language or any other order of 
determinate symbolic meaning. 
 
Nancy distances himself not only from the thought that the unity of the image 
grounds in the Kantian systematic unity of reason, or from the Gestalt 
Psychology’s concept of the unity of forms. Actually, in Nancy’s account, the 
Kantian systematic unity of reason, the system or the edifice to the extent that it 
constructs itself comprises in its own fundamental rules dis-unity, dis-placement 
and dis-junction. In his account, the Kantian unity places itself always in plurality 
and within this dissimilar unity, the ‘discourse’, on its side, forbids itself to appear 
and to manifest itself into a pure presence-to-self.219 Nancy explains that the 
assumption of the unity of the system is based or constructed on a technique 
borrowed from the idea220 of nature, which is the technique of judgement that 
operates “in the manner of art”. The system of the Critique of pure reason gives 
the limits and legislates over the regions and the regimes where reason exercises 
itself, which means that the Critique delimits the end of reason. In delimiting the 
end of pure reason, Critique is also delimiting the purity of its own instance as 
Critique. Critique is what delimits the pure and productive relation of pure reason 
to itself. Nancy explains: “the moment in which philosophy conceives its 
immaculate conception is precisely the moment in which it tears itself apart, or 
remains transfixed, torn between an inconceivable virginity and the terrifying 
presentation of an intolerable face that castrates the philosopher or leaves him to 
die of laughter in front of the abyss of his own mutilation.”221 Nancy continues: 
“The schema of the system should present itself a priori. However, it is this “a 
priori” that transcendental delimitation forbids a priori, which is the same as 
saying that Kant renounced the talent of this presentation, the talent of poetry as 
pure manifestation.”222 The way Nancy figures out the Kantian unity is by 	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thinking the relation between ‘Darstellung’ and ‘Dichtung’, between 
philosophical presentation and poetic or aesthetic presentation: the struggle 
between two incongruent forms of presentation – the one by method, which is the 
logical mathematical method, and the other by manner, which is the aesthetical 
method of style and tone. Nancy discovers that the systematic unity of the 
Critique, that is the schematism itself, is actually the “poetic union of unlikes” –  
“The union of the category and of intuition, this “concealed art” of the 
Critique, the condition of possibility of Darstellung in experience, 
constitutes here the superior power of Dichtung. […] In Dichtung’s 
capacity for sensibility, or in the sensible figuration of this power, that is, 
in the sensible figuration of the power of sensible exposition, is at work 
what makes the system possible in its functioning and in its very 
systematicity, since the Architectonic of the Critique, whether it be the “art 
of systems”, needs precisely a schema in order to present the system, a 
schema of an “organism” that rests on the “affinity of its parts”. And this 
schema of the system constitutes (or must constitute) the ultimate 
jurisdiction of reason to the extent that it has to expound the cause of its 
science.”223 (The italics are Nancy’s)   
 
In Nancy’s account of the image the unity of the image is achieved violently in 
the imposition of a force. The world appears to us as meaningful in sense 
perception only on the basis of this fundamental possibility of image formation, 
and on the basis of the presentability of intelligible, sensible, and visible forms. A 
fundamental order of imaging and of the con-figuration and presentability of 
meaningful images allows us to perceive with our senses the world as meaningful. 
The way Nancy understands the ground of the image is closely and intimately 
linked to his account of sense and world-disclosure. Because of this intimate link 
between the image and the sense of the world, images of art cannot simply copy 
or cannot simply represent or signify worldly existence. They do not simply trace 
an already given set of meanings we might ascribe to the world. 
On the contrary, artistic images participate in a more direct and fundamental way 
in the order of imaging (in the order of image-formation) by which the world of 
sense perception and meaning is constituted at a fundamental level. Artistic 
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images touch upon, expose, or present the sense of the world, that by, through and 
in which the world itself emerges into sensible-intelligible visibility. 
The ground of the image is the diffuse horizon of sense, which is always 
withdrawn, absented or distanced from and within any visible meaningful form or 
worldly appearance. This allows Nancy to state, that if the ground is always 
withdrawn, then sense itself, the sense that existence is, is always an ungraspable 
excess over the image and an excess over the world of visible appearance. This 
means, it (the ground) never presents itself nor is it ever graspable in terms of 
concepts, signification or determinate meaning. Thus, what concerns Nancy is the 
means of how to accede to the excess and surplus of sense, to the excess of being 
in relation to being itself. For him, art and the image open us this means and, 
Nancy argues, that images of art do accede to the sense, truth, or real of the world 
itself in its very ungraspability or excess.    
The image is the distinct variation of the totality of a distinct and dissimilar sense. 
The image is always distinct and set apart from things ‘present-at-hand’ and from 
any kind of relation of the signifier to the signified. Although artistic images 
might engage and they do engage with representation, discourse or other forms of 
signification, they are irreducible to these determinate relations. What sets them 
apart is the impact they have on us, the way they touch us in a direct and intense 
mode. Artistic images make sense in a diffuse manner, which is intimately linked 
to our shared experience of the world. In this way, artistic images respond to “the 
exigency of the access to sense─ its exaction, its exorbitant demand”.  
 
(Because of this, for Nancy, artistic images give us access to the real. The real is 
what is prior to our symbolic knowledge, prior to language and is different from 
the Lacanian ‘real’. 
Whereas with the Lacanian real it is arguably to what extent it has sense or 
meaning or whether it has no meaning at all, appertaining more to the realm of 
bodily drives and to the form of material existence that resists the symbolic order, 
the real for Nancy makes sense, it has meaning. A meaning that is not symbolic, 
but which is nevertheless meaning. It is radical exteriority. The real is the sense of 
the world in its very excess, its withdrawal, and its ungraspability. The real is pure 
and simple reality, “detached from any use, impracticable, untreatable, even 
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untouchable, dense and porous, opaque and diaphanous (…), an impalpable and 
impassive film (…)”.224) 
9. “Image and Violence”  
Nancy questions also the relation between the image and violence, which, as we 
know, dwells in representation and naming. As we can see, truth brings each one 
of the two in the proximity of the other, keeping them, at the same time, separated 
and at distance. Nancy points at the similarities between the image and truth. 
Image is like truth – being actually a kind of truth in its own. ‘Images of violence” 
and ‘violent images’ are both of them ‘double dualities’, as both of them, the 
image and violence, have to be looked at in relation to their double configurations, 
that of image as copy or truth and that of violence as violence or as truth.  
Violence is for Nancy the application of a force that remains, what resists the 
most. What resists the logic of violence of reducing the other to the same. The 
remainder is for Nancy a ‘vestige’. It remains as passed and as past. It is the 
sensible exterior that resists its transposition into the non-sensible, the exterior 
impossible to be internalized. It is not an invisible ideality that ‘expects’ 
visualisation. This withdrawal of sense, which is the remainder, is wholly tracing 
itself right at the visible and as the visible itself. It is what touches us there, right 
there in front of us. It is the withdrawal of sense that traces itself as the ‘sensible’ 
or in a sensible form in general – and this is why it is the realm of the ‘arts’.225 
This said, arts and works of art are inherently violent.   
Within this perspective and in relation to truth, Nancy identifies then two types of 
violence, a positive and a negative one. 
The negative type of violence is the violence that “is not quite intentional and 
exceeds any concern with results”, that “denaturates, wrecks, and massacres that 
which it assaults”. It is a violence that takes the meaning and the form away from 
what it assaults and turns it into nothing other than “the sign of its own rage, an 
assaulted or violated thing or being” and “is concerned only with its own 
shattering intrusion. “It is the calculated absence of thought willed by a rigid 	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intelligence.” This type of violence is only interested in placing itself instead and 
as truth through destroying the whole relation of forces and any conjunction of 
forces only and entirely for the sake of destroying it.  This violence accounts for 
completeness and worldlessness and denies any dissimilarity referring to nothing 
other than its own brutal force. In this case violence is a monstration, an exposure 
of a figure without figure, of a body without body.  
In the second case, that of positive violence, if we can speak about a positive 
violence, we are dealing with the violence of truth. Truth is always violent in its 
own way, because it irrupts only by questioning and tiring apart an already 
established order. This violence is not only destroying, but at the same time, it is 
also destroying itself, as it only irrupts in a withdrawal – that is, “opens and frees 
a space for the manifest presentation of the true”.226   
What characterizes both types of violence is their impossibility to negotiate, 
compose, order and share, as they always act as a force that tires a given order 
apart. Nancy calls this, the “intractable” and understands it as “the mark of truth’s 
closing or truth’s opening”.227  For Nancy, violence “is the ambivalent name of 
that which defines, in all its problematic character, the habitus if not the very 
ethos of our world: one that has no other world behind or above us.” 228 Put in 
other words, we live in a world of and as a picture, in (re)presentation. It is the 
imaginative subject who creates the world and the picture of the world and 
everything that ‘is’ is according to this picture. The pure conception of this 
imaginative subject is schema, or in another word, violence. 
 
   
In 1938, Heidegger gave a lecture, “The Age of the World Picture”, in which he 
asserts that Modernity is directly linked to representative thinking and to the 
conquest of the world as picture. Heidegger looks at representation in relation to 
the direct meaning of “vor-stellen”, to represent, maintaining that it also means ‘to 
set out’, to place before oneself, at a neutral and controlled distance. In the age of 	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Modernity, the world has been explored and approached by a controlling subject 
that “frames” it like a window or a photograph, placing this picture within the 
horizon of a controlling gaze. The world is thus known by having a clear picture 
of it, and therefore everything that remains outside of this frame, of the horizon 
patronized by the controlling gaze “is not”, it does not exist, because it is not 
graspable in a picture. Representation was facilitated by men’s tendency to 
approach the world from an ‘outside’ position – either that of the subject, or that 
of God. I will come back to this, but at the moment let us return to the Nancy’s 
image.    
Representation is the violent ordering and categorizing of everything that is, all 
beings and entities and their totality as a world. Beyond this world there ‘is’ 
nothing. Nothing exists outside of the ‘word-picture’. The violence of the habitus 
and the ethos of our world is the violence of reason, of splitting being from Being, 
off splitting the object from Being (or presencing). At the same time, ‘naming’, 
knowledge and representation are the primal act of the taking-possession of all 
nature as this world of entities. The violence of ‘naming’ leaves its marks in the 
concept ruptured from existence. It ‘takes out’ the ‘here and now’ and imposes a 
‘everywhere and nowhere, an always and never’. 
There is an obvious link that violence maintains with the image: violence makes 
always an image of itself and it is this image what authorizes violence and 
activates it. Violence consists in imprinting a mark, the sign of violence 
manifested on the assaulted being or thing. The force of violence consists in 
imprinting by force the image, the body of this force in and as an embodiment and 
spacing of this violent act. Violence wants to be demonstrative and monstrative, it 
wants to show, to expose its effect in an absolute way. Art is for Nancy “violence 
without violence” as it always presents an opening into a shared worldly existence 
by its own withdrawal. This is always a here and now, a singular occurrence that 
transforms itself continuously. Art as truth says something about the world 
without “being accountable to the world”. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable 
complicity between violence and speech, violence and image, violence and line 
and violence and marks.  
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10. “Masked Imagination” 
Nancy focuses in this chapter on Heidegger’s choice of the death mask as an 
example for the paradigmatic, exemplary image. Nancy validates Heidegger’s 
choice to reflect on the death mask229, but at the same time he also points out the 
implications of Heidegger’s step back and sudden withdrawal to fully engage with 
the complex implications of his own example. However Nancy follows Heidegger 
in his reading of Kant and engages with the schema-image both as negativity and 
as creativity.  
 Heidegger’s move to engage with the image in its meaning that comes from the 
Latin “imago” – the representation of the dead, and to use the example of the 
death mask, was probably motivated by the release of several books of 
photographs of the death masks of famous personalities.230 In 1925 (when these 
books started to be published), Heidegger gave a series of lectures on Kant’s 
thinking that would result in his book “Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics”, 
published for the first time in 1929. Since we can assume that Heidegger did 
encountered the phenomenon of the death mask for the first time in Benkard’s 
book “Undying Faces” while he was giving these lectures in Marburg, where the 
book has been published, we can find in this empirical context, a possible reason 
for Heidegger’s peculiar choice of the death mask, as an example to serve him in 
his analysis of the Kantian schema image.  
What Heidegger sets out to do in his reading of Kant, was to highlight a different 
Kant from underneath the epistemological context that was forced upon his 
thinking. Resulting from this, Heidegger would also be able to lift the 
epistemological character of philosophy out of its foundations. In “Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics”, Heidegger analyses three main thoughts: he shows, 
first of all, how the problem of Metaphysics is to be posed in Kant, secondly, he 
identifies wherein the problem lies and thirdly, he uncovers in which way the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Cf. § 20 Image and Schema, in: Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. 
Richard Taft, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008, 5th edition; § 20 
“Bild und Schema” in: Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Frankfurt am 
Main: Viitorio Klostermann, 6. Auflage, 1998 
230 Such as: 1925, “Undying Faces” published by Ernst Benkard and showing the death masks of 
well known people from Renaissance to the First World War including those of Schiller, Wagner, 
Nietzsche, Brunelleschi and others. In 1926, “Totenmasken” published by Richard Langer and in 
1929,“Das letzte Gesicht” (The Last Face) by Egon Friedell.    
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Kantian thought is already an anticipation of the decline of the metaphysical 
thinking. In doing this, he concentrates himself on the chapter of Schematism 
taking a position against the Neo-Kantianism’s belief that regarded this chapter as 
an “insignificant addendum”. As opposed to this view, Heidegger claims that the 
Schematism chapter is what holds together the entire structure of “The Critique of 
Pure Reason” and not only this, it is also the connective hinge for the three 
critiques overall. He also argues that the faculty of imagination is what anchored 
and led to the metaphysics of presence and representation, but at the same time, he 
claims, imagination is also the vanishing point where temporality postpones 
constantly the ‘present-at-hand’ and allows ‘Dasein’ to go beyond itself due to the 
temporal structure of the ‘synthesis’. Imagination is the activity of the ‘synthesis’ 
of the manifold of perception with the concept of understanding. The Kantian 
imagination initiates a thinking embedded in the history of Western metaphysics 
of presence that is produced by a subjectivity for itself. However it also yields to a 
thinking of a “presentation” as “Darstellung” and a “free giving” as 
“Sichgeben”.231  
Heidegger’s analysis of the schema image aims to elucidate the metaphysical 
conception of truth on the ‘adequatio model’ as the essence of presence, and 
secondly, he aims to extract from underneath this, another and different 
conception of truth as “exhibitio originario” in its literal meaning of an “original 
self-offering”. In arguing that these two notions of truth are intertwined with each 
other in the Kantian text, he sets out “to lay them patent” or “to lay them bare”, 
which is to outlay them hermeneutically (“hermeneutisch auslegen”). In the 
course of and as a result of his laying-patent (“freilegen”), Heidegger discovers a 
new kind of image other than the image as force to represent. The decisive move 
for his interpretation was Heidegger’s decision to take on the problem of 
‘presentation’ (“Darstellung”), rather then focusing on the problem of 
‘representation’ (“Vorstellung”). In these new terms, the schema image becomes a 
mode of depiction, rather then representation (as ‘bringing to mind’). One of the 
examples chosen by Heidegger to predicate his notion of the schema image was 
the example of the death mask. The death mask is taken on as a peculiar mode of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 This radical reading of Kant led to what is known as the “Davos dispute” between Heidegger 
and Ernst Cassirer in 1929. 
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depiction – Nancy will speak of the “exemplary example”. But before we look at 
this in detail, let us look first at Kant and his notion of the schema.  
10.1.  The Kantian Schema 
In “Critique of Pure Reason”, Kant tried to ground and to justify the mechanisms 
of the established forms of cognition in the form and nature of self-consciousness. 
The philosophical task of his system was to find a method to describe the nature 
of self-consciousness.  
In his Critique Kant aims to lay a ground or foundation for the knowledge of all 
objects of experience in explaining the conditions of possibility of cognition and 
perception. In doing this, he aims to present, in first place, the possibility of the 
synthesis of sensible intuition with intelligible forms, meaning concepts, 
categories, or logical functions. Synthesis is a determination of a certain space and 
time by which the sensible manifold is related to an object in general according to 
the categories. Because of its activity, synthesis refers back to imagination, as it 
relates diversity to an object in general, and because of its unity it also refers back 
to the understanding and in its totality to reason. Imagination, understanding and 
reason are the three active faculties that participate in synthesis. For Kant, pure 
knowledge is grounded and originates in the ‘a priori’ structures of the faculty of 
understanding and it is this pure knowledge that makes the experience of the 
sensible world possible. What we encounter in our experience are not things in 
themselves, but things, as they appear to us, phenomena – more precisely, a 
sensible empirical diversity. This sensible manifold appears in space and time. 
Space and time are the pure forms of intuition; they present the sensible manifold 
(in time and space), but also their own pure a priori diversity of space and time in 
themselves. A priori structures are universal and necessary conditions for the 
possibility of our experience that are not derived from the empirical experience of 
the world, but are given to us prior to our experience. Kant lays the ground of any 
experience at all in the a priori structures of our mind. He also aims to show, how 
both the subject and the objects of our experience are not the result of our 
experience, but rather the products of a complex set of structures of concepts and 
categories of our mind, which open the possibility for the existence in the first 
place.  
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As already mentioned, Nancy is looking in detail at Kant’s Critique in his book, 
“The discourse of the Syncope. Logodaedalus”, focusing especially on the 
”architectonical” overall structure of the “edifice” and reflecting on the question 
of philosophical presentation, of ‘Darstellung’ as the syncope of ‘Dichtung’ and 
on the importance of the schematism theory232. In following Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the Critique, Nancy states that reason affirms itself in the 
Critique and that by or in the gesture of the Critique we are actually confronted 
with the very gesture of ontology as the self-founded reason itself. What interests 
Nancy in Logodaedalus is to what content this self-legislation of reason requires 
an exposition of a pure style, the absence of a seductive voice and tone, and at the 
same time, the aesthetic form of a ‘making-fit of’, the creation and invention of a 
‘toned’ Critique able to be the foundation of reason.   
Howard Caygill noted that the reception of the Critique was marked by the 
tension between foundation and limitation233, as it lays the foundation and, at the 
same time, it traces also the limits of our experience marking what is beyond the 
possibility of human knowledge. Following this, the interpretations of the Critique 
are divided between those who follow the idea of the grounding of the possibility 
of knowledge and those who are questioning the possibility of foundation itself. 
We have to place Nancy, along with Heidegger in this second category, where the 
status of the Critique as discursive “edifice” is analyzed in depth, especially the 
relation between the “Transcendental Aesthetic” and the “Transcendental Logic”.  
“The Transcendental Aesthetic” presents time and space as the two forms of a 
priori intuition that make the experience of sensible objects possible. Kant refers 
here to space, as the necessary a priori condition for external intuitions in its 
transcendental ideality and not in its empirical reality, which he affirms 
nevertheless. The fact that we are able to represent time a priori in our 
consciousness allows us to perceive objects as related to each other and spatially 
extended. Time is an a priori form of invitation as a necessary condition, but also 
a form of sensible intuition. Time is the form of the internal sensible intuition that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Logodaedalus was initially only the first part of a project that would contain also a second book 
“Kosmotheoros”. However this second book remained unpublished. 
233 Ian James, The Fragmentary Demand. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean Luc Nancy, 
Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 29 
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allows us to intuit our own selves and to perceive the temporal aspect of our 
‘inner state’. As an a priori structure of the mind, time makes the experience of 
external phenomena possible, because these can only be experienced in the form 
of a temporal succession, but as the immediate condition of our inner experience 
it is also the inner condition of our feelings and thoughts. Whereas. “The 
Transcendental Aesthetic” provides the rules for the sensible intuition, “The 
Transcendental Logic” shows that knowledge is only possible as the unity of 
intuition. Therefore, “the pure general logic” identifies pure principles that form 
the canon, the set of rules that are necessary conditions for the unity of the 
understanding and of reason. The pure general logic cannot be derived from the 
content of experience. These principles refer to “a form of thinking in general” 
and have no empirical content; they describe more how different ways of knowing 
relate to and interact with each other. “The Transcendental Logic” gives the rules 
for conceptual understanding and rational inference.  
The only way to experience and to comprehend any things in their actuality is 
through an objective reality and through the use of concepts. Kant defines this 
mediated way of knowing via concepts a judgement. In this sense, concepts are 
predicates of possible judgements. He refers to these pure non-empirical concepts 
of understanding in the “Transcendental Analytic”, where he also analyses the 
categories - quantity, quality, relation and modality, the pure concepts of 
understanding, and other logical functions of understanding, which are again, in 
accordance with the categories: quantity, quality, relation and modality. What is 
for Kant at stake here, is that these logical structures open the possibility for 
content, fact that allows them to actually be a priori conditions for the possibility 
of knowledge. These logical structures can be synthesized with a sensible content. 
Kant writes that the necessity of transcendental philosophy is to “offer a general 
but sufficient characterization of the condition under which objects in harmony 
with those concepts can be given, for otherwise they would be without all content, 
and thus will be mere logical forms and not pure concepts of the 
understanding”.234  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 14th 
printing, p. 270, A 135 Original text: Imannuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Bd. 1, Hg. W. 
Weischedel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 14. Aufl, 2000: “[…] daß sie 
von Begriffen handelt, die sich auf ihre Gegenstände a priori beziehen sollen; mithin kann ihre 
objective Gültigkeit nicht a poste|riori dargetan werden, denn das würde jene Dignität derselben 
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What opens the possibility for this unity between the sensible and the intelligible 
is what Kant calls the “schema” of the concept. The method by which schemas are 
applied on sensible intuitions is called “schematism”. A schema is similar to the 
synthesis also a spatio-temporal determination, but one that in itself corresponds 
to a category at any time and everywhere. It is a time-space relation that embodies 
actual conceptual relations. The faculty of imagination schematises only under the 
legislative power of understanding and only for speculative interest.  
The schema has therefore the same ambivalent function as the Critique itself – on 
the one hand, it makes knowledge possible, and on the other hand, it is limiting 
the usage of concepts. The schema dictates how concepts and intuitions have to be 
united. Kant calls the schema the “representation of a general procedure of the 
imagination “ that provides the concept with a sensible image.235  
“[…] the schematism of the understanding through the transcendental 
synthesis of imagination comes down to nothing other than the unity of the 
manifold of intuition in inner sense, and thus directly to the unity of 
apperception, as the function that corresponds to inner sense (to a 
receptivity). Thus the schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are 
the true and sole conditions for providing them with a relation to objects, 
thus with signification. […]”236 
A representation or re-presentation refers to the synthesis, to an active grabbing of 
that that is presented: it implies both activity and unity. Thus representations are 
very different from the sensible material they represent which is passive and 
diverse. In a representation with the help of synthesis, we first apprehend – that is 
we depict the manifold in a certain time and in a certain space and we figure 
various parts in time and space that we then reproduce and con-figure. In this 
sense we can say that representation is the synthesis of that which is presented and 
thus knowledge. There are different sources for representations (intuition, 
concept, Idea…) and specific source of representation is for Kant a faculty. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ganz unberührt lassen, sondern sie muss zugleich Bedingungen, unter welchen Gegenstände in 
Übereinstimmung mit jenen Begriffen gegeben werden können, in allgemeinen aber hinreichenden 
Kennzeichen darlegen, widrigenfalls sie ohne Inhalt, mithin bloße logische Formen und nicht reine 
Verstandesbegriffe sein würden.”  
235 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 14th 
printing, p. 273, A 140-B180 
236 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 14th 
printing, p. 876, A 140-B 145. Original text: Imannuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Bd. 1, Hg. 
W. Weischedel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 14. Aufl., 2000, A, 145-146, 
B. 185, S. 192-193   
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However a faculty can also refer to the different relationships of a representation 
in general.   
The schematism is the process of the imagination in which sensible intuitions and 
concepts plus categorical principles are synthesised making possible the 
experience and knowledge of the objects in the world in a unity. This unity is the 
unity of the apperception, the “I think” of the consciousness.  
 
In his “Critique of Pure Reason”, Kant tried to gain the certainty about the world 
from self-consciousness without using the theological argument. According to the 
traditional concept of truth, truth is “veritas est adaequatio rei at intellectus”, that 
is: truth is the correspondence of matter to knowledge. This refers back and 
draws, in the midst of its various interpretations, on the Christian word view 
according to which God created all things in the world after his idea that was 
formulated in the divine intellect. Things are true insofar they correspond to the 
divine idea, but, as human beings were created in the God’s image, they can for 
themselves and in themselves reproduce or produce ideas of things that 
correspond to ideas created in the divine intellect. The Christian concept of truth 
indicates, that the truth is the adequation of the divine idea to the things created by 
God guarantees the truth as the adequation of the human intellect to the created 
things. 
 
Let us remember the “Cartesian Cogito”. Descartes also aimed to find a set of 
principles through which one could decide, what can be known as true without 
any doubt.  Descartes fought the radical scepticism resulted from the unreliability 
of empirical perception with the belief, that even if I doubt everything I know 
about the world, I can still rely on the minimal certainty of the fact, that I am 
existing as a thinking being. I exist through my doubting of the knowledge I have 
about the world. For Descartes, the only indubitable knowledge is that as a 
doubter, as a thinking thing. In order to establish a link to the world outside self-
consciousness that can be perceived in a reliable way, Descartes will have to 
accept God as the bridge between his self-consciousness and the outside empirical 
world. Kant asks himself, how can subjectivity produce an objective true 
knowledge of the world without accepting the hypothesis of a pre-existing 
objectivity of the world. Kant’s purpose, as mentioned already, is to establish 
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subjectivity and cognition as their own foundation. He argues that the multiplicity 
of perceptions of the world is given to us via “intuition” and that we need a 
“synthesis” to gain identity from the inherent difference. Repeatable knowledge is 
the result of the identity provided by the continuity of our self-consciousness. At 
two different moments of our life we cannot receive two identical perceptions, but 
we can still, nevertheless establish general laws of nature. This means, that our 
knowledge of the world via synthesis cannot be only the product of our sensuous 
experience of nature. There has to be something else in the synthesizing subject, 
there has to be a link between the thinker and his thoughts. Kant wants to prove 
that the relationship of the thinker to every thought he might have is the identity 
of the synthesizing subject. If this is accepted, then Kant can also prove, that the 
cohesion of philosophical thinking is not coming from an external source. One 
needs to reflect on, how a subject can move from one case of  “I think” to the 
other and to reflect on the nature of a pure apperception, that is the 
“thoroughgoing identity of oneself in all possible representation”237.  
We can know the world only through appearance. The world appears to us via the 
constitutive a priori “categories” of subjectivity. These a priori categories 
synthesise our intuitions of the world into cognisable forms. Kant claims that we 
cannot know the world how it is in itself. Our knowledge doesn’t follow the 
objects; they rather depend on how the subject constitutes them as an object “by 
giving them a repeatable identity in a predicative judgement”.238 Kant is insisting 
in the distinction between appearances of things and things in themselves and he 
wants to describe how truthful a priori knowledge is possible through looking at 
the applications of pure concepts to intuitions. As an example for truthful a priori 
knowledge whose truth cannot be proved empirically, he names different 
undoubtedly true propositions of Mathematics. Kant’s conclusion is thus, that 
there has to be something in us that makes a priori knowledge possible. Kant 
wants to give a systematic exposition and explanation of how cognition and 
morality are possible and aims to establish what is the general case. He is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 14th 
printing, p. 227, A 116 
238 Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity. From Kant to Nietzsche, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2nd edition, 2003, p. 17 
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concerned with the general principles and rules for the possibility of cognition and 
perception and not with singular and individual occurrences. 
Kant defines “intuition” (Anschauung) as the immediate relation between the 
subject’s perception and a given object. The object has to be given to us, so that 
perception precedes the concept. Kant writes that the perception that gives the 
material for the concept is the only character of objective reality. Appearances are 
therefore objects as given to us, in their actuality. The things in themselves are not 
given to us.  
There are “empirical intuitions” and “pure intuitions”. An empirical intuition is 
the sensation of the hardness of a piece of rock. The pure intuition is the 
framework within which we can apprehend things - time and space. We only 
perceive things given to our senses in a spatial and temporal form. Time and space 
are the a priori forms of pure intuition. Understanding distributes intuitions to 
higher, general categories or concepts. Categories are a priori forms of judgement 
and synthesis that are applicable to everything that is an object. The a priori given 
categories in the faculty of understanding synthesise intuitions into concepts. This 
is only possible, with the help of a mediator, because pure forms of understanding 
cannot be applied on something that is given empirically. Via the schema, our 
understanding creates empirical equivalents for the a priori categories.  Cognition 
is possible because of, on the one hand, the “receptive sensuousness” that gives us 
the intuitions and, on the other, the “spontaneous understanding” that thinks of 
objects as perceivable objects and applies on them categories and concepts (it 
synthesises and schematises). 
The faculty of imagination in the first A version of the “Critique of Pure Reason”, 
is both what reproduces intuitions without the object of intuition being present 
and what organizes (or synthesises) the multiplicity of sensuous intuitions into a 
coherent content by producing associations. Here imagination is productive and 
receptive. However productivity is supposed to be the function of understanding 
that is necessary for the synthesis of intuitions, whereas receptivity is the function 
of the sensible and sensuous. This would thus suggest an ambiguity between the 
functions of intuitions and concepts. Consequently, in the second version B of the 
Critique from 1878, Kant changes the role of the faculty of imagination. The 
productive imagination is now subordinated to the categories of understanding, 
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because Kant wanted to subsume all synthesis under the faculty of understanding. 
The problem encountered here by Kant is that of marking the limit between 
spontaneity and receptivity. Imagination organizes the images given in intuition 
into “schemata”. The schemata are subsumed and synthesised under the categories 
and the concepts. Imagination is limited by the “compulsion of understanding” 
and schemata are ”nothing but determinations of time a priori according to 
rules”239. 
Kant explains that categories and concepts are distinct from sensuous intuition. 
The subsumtion of a perceivable object under a concept of understanding implies 
that the image, the representation, of the object must be identical, 
“homogeneous”, with the content of the concept or it must at least belong to the 
content of the concept so that we can speak of the subsumtion of an object under 
its concept. Thus pure concepts of the understanding have to be in accordance to 
this, but they are in no way similar to sensuous intuitions. Pure concepts are 
entirely “inhomogeneous” and never encountered in any intuition. A priori 
categories and concepts get an empirical content only via the schemata. We 
apprehend the inherently particular sensuous manifold as coherent entities of same 
kind via concepts made sensuous by the schemata. The “transcendental” schema 
is the linking bridge, the mediator, the mediating representation between 
sensibility and understanding that facilitates the subsumtion of an intuitively 
apprehended object under a concept. And the “Schematismus” is the procedure 
that provides the concept with its corresponding image.  
 “The synthetic unity of self-consciousness” is the fact that “I think” that needs to 
shadow all my representations. I can become aware of my own self-consciousness 
in time and be aware of the unifying principle for my representations only through 
the synthesis of different moments of consciousness. This synthesis is bound to an 
act of “spontaneity” and is “self-caused”. This spontaneity cannot be part of the 
sensuousness, as, in such a case, we would both have to and want to find the “first 
cause” or we would have to ground a cause in another cause ad infinitum. The 
causally determined world makes available for us the realm of the sensuous via 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity. From Kant to Nietzsche, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2nd edition, 2003, p. 28 
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intuitions. These intuitions are synthesised by our apprehension according to 
categories and the principles of judgement. Kant also claims, that my inner 
experience, what he calls ‘the inner sense’, is only possible in relation to a 
presupposed external experience. The fact that I can grasp the manifold of 
sensible appearances and representations in one consciousness is the condition for 
naming them my representations. The mind possesses only a representation of the 
identity of a function through which it combines the manifold intuition into an 
object and this object is the representation of “I think”. If this wouldn’t be 
possible, then my self would be the divided sum of as many and as different ideas 
of which I am conscious.240  
Kant is confronted here with a twofold difficulty. On the one hand, the assertion 
that the “I” is self-caused is itself problematic. The ‘I’ cannot be available as an 
intuition, since the ‘I think’, which is the “synthetic unity of self-consciousness 
that allows me to be aware of my identity at any moment across time, must be 
able to accompany all my representations. On the other hand, the synthesis of the 
‘I’ needs to be self-caused, because it cannot be grounded in or caused by 
something else, as this would imply the search for this first cause or ground. The 
‘I’ needs to be an act of the spontaneity of understanding and not of the sensuous 
that is causally determined. The ‘I’ is the synthesizing process that allows the 
subject to identify itself, and the identity of the self is and must be independent 
from the given sensuous manifold. For Kant, the ‘I’ is what has a synthetic unity 
and what makes a set of cognitive rules that process intuitions into the unity of 
experience. The problem of the synthetic unity of the ‘I’ lies in the fact that, on 
the one hand, Kant demonstrates that it cannot depend on empirical perception 
and is thus self-caused, but on the other hand, he claims that empirical perception 
is a necessary condition for it. “The pure synthesis of understanding is the a priori 
foundation of the empirical synthesis”241, which is the ‘I’ that accompanies all my 
experiences. The ‘I’ thus is more than the appearance of an “inner sense”, since it 
seems that it needs to have an ontological status. This ‘pure spontaneity’ must be 	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given, so that the simple being of self-consciousness can be presupposed. Self-
consciousness is not cognition of oneself, because cognition is only possible for 
what is given as appearance. The nature of self-consciousness cannot be 
completely understood by splitting the “I” into subject and object, since full 
cognition would be the intuition of something intelligible. This would be the self-
caused intuition of a self-caused synthesis of intuitions, which would require 
something like an ‘intellectual intuition’. However, an ‘intellectual intuition’ 
would contradict Kant’s idea that intuitions without concepts are blind and 
concepts without intuitions are empty, and therefore he denies the existence of 
any thing like this. In relation to this problem that has been acknowledged by 
Kant himself, he writes in “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics”, that the 
“representation of apperception, the ‘I’ is in fact nothing more than the feeling of 
an existence without the least concept and only a representation of that which all 
thinking relates”.242  Thus, we could assume, that ‘feeling’ might also refer to the 
thought of a relation between the object and the subject’s pleasure or displeasure, 
a thought that will allow Kant to reflect on and to acknowledge the significance of 
aesthetical experience.  
   
I want to return now to Nancy’s text from “The Ground of the Image” and more 
precisely to a passage from the second chapter, “Image and Violence”. Nancy 
writes here: “ The image not only exceeds the form, the aspect, the calm surface 
of representation, but in order to do so, it must draw upon a ground – or 
groundlessness – of excessive power, the ground of Being. The image must be 
imagined: that is to say, it must extract from its absence the unity of force that the 
thing merely at hand does not present. Imagination is not the faculty of 
representing something in absence; it is the force that draws the form of presence 
out of absence: that is the force of “self-presenting”. The resource necessary for 
this must be in itself excessive.”243   
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Kant writes: “This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances 
and their form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true 
operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with 
difficulty”244, and Nancy claims that Kant knew exactly that the force of 
imagination, or its secret lies in the power of the schema to imagine itself and to 
imagine imagination; the secret of “absolute withdrawal of power into the ground 
of power itself by which it is forced to invent itself at every moment” and the 
mystery of what doesn’t envelop a secret, but which is illuminated from itself.245  
And, he also argues, that it is precisely this mystery with which painting 
“implants” itself without trying to either resolve it nor to make it an object of 
belief. The secret of schematism is nothing that can be revealed or unveiled, since 
every unveiling would be at the same time a new veiling. This is what is also at 
stake in painting – the “mystery of birth itself, of being in the world and being-a-
world”, the “mystery of incarnation”.  
“The art concealed in the depths of the soul” is the force and power of the ‘pure 
image’ itself, whose intimacy cannot be violated.  It is the power of the pure 
image that makes experience possible, “whichever one” form and unity of a 
composite possible and the presence of and to a world possible. The 
transcendental schematism is the force of the object and of a world of objects. 
This pure image is a formidable “force-sign” through, which a presence 
distinguishes itself from a ground of restlessness and discomposure “on which 
nothing can be built”. 
It is the “force-sign” articulated in the unity that opens the possibility for the 
object and for the subject, for presence in general. The pure image or schema is 
per se violent.  
“It must irrupt, tear itself from the dispersed multiplicity, resisting and 
reducing that multiplicity; it must grasp itself, as if with claws or pincers, 	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out of nothing, out of the absolute non-unity that first is given of partes 
extra partes of a dispersed exteriority; unity must thus relate itself to itself 
in itself in order to present itself and thus externalize itself, while also 
excluding from itself that which is not and ought not to be, that of which it 
is the refusal and the violent reduction.” 246  
Kant explains that the method or rule of com-posing or synthesising is the form of 
activity that underlines the creation of this image and it is characterized as a form 
of movement. To illustrate this he gives the example of the image of five points. 
When one grasps this image, one grasps the schema of number as such or the 
number as schema. The schema of the concept is the representation of a general 
method by means of which the imagination creates an image for the concept. 
Categories, as ‘a priori’ forms of reason, have each one of them their own 
transcendental schema.  Kant writes that this “pure image […] of all objects of the 
senses in general is time” and Nancy explains that this is so because the very 
moment of synthesis, which is the production of unity, is time. “Time is the very 
unity that anticipates itself and succeeds itself in projecting itself endlessly in 
advance of itself, grasping at each moment – in this ungraspable instant – the 
present in which the totality of space presence itself, in which its curving expanse 
is surveyed in a single view, from a perspective in which time is both the blind 
stop and the obscure vanishing point.”247 Time is the ‘a priori’ form of the ‘inner 
sense’ and as the faculty of imagination determines the ‘inner sense’, it also 
determines time. As a result, schemata are ‘a priori’ determinations of time 
according to specific rules. Schema is the product of the faculty of imagination, 
which is the ability to represent an object in intuition, even if the object is not 
present; imagination provides reason with “intuitive matter” on which ‘the inner 
sense’ can leave its trace, that is to determine. The image, the schema records the 
activity of the understanding and it also reflects “the kinetic form of a concept” 
The pure concept, Kant defines it as the “forma formans”, must be recognized in 
what it is formed, in “forma formata”. Consequently, the concept has to be 
imagined, which is embodied in an image, and it has to form (trans-form) the 
matter of intuition into an image by imagining the image-object.  	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The schema of quantity is the schema of a pure concept of understanding, and it is 
the ‘number-as-schema’, the rule of com-position, the rule of “making-into-the-
one”, the “putting-into-picture”, the “making-image” (Nancy). Number is the 
unity of ‘synthesis’ of the manifold given. In apprehending this unity of the 
‘number-as-schema’, the ‘I’ produces time itself.      
The schema, the pure image or time is the image of all images; it is what 
anticipates itself and what produces unity as such. It is a force that violently 
retracts the dispersed and disseminated exteriority while, at the very point of the 
consolidated folding, it also inserts a joint, a chasm, a disrupture or a fissure in the 
continuity of ex-tension. For Nancy, the schema is the “earthquake” in ‘the there-
is in general’ that opens the chasm of presence. The schema draws form as 
presence out of the absence of noth-a-thing, of anything, of the vanishing point of 
things; therefore presence is also there where there is absence and this means that 
presence returns to itself only where there was no being in itself. With Heidegger 
Nancy writes: “Where being was in itself, presence will no longer return to itself: 
it is thus that being is, or will be, for itself.”248  Not the being as object ruptured 
from its own indistinct context, but ‘Being as noth-a-thing’ (Heidegger). The 
image, understood ontologically and as an existential, is the only way in which 
beings and ‘not-things’ can present itself to us. And, unity forms an image – 
“bildet ein Bild” – of something that not only has or is without image, but without 
identity, without unity. Through the image some thing presents itself by 
resembling itself and in the end by being itself. The image is existence as being 
open and as coming. Before resemblance there is gathering and bringing itself 
together, the image assembles itself in order to resemble itself. In doing this, form 
must make itself distinct from the ground, from the dispersed multiplicity without 
unity; it must withdraw itself from this exterior. That is: “being is torn away from 
being” and “it is the image that tears itself away”.249 In the image that makes 
every image possible, the schema, gestates always and right from the beginning. 
This force is the schema that will “torn being away from being” and that will open 	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the ground of the image to its very bottom, “to the depthless underside of its 
presentation”250, displaying and manifesting the prodigious sigh that warns and 
brings to light, that exhibits presence. “Aletheuin” is what the image is, its ability 
and power for ‘truthing’ - speaking, discovering, uncovering, telling, touching, 
opening, the imminence of truth.251  
Time and space as ‘a priori’ forms have to anticipate themselves; they have 
already taken place in order to take place. Time and space opened the opening 
itself in order to open the possibility of a world. They have already imagined the 
imagination itself in order to imagine representation.  As we have seen already, 
experience is first of all image, which is the possibility of presentation, the display 
of presence and the bringing to show. Presence means being present, but also the 
presentation of being. Everything that is, presents itself in the form of an image 
that I provide for myself or that gives itself to me. Any imagining subjectivity is 
also the objectivity of the image. And, Nancy writes, the condition of the “subject 
of representation” can only be something that is not yet either subject or object.   
Representation comes from the Latin “representatio”, which is an accentuated 
form of presentation that is destined for a specific gaze. Representation makes 
something observable and exposes it with insistence. In Greek, representation is 
“hypotyposis”, which refers to the presentation of the lines of a figure. The subject 
of representation is what is not yet either subject or object; it is figure, form, 
certain unity; it is the making of an image, the putting into image, the gathering 
and assembling into an image; it is “Ein-bildung” – the formation of the one, the 
force of the one. The possibility and potential for the “Einbildung” is what makes 
the subject a subject and the object an object. Thus, it is “Einbildung” itself that 
marks and proclaims the “infinite antecedence” of the subject “to every possible 
object”.252 
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The schema is what gives itself before all else; it is what makes every image 
possible, the “fore-seeing of the image, the opening to a view in general”. The 
schema fore-sees, it “opens the vision of the unity of the concept and sensible 
material”. The schema is not given to us by our empirical experience of the world; 
it is a pure non-sensible image that bears already in itself the unity of the manifold 
without containing it, as no manifold has been given to it yet.  The foreseeing of 
the schema is an image of an image, the gathering together, a pure image of the 
presentation of the manifold as unity in general. “The schema foresees and in sum 
pre-(s)-ents self-presenting”, “es vor-bildet, es bildet vor das Bild”.253 The schema 
imagines or images the imagination itself. It presents the ground from which it 
emerges. Therefore, as Heidegger showed in his interpretation of the schema, the 
image cannot be and never is only representation meaning only figuration and 
fiction. The schema is representation, but more than this it is presentation, 
“Darstellung”. 
It is in the following passage, that Nancy announces once again his understanding 
of the image and of the “kant-ian” unity:  
“an image is (the fact) that and the way in which something forms itself in 
and as one. An image is the making-one, the making-itself-one of 
something. This “one” is not unity as opposed to multiplicity: it is the 
possibility that anything at all, including something multiple or fluid, may 
come to presence; which is to say that, as some thing or event, it may bring 
itself out of the confused and incessantly dissolved dispersion of sensible 
givens in order to give itself to be seen. In order to make something to be 
seen. To give itself – to be given – to be seen coming out of the non-
visible and the non-seeing: for we understand that in the imagination thus 
envisaged, the object and the subject are given together and give 
themselves to one another, or even in one another, ein ins andere hinein 
sich bildend. ”254  
In his “Critique of Pure Reason”, Kant places the schema, the imageless image, in 
a moment that happens previously to the first encounter with the materiality of the 
manifold. In this, “the priority of the look over the look”, Heidegger discovers and 
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unveils the impossibility of the self-originating look. For Heidegger the look can 
never coincide with itself, which means that it cannot complete itself.   
The most primordial level for Dasein to envisage the world is on a pre-theoretical 
and pre-reflexive level, in an openness-towards-something, towards the world. 
But Dasein is or it ex-sists as and in the mode of potentiality, possibility and 
power (in terms of an ability to become). The being of Dasein is possibility and 
not primarily actuality and thus, Heidegger claims in “Being and Time” that 
Dasein is essentially incomplete, open. Dasein is essentially and irreducibly in 
excess of itself, a ‘not yet’, and excess of actuality, a projection in and of the 
future, never to be realized or touched upon. Dasein has and is the look and 
therefore, the look cannot be complete either. To imagine itself as the one, the one 
and anyone requires the absence of the one, which means that it requires its own 
absence. Dasein as we have seen previously, ex-sists, projects itself, throws itself 
ahead of itself. For Heidegger, the possibility, of the being of Dasein that is 
irreducibly possible is death itself. Dasein ex-sits towards its death – a death that 
remains always in the future, something to come. The gaze of a dead man 
symbolizes and is the image that “looks without seeing and sees without looking”.  
Nancy is interested in the fact that Heidegger is glossing over the concealing role 
of the mask, engaging with the mask only as a means of “self-showing”. The 
reason for Heidegger’s abrupt abandonment of his example before discussing all 
the meanings of the death mask, lies for Nancy, in his not-being-able to see the 
look of the death mask also as “the death of the look”, the death of Dasein (‘s 
possibilities towards death). That is not a look that shows the look, but the look as 
a mask, which is a look that withdraws and conceals the look and that refuses to 
look.  
Nancy writes: “in the ground of the image there is the imagination, and in the 
ground of the imagination there is the other, the look of the other, that is, the look 
onto the other and the other as look – which also opens, consequently, as another 
of the look, a fore-seeing non-look.”255  
In “The Muses” Nancy puts this in other words:  
“The gesture of the first imager, man puts himself outside its self, even 
before being a self. Man figured himself as the similar that came before 	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the self, the look of the self as the other, that figured it, what the self was – 
the self as the stranger, the look of the other. The ‘I’ is then the “the-being-
one-in-the-other”. “The same is the same without ever returning to itself, 
and this is how it identifies with itself. The same is the same of an identity 
that alters itself from birth, thirsting after a self that has never yet been 
self, and whose birth is already alteration, and who appropriates itself as 
this very alteration.”256  
What is at stake here is that the one of the image – which is the unity of the image 
– comes not from an auto-intuited self, but from the other and from the self as 
other. The self that knows itself by being the other for the self, and the self that is 
always the other. Perceptional forms come to us only via disunity, distance and 
withdrawal, and this is the only way man can imagine and foresee.  
The image re-presents a thing only inasmuch as it says of the thing that it is and 
how it is. This is also how the image affirms its being that thing. Therefore, the 
image is the sameness of that thing, but it is a distinct sameness. The thing-as-
image is different from the thing as being there, available, (a general “vorhanden” 
in Heideggerian sense) as given in sensible form for the subject’s intuition. The 
image is more then the representation of the thing, as it presents not only the way 
the thing is, but also the ways beyond its way of being, the noth-a-thing. In Kant’s 
case, the schema is what stands and makes the connection between reason and 
intuition, between the intelligible and the sensible. The schema represents the 
thing as an image and the image of this thing is at the same time a ‘copy’, the 
reproduction of the schema of the concept.  
For Nancy, Kant’s thinking was, in the history of modern age, the first moment, 
when the image was set outside the order of representation. The image and the 
faculty of imagination was from then on “presentative, appresentative, or 
apperceptive”257. Man was from then on the controlling agent that images and 
places ‘in-front-of-itself (“vor-stellen”) all present and existent entities, as 
opposed and in relation to itself. Being, as the totality of all entities, is “objected” 
and represented for and in front of man. Being exists and is an entity (Seiendes) 
only as and in so far as it is ‘placed’ (“gestellt”) in front of the image-synthesis of 
man (“vortellend-herstellenden Menschen). Being-image is being in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p. 70 
257 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 81 
	   117	  
representation, a ‘being in the know’ or being in something, being prepared and 
disposed, equipped and assembled (“das Bescheid-wissen, das Gerüstetsein und 
sich darauf Einrichten”). In man’s faculty of imagination and in its ‘en-forcement’ 
by the subject, being turned into its object. Entities are always to face the subject 
and truth became the certainty of the subject’s imagination. Being became the 
concreteness of imagination and the subject ‘the off shore ground’ on which 
everything is layered.258 Imagination is sensing and perceiving for itself, ‘ad 
subiectum’ – that is, perceiving on, to, by the ground, perceiving next to and 
towards the ground. 
The imaginative subject sets everything in the world in front of itself, across of 
itself and produces as such its objects. Everything, including the subject itself, 
becomes thus object for knowledge, knowledge whose ‘truth’ lies, as mentioned, 
in the certainty of the subject’s imagination and its existence as presence. The 
modern man in becoming the imaginative subject becomes also the source and 
representative of the knowledge of the world, understood as the totality of Being. 
Being, in the totality of its entities is now only inasmuch as the subject foresees it, 
only inasmuch as it con-fronts the imaginative and productive subject. Everything 
is only if it is according to and in front and towards the imaginative subject. What 
is important for Nancy is the fact that Kant’s presentation of the faculty of 
imagination produces as such a knowledge that comes from the image, from the 
image as subject and from the image as object – the image is what produces both, 
the subject and the object. Things are only known in so far as they are presented 
in and as an image. What is objectively present is (re)presented in and as some 
image. The Kantian subject acts and functions like a God that imagines, “he 
imagines the moral world and he imagines himself as the light of this world” and 
“is nothing other than the imagination that creates the world”.259  
Nancy shows here that Kant rather than questioning, he only reinterpreted the 
‘adequatio’ theory of truth, as truth (or light) is what is at stake here. The 
Christian world-view implies the Christian belief that all things in the world were 
created by God after an Idea that originates and is founded in the divine intellect. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Die Zeit des Weltbildes, in: Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 7. Auflage, 1994, p. 69-113 
259 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 83 
	   118	  
Thus created things were true – according to this view – in so far as they 
corresponded with the divine Idea. God created human beings in his image, and 
therefore they can produce and reproduce the ideas of the things that were created 
in accordance with the divine Idea. “Veritas est adaequatio rei ad intellectum” is 
the way truth is understood according to the Christian World-view. In Kant, 
something is true when it is in accordance to the rational concept of its essence. 
Thus the divine order has been only replaced by the rational order and the 
foundation and the ground of truth is now rationality and cognition.      
Man imaged thus world and the world became an image, “Weltbild”.260 The 
subject imagined the unimaginable, he imagined himself and he imagined the 
world. His first knowledge was the knowledge of his own self that is outside of 
the self – the finite self that puts itself in front of itself and images thus itself 
without limit. The schema for man is, for Nancy, “self outside self”, the outside 
standing for self.261 The subject imagined the world and the unimaginable, 
knowledge and non-knowledge. In between these two extremities (in between 
‘thingness and ‘nothingness’), Nancy explains, lies “technics” or “art” (tekhné or 
ars), the knowledge and know-how of man’s own strangeness, its self that is not a 
self, its alterity present from birth, the original ‘monster’ and its endless 
‘monstration’. The image, as the ‘monster’ of presence, who exhibits the non-
essence, the abyss of presence, exited presence as “bottomless appearance – 
aperity, resemblance without original”, that is as the origin itself of the presence 
that presences itself in coming forward, in and as becoming. 
In “The Muses”, Nancy refers to the technicity of art as the production of 
revelation, thought as a materiality and immediacy unveiled in its truth. The role 
of the technics, of the know-how, is to ‘to put the work out of work’, to bring the 
work outside of itself in the locus where it can touch the infinite. For Nancy, art is 
always coming to an end, which is, the beginning of plurality. Technics here 
corresponds to Heidegger’s ‘tekhné’, to preoccupation, manipulation and 
production. It is the technics of existence, its knowledge and know-how, which is 
the relation to the endless ends, to the singular plurality. This thought is also the 	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origin of Nancy’s belief in the endlessly multiplying origin of art – in 
contradiction to Heidegger’s understanding of the artwork as the place where truth 
is being put to work, as a gathering and sameness that leads him to think the 
common origin of arts. Art and the artwork led the artist, Nancy asserts, always to 
an end that is always a coming, passage, vestige, a postponement right from the 
beginning. Technics, Nancy writes, is “the pure production of form”, but not of 
any form, but of form as “beauty”, as form that is absolutely valid in itself and for 
itself. And, in following Kant, he explains that this kind of form is the form that 
exceeds all forms, an excess of form; that is the Kantian “Sublime” in which the 
subject, the imagination imagines itself as unimaginable or unimagining, and thus 
again, as productive of itself even unto its failure, productive of its limit and of the 
surpassing of its limit.262 In the pure production of the sublime, the excess of all 
form, “imagination imagines itself as unimaginable or unimagining”.263  
The Kantian subject ex-pands and ex-tends Being between the two extremes: its 
transcendental temporality and its unconditioned freedom. Time is what makes 
the synthesis of the ‘I’ and the synthesis of the given manifold in the schema of its 
singular appearance possible and also what enables its presentation in the unity of 
a com-position and con-figuration of the image. We should probably remember 
here Blanchot’s reading of Bataille’s ‘limit experience’, the result of man’s 
“essential lack” that allows him to ‘affirm’ and to appropriate a ‘beyond-of-
knowledge’ and Being’s new status: “the sovereignty of Being without being in 
the becoming without end of a death impossible to die”.264 (Death is with 
Heidegger an excess of Dasein’s possibility, an ability that is irreducible possible 
and whose reality is felt in every instant. A virtual possibility embodied in the 
touch on the world and on Dasein who senses its contractive limit. Death is 
always something irreducibly to come, always in the future, always postponed. 
Death is the end towards which existence ek-sists, at once the very closure of 
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existence and its beginning. It is the ownmost possibility of a human being, the 
possibility in which the authentic ‘ownness’ can be appropriated and realized.     
“ Number is therefore simply the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a 
homogeneous intuition [in general, a unity] due to my generating time itself in the 
apprehension of the intuition.”265 The schema, the pure, non-sensible image of 
quantity is ‘one’ as “the schema of the one as successive to itself”.266  This is what 
makes in first place the image and representation and its unity and unicity 
possible. 
So between the imaginable and the unimaginable there is possibility and 
potentiality, the opening, the passage and coming to the infinite, to the singular 
plurality, to the endless diffuse dissimilation and multiplicity of sense. And what 
is able to connect to this diffuse multiple sense is art as the ‘tekhne’ that puts the 
work of art in proximity to infinity, touching the limit and being at limit with the 
untouchable. Art is the pure production of “beauty”, signifying nothing else than 
itself.267  
For Kant, it is the faculty of understanding of the subject that produces this unity, 
which means that the subject imagines the unity of the successive presentation of 
the subject as subject-of-a-representation. This is, after Kant, the primary 
condition for the schematism of representation in general. This is the potency that 
opens at first hand the possibility and every possibility for being a thing and for 
the image – being as it is, is only presented in and as an image.  
The subject must thus produce its own unity each successive time when it is 
facing its own self as a subject of representation, each time the self is confronted 
with its self outside itself. This is the condition for any image and therefore for 
every object and for every representation, for any being as image. The image is 
the singular and finite appearance of an infinite and indistinct chaotic flux. It is 
the finite time-space occurrence of the dissimilar ‘nothingness’, the unknown and 
the untouchable. The image is the distinct of the indistinct. Man’s schema, the 	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unity of the self outside self, man’s own strangeness, its being-its-own-foreigner, 
is what makes the unity and unicity of the image and of representation possible. 
The image opens the vision of an object for the subject, it creates and shows the 
‘look’ (“Aussicht”) of the object and directs the gaze, it spaces the visible and the 
invisible. ‘Vision’ is the apparition, that is the presence of the thing for the subject 
and the ‘sight’ is the saying and the performative enunciation of a ‘vision’. The 
image makes it possible to visibly accede to the invisible. It ‘places’ into presence 
and makes possible the taking place of sense. The schema is the formation; the 
sudden con-figuration that separates the distinct and finite form from the indistinct 
infinite and that forms form and, at the same time, unifies forms according to their 
sameness. The schema is tension and torsion that gathers in itself in a completion 
without end, a “finite finishing” that is an “infinite finishing”.268 The schema is a 
traced line that “con-figures by virtue of no other essence than the inimitable 
existence of its singularity. An existence immediately lost, a model abandoned, a 
mold overturned”;269 “a sort of ad hoc formation of the image always renewed, 
but never completed in the unique form of the real”.270 
The other extremity of the subject’s imagination is freedom. For Bataille this is 
realized in “the essential lack”, that is man’s negation of it’s own negation, the 
affirmation of the one negation that has nothing left to negate; the affirmation that 
makes the impossible possible, that imagines the unimaginable, that experiences 
the unknown when everything is known. This, the non-representation of the world 
in “an image of the world as a rational or reasonable whole endowed with ends”, 
this is man’s possibility for freedom. The Kantian subject is the imagination that 
imagines the world, “the intuitus originarius”, Kant’s God, who “imagines the 
moral world and he imagines himself as the light of this world”.271 It is the 
“intuitus originarius” that controls the thought of the “intuitus derivatus”, which 
is the imagination that produces representations. Time and freedom, the two limits 	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of imagination, they make the moral world and the imagining subject possible, 
and have to come therefore from before the subject and “from before themselves: 
in order to take place they have already taken place. In order to open the 
possibility of a world and of experience, they have already opened this opening 
itself”.272  
Imagination, “Ein-bildung” (putting-into-image) is the ‘making-image’, the 
subjectivisation of the subject and the objectivisation of the object. “Ein-bildung”, 
Nancy explains, is the “Einung of Bild”, its “Einigung”, “the uni-fication in Bild 
or in image”, “the making-one”, or “the bringing-into-the-one-of-the-Bild”. This 
is, Nancy argues, the “for-seeing of the image” prior to any image, “the opening 
of a view in general”, the Kantian schema, which for-sees the unification of the 
concept […] and the sensible material […]”. The schema is the pure non-sensible 
image, because it is the unity of the manifold before any manifold is given to it. 
The schema is more or less than the pure unity of the “One” that is only the 
“One”. The schema is an image of the image of the “One”, it for-sees the image 
before it gathers the image in itself, and it shows the way something presents itself 
in general and only as such. In this sense the schema presents the presentation of 
the image, it “presents self-presenting”. What is thus presented in the schema is 
self-imagination itself: “es bildet, es vor-bildet, it performs or models the Bild”. 
The schema exposes the ground from which it emerges. What interests Nancy in 
the Kantian schema is the fact that here, in the schema, lies a possibility for the 
image that is more than ordinary representation or fiction. And from this thought, 
Nancy can develop his thinking in untying the artistic image from the order of 
signification and representation and to develop his own art-ontology. The image, 
in his understanding, presents that something is and how it is in the “One” of the 
image, in which case the schema of the “One” is the only possibility for anything 
to come to presence the only possibility for the distinct to emerge from the 
indistinct. 
10.1.1. Excursus: The Sublime 
One experiences the sublime, or better the feeling of the sublime when faced with 
a formless or de-formed immensity and power. The feeling of the sublime is 	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entirely subjective and in it, imagination faces its own limit – this is to say, that 
imagination knows its limit in a simultaneous comprehension of the experienced 
inadequacy of a maximum and the blowback or the repulsion caused by its 
inability to extend its limits. This immensity that causes imagination to stare at its 
own impotency to (re)present, to bring-into-image, might initially be assumed to 
be encountered in relation to the sensible Nature. However, this shows itself to be 
the case only as a projection. Kant claims that it is reason itself that causes and 
forces imagination to unite the immensity of the sensible manifold into a whole. 
Reason forces imagination to sense the limit of its power and to subsume itself to 
the power of reason. The whole into which reason forces imagination to unite the 
limitless sensible manifold given in the world is the Idea of the sensible grounded 
in a suprasensible, or in the intelligible. The sublime refers to an unlimited and 
formless that allows us to feel a purposiveness that is independent from nature. 
The sublime opens the possibility for a purposiveness that results from our 
capacity to transcend nature by reason. It doesn’t depend on empirical scale, 
because it depends on the Idea. 
”The Sublime corresponds in its effect to “a pretension” of “our reason [which] 
demands absolute totality as a real idea […]”273. It is this Idea that allows us to 
think of a beyond or a more of that that can be realised empirically. Thus, the 
sublime cannot be measured by our senses and it cannot obey to any rules given 
by our understanding (as it cannot be given in our intuition and therefore we 
cannot conceptualise it). “This pain stems from the constitutive failure of the 
sublime presentation: the sublime articulates itself, on and in an ability, a radical 
insufficiency of the mind to present (to itself) its end.”274 The sublime is what 
points at the subject’s limits with respect to its sensuous relation to nature – and to 
the pain and alienation caused by this failure: it “concerns only those ideas of 
reason, which though they cannot be exhibited adequately, are aroused and called 
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to mind by this very inadequacy [italics are Nancy’s], which can be exhibited in 
sensibility.”275  
The fact that we have the sense of its limitation implies that we have also a 
capacity for an understanding not limited to and by the sensible. In the sublime, 
we feel the chance and the fascination to transcend our sensuous experience and 
to be on a threshold to something like a possible second nature. This second 
nature is nevertheless unable to present itself, because it is the pure legality of 
reason and the foundation of its own autonomy. Kant explains that if one tries to 
realize the ideal in an example this would lead to the collapse of its own edifying 
structure. The ‘good’ of the Idea, if brought in appearance, will appear suspect 
and fictional. We ourselves won’t believe in it.  What is sensed and encountered 
in the feeling of the sublime, this ‘second nature’, is precisely this impossibility 
and inadequation of the presentation of the grounding law of reason itself. In this 
sense, the sublime is dis-placement, it is the place of dis-placement. “The sensible 
sense of absolute sense” is what makes for the “supreme beauty, or the brilliant 
flash of truth” to go beyond itself and to expand and extend into the “sublime” 
that becomes “the terrible”, “the grotesque”, “an implosion of irony” or even “the 
simple position of the ready-made”.276 The difference between “exaggeration” and 
“ disproportion” is infinitesimal, Nancy explains, the fleeting difference of an 
instant that allows the one to be mistaken for the other and both at the same time. 
Thus the sublime can be either the sublime manifestation of the Critique in the 
face of the writer of philosophical prose or the grotesque and terrifying mask of 
the same. 
“The sublime is written”277, Nancy explains, as it “occupies the thin and perilous 
line of partition [partage] that Dichtung traces, the line that cuts and disarticulates, 
die kante of philosophy”. For Kant the nature’s style in the sublime is “simplicity” 
that he exposes it as the style of morality. Thus Nancy, asserts that apathy and the 
absence of affect and tone, of style, that Kant claims to be the true nobility of the 	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sublime, is nothing else than the “edifice”, the architectonic of the system – that is 
“the palliative [pallium] of presentation, a manner of writing: prose, a posture 
[…]”278, a style without style. The sublime is like “the well-armored treatise of 
mathematics”279.     
10.2. Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Image 
 After engaging with what is at stake in the Kantian schema, Nancy moves 
forward at Heidegger’s attempt to “lay bare” the secret of the schematism, to 
image the self-imagining of the schema. Nancy points exactly at which text he is 
looking: the section 20, “Image and Schema” from “Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics”. In criticizing the tradition of Metaphysics of the Western thought, 
Heidegger is questioning the status of the image as finitude. His understanding of 
the image comes from the meaning of the Latin word ‘imago’, which is the 
representation of the dead and Nancy will connect it also to ‘imago’, to ‘imitor’ 
and ‘aemulus’ that means emulator or rival. In following Heidegger’s analysis of 
the schematism, Nancy aims to show to what extent Heidegger successfully 
accomplished what he aimed for. 
To evoke the pure image that makes every image possible in first place, 
Heidegger will take the death mask as an example. The death mask is the 
objective adequation of a dead person’s features, since it is made as a physical 
mould of the face of a dead person. The death mask is the representation of the 
visage, the “Antlitz” of a dead person, and this representation can additionally be 
itself reproduced and thus ‘re-presented’ again. The encounter with the death 
mask is not something that happens usually and ‘the look’ depicted in it is so 
direct and real, that it results in most cases in a neglection of and an unawareness 
of the material composition of the thing; in a concentration on and perceiving of 
the look of the mask as something real. The viewer’s gaze penetrates the look of 
the mask and it infiltrates life in the dead person’s look. The death mask 
represents the expression of a face in the moment it died, and is characterized by 	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the dissimilar similarity between a living person’s and a frozen in death face. But 
the death mask depicts also something else than ‘the image qua depiction’ – it 
depicts also another concept of the image. And it is through this second concept 
and through the space opened now between the empirical and dissimilar sensory 
material and the rational unity of concepts, why it can explain the Kantian 
schematism. With Nancy we will see, that it is not only some example, but the 
‘exemplary example’ due to the concealing role of the mask (which Heidegger 
himself did not considered in his analysis).    
The death mask is an image, a Bild that is also ‘look’ or ‘Sicht’ as it shows in a 
visual form death. The death mask shows the aspect of death. All images, the pure 
image of the image and the image of the image, which is the reproduced image, in 
order to be images they have to show the “primary monstration”. For Nancy, “the 
Gesicht (face) of the one without Sicht (sight)” is the exemplary image.280 An 
image exists or comes into being only through the move into the “blind depth” of 
the world without subject.  
Nancy begins with looking at Heidegger’s etymological exposition of the German 
word for image, “Bild”, which, as he writes, has a different meaning from the 
Latin ‘imago’ that “implies rather form, aspect, or overall outward appearance”.281  
In German, the meaning of ‘Bild’ is closely linked to that of ‘Anblick’, which 
means “glance” or “look”. And Nancy cites from Heidegger: “First of all [Bild] 
can mean: the look [Anblick] of a determinate being insofar as it is manifest 
[offenbar] as something at hand [Vorhandenes]. It offers the look.”282 Bild is the 
glance or the look of the thing pointed towards us in offering its aspect. Abbild, 
Nachbild, Vorbild are all different types of Bild that offer the same glance and 
look, even if they copy or reflect (Abbild), reproduce or imitate (Nachbild) or 
only fore-see (‘vor-bilden’), providing a model for something yet to be created. 
Heidegger emphasises the difference between these three different types of 
images, Vorbild, Nachbild and Abbild, which, he claims, in the Kantian text got 
mixed up. This distinction alone is not enough to, Heidegger knows, disclose the 	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secret of the schematism. Heidegger wants to show that the possibility to produce 
an image, to create a ‘look’, happens prior to any formation of a mimetic image 
and that it refers back and is weaved in the originary meaning of the German word 
for image, “Bild”, as the aspect that makes itself seen. The image as “Bild” is of 
the order of the ‘monster’, being ‘monstrative’, since it warns and since it is the 
miraculous sign that has a prodigious force, which is the meaning of the German 
root ‘bil-‘.283 
The question and what is important for Nancy, when one does reflect on the 
nature of the image and of visual representation, is to grasp “how the image is not 
a form and is not formal”284, how “it is what does not show, but what gathers 
itself into it”. The image is ‘Abbild’ or copy or imitation, it rivals the presence of 
the thing, it is competition for presence, because it presents absence in presence. It 
shows that something is and how it is and brings therefore the thing beyond the 
simple form of presence to the realm of ‘pre-saentia’, where the thing is brought 
‘outside-in-front-of-itself’. This is the moment, when the thing, the object 
becomes subject, when it presents itself being not a ‘presence for the subject’, but 
‘presence as subject’, “Gegenwärtigkeit”. Following this, the image is touching at 
the limit of truth, but a truth that is different from the metaphysical truth and also 
from the truth that is “at work” in the Heideggerian sense. It is a truth understood 
as the sense of all senses. 
 For grasping the manifold and dealing with ambivalence there has to exist a 
certain unity, even if it is in a minimal form. And this unity that holds together the 
ambivalent, the multiple and the fragmented is the pure unity of the “being-one” 
of the image, the pure image that is in itself violent. And, the opening or 
possibility for the shared worldly existence and for the diffuse sense of the world 
can only happen in the passage of this unity.  
This is the unity that makes every image and presence possible for us to 
comprehend. It is the Kantian transcendental unity given by time that allows 	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everything to show itself in such a way that is given to the subject, that gives itself 
to itself and by itself - and with Nancy now – it also means, that it gives its ‘self’ 
to the outside, to the radical exteriority of the sense of the world and of the 
‘body’. It is the unity of the “effraction” of the “partes extra partes”, the sharing of 
embodied sense which gives us a world of bodies. The “groundless unity”, rather 
the excess of the “groundless unity” that exceeds any signs, any form of fixed 
symbolic order of concepts that reveals nothing else than this excess is the way 
one can speak of a ground in Nancy’s thinking. The violence of the force of the 
pure image, the image of the image is the violence without violence that reveals 
only the fact that there is nothing to reveal, as the revelation never takes place 
remaining only imminent. The excess of this groundless unity is “imminence 
infinitely suspended over itself”.285  
What Heidegger is doing in “Image and Schema” is to demonstrate that “every 
creating-a-look” can be traced back to a “primordial putting-into–the-look” of the 
schematism. This ‘putting-into–the-look’ of the schematism has to be understood 
literally as a put-into-a-visage, put-into-a-face, to give it a face, a look – that of 
the death mask. They way Heidegger proceeds from here, is by discussing the 
three senses of ‘Abbild’, ‘Nachbild’ and ‘Vorbild’. “The ordinary mode of the 
Bild is empirical intuition”. The empirical intuition is always “a this-here [Dies-
da]” for Heidegger. “Empirical intuition” is the way we comprehend presence, 
presence, which can be either in singular or in plural form, but which nevertheless 
is always ‘one’, the ‘one’ of the “grasped in presence”. Intuition is the how and 
the condition for grasping presence. “Abbild” is for Heidegger the copy “of what 
shows itself”, the “copy that copies the thing and the thing’s showing-itself”286. 
Therefore ‘Abbild’, ‘Nachbild’ and ‘Vorbild’ always “show the Bild, while also 
showing itself as something that shows itself”.287 The originary “monstration” of 
the image is therefore repeated in the copy that restages it in the ground of a 
second monstration. The force of unity of the pure image, the primary, originary 	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and proper value of any image is the gaze of the image that looks at us ‘offering-
its-look’ by ‘seeing-outward’. Each thing in presenting itself to us and in showing 
itself, it brings itself to presence and therefore is in its ground a subject, an ipse. 
Heidegger wrote that: “ Dasein is face to face with what-is in itself”.288  Whereas 
the concept of the image as the representation of the thing for the mind positions 
the thing face-to-face with the subject, in Heidegger’s concept of the image as 
depiction, the thing as ‘becoming’ is also at distance, but in terms of a temporal 
distance – “Entfernung” understood as “Ent-Fernung” and thus as an abolition of 
“Ferne”, of the distance itself. 
Each “Bild”, Heidegger affirms, shows the “Bild”, but it also shows itself as 
something that shows itself. This ‘showing’ takes place in each “Bild”, being it 
“Abbild”, Vorbild”, or “Nachbild”. The image always shows itself, gives itself to 
be seen and offers its ‘look’, its “Aussehen”, its “looking-like-while-showing-
itself of every thing understood at the same time”, “as if it were looking at us 
(aussehen, “to look” or to seem like breaks down literally into seeing-
outward”)”.289   
In other words, we could say, that the original image shows itself as the 
resemblance of a monstration, that is under and as the aspect of a miraculous sign; 
“the primary image is always an image of an image” and “the image makes an 
image by resembling a gaze”.290 The image emerges and gathers itself into 
presence only by resembling a gaze. The image of all images presents the visible 
only by being itself a look that gazes at us and is therefore both what stays on the 
other side of the look, on the side that confronts the look and also on the side of 
that that opens as a look. Nancy relates this to the speech figure “sage comme une 
image”, explaining that the meaning of this speech figure might come from this 
primary monstration. And, it can also be read as an account of the knowledge and 
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art that is at work in the originary image, the knowledge “of making activity out 
of passivity, of seeing by being seen”.291 
Things that are “vorhanden”, ‘present-at-hand’, have already showed themselves, 
have presented themselves to the subject already – otherwise, they would be not 
available yet. They can now be represented in copies, but they do this only in their 
showing-themselves in each copy of the copy.  Before ‘availability’ there is the 
moment of ‘becoming presence’ and this moment precedes every being present. In 
the ground of the image, “at the bottom of showing itself”, the image is a subject, 
an ‘ipse’.292   
The photograph or the reproduction of a ‘death mask’ shows the death mask, it 
shows what the mask shows, and how it shows it, and it also shows itself in 
showing the death mask and what the death mask shows, the dead man. This is 
also showed in the corpse of a dead person, because the corpse shows the face, the 
look, the look outward of the dead person – how the dead man looks outward. 
Heidegger, explains that the look of death shows itself as if it would gaze and 
look at us, “als blicke sie uns an”293. On this Nancy comments, that this “as if” 
refers and implies resemblance as in being the same as what it faithfully 
resembles. This means, and Nancy extracts this from Heidegger’s own example, 
that the primary image, the schema, contains already the “copy” or “das Abbild” 
in itself – “it shows itself as a gaze directed to us”294. For Nancy, Heidegger’s 
thought might as well say that the primary image is concomitantly always image 
as monstration and image as resemblance. The image gives itself to be seen by 
resembling a gaze.    
What does it mean for Heidegger the fact that the originary image originates itself 
in an image, is “like an image”? The Idea, in its Greek meaning of “eidos”, 	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denotes a “carrying-itself-outwardly in general of every possible particular 
aspect”.295 Idea is then the “how of self-showing in general”, the schema and the 
unity of representation, which is the unity of the concept with the manifold of the 
sensible forms. This unity gives rules by which plurality is drawn out and 
inscribed, marked, made distinct and made thus image. The force of the schema is 
to, on the one hand, to open the possibility for presentation and knowledge, and 
on the other hand, it regulates and sets the limit of concepts in giving the rules of 
how the “plasmatic chaos of sensation” is to be marked in terms of “drawn’, 
traced or sketched – con-figured. Thus what presents is not a kind of unity in a 
numerical sense “that would capture and make rational what is given as the 
sensible flux”.296 The look or the Idea that lodges in the ground of every image is 
a “Bilden”, as in forming, making or shaping, as in framing. It is showing as 
figuring and establishing. Innovation, creation and production. What it gives is 
not an image or form that represents, but more and especially an image or form 
that sets the con-figuration of the possibility of every image in motion.  
The schematism then, does not provide an image, but something that is “like an 
image, (it) is something like an image and an image of all images at the same 
time. This means it already anticipates itself in taking place, it is the ‘antecedence 
of the image to itself’, the imagination of the image. This imagination is what sees 
before and outside itself the look that it will present to us and allow us to 
represent to ourselves. The schema then, in Kant’s thinking, is the image of 
imagination, the self-imagination and the foreseeing of the imagination itself. The 
schema is what makes every look possible. It is an “anticipation of an and in 
apprehension”.297  
The look in this sense is different from both the “intuitus originarius” that arises 
from nothingness and it does not give itself completely in the “intuitus 
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intellectualis”. The look “precedes itself and therefore always succeeds itself”.298 
It is able to fore-see itself but it is and will never be able to visualize the totality of 
its form, as this is already past or soon to come. Heidegger, in following Kant, 
shows that the pure image or what he calls “the schema-image” is time, but he 
goes much further than Kant does. There is no presence that is not preceded by its 
own “givability identical to its own receivability: Vor-stellung of its Stellung, pre-
positing of a being-posited”.299 Time is what is the non-present of the look that 
cannot grasp it’s own unity directly, but only as “Bildung” as formation or 
configuration of the unity of the manifold. But this unity is in itself manifolded: 
“the self-imagining unity is the unity unifying itself as a sensible unity”.300 At the 
same time, “the sensible images itself by sensibilising itself as a thing that is 
sensed”.301Heidegger closes the example of the death mask prematurely and 
Nancy proposes to further investigate those implications that were left out in the 
Heideggerian analysis.  
10.3. The Death Mask 
In ‘laying bare’ his understanding of Heidegger’s example, Nancy refers first of 
all to the difference between the example of the death mask and the next example 
given by Heidegger in his book - that of the house, explaining that the death mask 
refers to the “look of the production of an image”, of the way in which the dead 
man shows himself, whereas the house exemplifies only the “production of a 
look”, of the house in this case. Obviously, both examples refer to the eidetic that 
is a non-sensible image, but the house refers to the “imaged image” (“ein-bilden”) 
and the mask to an “imaging image” that looks back (“einbildend”). In this case, 
Nancy claims, that the really exemplary example is that of the death mask, which 
has a special status because it shows an “originary showing-itself through the 
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showing-itself and the outward-seeming of a dead man”, this is through the look 
of someone who doesn’t show itself, but who withdraws himself by definition. I 
have mentioned already, the empirical context that seemed to influence Heidegger 
to choose this example, however, Nancy gives also another specific  reason for 
why one needs to use precisely this example – reason that Heidegger missed out 
to understand, probably because he refused to think of the notion of the ‘mask’ in 
itself as something that is used for hiding and masking, for covering a face. Nancy 
asks what is manifested by the “face of a dead human being in general”302 and he 
argues, that it is this generality given by every corpse of a dead individual that 
implies also a ‘transcendental’ reason for the death mask as an example that can 
explain the method of schematism. Nancy is intrigued by the fact that Heidegger, 
the thinker of Dasein as “being-towards-death”, is not concerned of the dead 
person as being-dead, and of the fact that the aspect of the dead person confronts 
us face-to-face with someone who is blind. It is the look or aspect as a face-to-
face with the look that does not see anymore. This means that whereas we look at 
the dead person, the dead person does not see. And Nancy explains, that this is “as 
if the before (the look) remained in the now (the non-look), or as if the now (the 
non-look) retroactively affected the before (the look)”.303  Thus, in this example 
we are encountering a merging of the look as ‘a dead look or aspect” and the look 
as “the looking aspect”. This means that the aspect of the dead look presents and 
shows its past aspect as the look that sees – and this is “the present past” of the 
withdrawal of a look. Nancy affirms, that it is this “look of the withdrawal of the 
look” that opens the possibility to ‘for-see’ the rules that are constitutive for the 
schematism of imagination and for the understanding and the reason. ‘The look of 
the withdrawal of the look’ is what makes possible the ‘eidos’ of that for which 
there is no intuition possible, the pure synthesis of the understanding, the 
representation of apperception and the ‘I’.  
It is an interesting move that Nancy undertakes now – he draws a parallel between 
a double impossibility of every ‘self’: the impossibility to substitute oneself for 	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the death of someone else and the impossibility of being in the place of the 
‘intuitus originarius’. Both these cases imply an access without access, which is 
also the access to that that has no look or aspect. What is attempted in art or in the 
thought of the ‘intuitus originarius’, in the schematism, stretches always between 
to extremes: either it attempts to bring the invisible to the surface or to depict the 
look of that that looks through. Nancy writes that the gaze without gaze or the 
withdrawal of the gaze, or the gaze as withdrawal is “the fore-look of the look, the 
Ein-bildung of the Bild and the fore- or forthcoming [prévenance] of presence”.304  
In the same way in which ‘dying’ is not deceasing but the condition of “the 
thrown being toward the ownmost potentiality-of-being”, the look of the dead 
person, the aspect it presences, is not only the aspect, the ‘Abbild’ of the dead 
man’s face, but it is the possibility for the schema, for the pure and simple image. 
Death and the secret of the schematism are the ungraspable and the ownmost as 
the two impossibilities of being either in the place of the dying other or in the 
place of the “absolute seer”, however death in itself doesn’t die, on the contrary it 
passes through “Ableben” and demise by being ‘the ownmost potentiality-of-
being’ for every ‘thrown being’, and the ‘bilden’ of the schema escapes every 
‘Bild’, ‘Abbild’, ‘Nachbild’ or mask as the face, the look (das Gesicht) of the 
dead man that is made distinct and marked by ‘its being past’. Every ‘I die’, 
Nancy emphasizes, is in close proximity to every ‘I imagine’. And this reflects 
itself also in the thing that the gaze of the dead man can be seen as a model for a 
twofold being of the look – as the look that looks but doesn’t see, and as the one 
that sees without looking. These two different hypostases of the look of the dead 
man that are conjoined now in one look, in one model at the same time, implies 
that the gaze of the dead man is “the model of the fore-vision of the unity that 
anticipates itself in the precession of its succession”, which is also “time as a 
series of time, which forms the first schemata”.305  This model images, which is 
‘bildet’, and ‘in-images’ as ‘ein-bildet’ a ‘Bildung’, an imaging in general; it 
images the ‘one’ of the unity of the image, the ‘Einung’ of the ‘Bild’ in a ‘Bild’. 
But because it is what for-sees the look in general or “the general imagery of the 	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image”, it has in itself no look. It “fore-images” and ‘vor-bildet’ the one, the unity 
and unicity of the image, but it is in itself without look or gaze, that is the empty 
gaze that imagines itself as ‘one’ and “bears itself ahead of itself as that which 
succeeds itself”.306  What Nancy puts forward here is, that in order to imagine the 
‘one’ and to imagine oneself as the ‘one’, the look’s path to imagine starts from 
death, that is: from the very point where it ceases to exist. This means that the 
only way the ‘one’ appears as such to itself is in its vanishing point and moment, 
in its disappearing. The death mask shows that death as the non-presence of the 
‘one’ is also its birth, in which the ‘one’ ‘pre-sents’ itself in preceding itself. The 
‘one’ shows itself in the moment it disappears; it shows itself in hiding itself. 
This side of the look that has been opened by Heidegger’s example of the death 
mask was excluded from his analysis, probably because Heidegger refused, as he 
himself wrote, to engage with the mask as a specific form of presentation – that of 
the showing in hiding. This stated disinterest in the mask as the self-showing that 
withdraws, as hiding and self-hiding, or as a “monstration in concealment”, might 
also be due to the fact the Heidegger was guided and followed in his ‘Kantbuch’ 
“a logic of self-showing”. In a very strange way, Heidegger seems to obey, in the 
way he is structuring his thoughts, to the form of presentation given by the mask – 
he shows something and at the same time he also hides something. He shows the 
truth of the look of the dead man, but at the same time he also leaves it veiled, in 
the fact that he doesn’t uncover it as the death of the look. This play of veiling-
unveiling, of ‘aletheia’ is at work in the ‘eidos’, in the ‘Idea”, which implies also 
that the Idea occupies (“from the Latin ‘capio’, to take, to grasp“307; and also: in 
German with the meaning of  (be)greifen) already a look in ‘aletheia’ – this 
means that the Idea grasps for the play of veiling-unveiling, that is: it ‘gives a 
hand’ and it ‘takes a hand’ in the self-showing of that that has no look or image. 
This logic, Nancy observes, will be used later on by Heidegger, to think being as 
an ‘event of becoming’ and to overpass thus the fix and eidetic notion of being. 
However, in “Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics”, he seems not to observe the 	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demand that is at stake, that is: there has to exist a self-showing of the unshowable 
and there has to be an ‘eidos’ of the ‘aletheia’. And, Nancy insists, this is the most 
important thing gained by Heidegger’s thought in his appropriation of the Kantian 
schematism, whose possibility hasn’t been opened in any work after the Critique.  
Thus Nancy, announces that death – a death however that is not linked to the 
discourse of death, but “as the dead one’s apparition, in the final discreteness of 
its spacing: not the dead body, but the dead one as body – and there is no other”308 
(the italics are Nancy’s) - is the movement of self-presenting and that in the 
ground of every image there is the ‘unimaginable imagining’, the sublime as “the 
presentation of the subject without objectising schema”. “The image always 
promises more than the image, and it always keeps its promise by opening its 
imagination onto its own unimaginable.”309  
‘Aletheia’, as the play of veiling-unveiling, was also seen as a sort of expecting 
revelation, an imminent revelation that will never take place because it is always 
(only) imminent. Temptation of vision, of revelation and of illumination of a 
‘thing in itself’. There is this ongoing and desperate desire to dis-cover and un-
cover and to bring to light a hidden meaning either in text or in image. To read 
and to see something that has not been written or figured. This is the desire to 
reveal the secret, and this is what the death mask opens – the abyss (‘Ab-grund’) 
of the mystery that lays bare to the point that there is nothing else than absence of 
self-evidence. Where Heidegger uses the death mask, Blanchot refers to the 
‘corpse’, the dead body of a human being that is neither a thing nor present. The 
strangeness of the corpse is the strangeness of the image and of Being: both are 
there while at the same time, they are both neither there nor elsewhere, being both 
concomitantly in the ‘here’ and in the ‘nowhere’. The corpse, the absence of a 
body fills space with its absence – it has absolute freedom of movement and it 
paralyzes the power of doing of the living beings. Everydayness is held 
‘syncopated’ by the corpse, in the same way, as a thing without utility is 
becoming only the image of itself that has no use anymore, and that appears for 	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Press, 2005, p. 97 
	   137	  
itself for the first time as itself. Ahead of the presence as appearance, as 
availability and presence-at-hand, there is nothing left. There is no place for the 
corpse and no place for the image – both are errant and wandering. 
For Nancy, the corpse is the cadaver without body. The corpse is not the body. 
The ‘dead body’ is an apparition and discreteness that remains – the body of the 
decay, the “declension of occurrences” that is the instant of spacing the most 
proper and individuating distinctness.  The dead body remains in the areality of 
bodies. In Heideggerian terms, it is “der Verstorbene”, a being more than just 
being-there ready-at-hand, an (embodied) being outside factical presence in the 
absolutely and irreducibly most authentic mode of being to oneself.  Dasein’s 
ability to be throws constantly existence towards its ownmost and uttermost end 
and bodies as the existence addressed to the out-side is the excription of Being as 
an ontology of the body310 - but for Nancy only in the ‘here and now’ of the body. 
Not as project towards something, but as the spacing of the expansion and areality 
of bodies.          
However, whereas Heidegger understood errancy as the search for truth, for 
Blanchot and Nancy errancy is the truth of the image and the body. The corpse 
resembles the dead person, however the person that was before is not the same 
with its corpse. In order for the dead person to resemble itself, it has to become 
impersonal and anonymous, that is: it has to move to the zone of “the neuter”, in 
which the self will become infinitely errant.  
Nancy remarked the proximity between ‘I die’ and ‘I imagine’. He also explained 
how the ‘one’ of the image has no look beside its ‘fore-tracing’ and ‘fore-seeing’ 
of its own look that originates in the face-to-face look with the gaze that doesn’t 
see, in “death as the unseeing gaze face-to-face with my own gaze as it sinks in 
turn into its withdrawn image”311, and thus how the ‘one’ has its birth in the look 
of the ‘other’ and not, as Kant claimed, in the auto-intuitive self. The ‘other’ does 
not present itself as such, but only as its ‘same’. The ‘other’ shows itself only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand, New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008, p. 2-122, and Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen: Max Niemayer Verlag, 2001, 18. 
Aufl. P. 237-240 
311 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 97 
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through its image as the ‘same’ in being itself, but always as an ‘altered same’, 
altered in the fact that it is visible and imaginable. In the ground of the image 
there is the look of the other, “the schema of the same in its other”.312 And for 
Blanchot death is never the death of the ‘I’, as the self can never resemble itself as 
itself, but only as the ‘neuter other’. At the same time, death is also the 
unavoidable and unapproachable, as ‘I’ is deprived of any power to die or not to 
die. Death is always something that remains exterior to the ‘I’, as does the 
unimaginable imagining.313  
In the imminence of any revelation that remains only imminent, the presence 
offered in the image is the vestigial presence, the trace of a movement that doesn’t 
head towards self-apprehension, but towards self-abandonment. A movement that 
happens always at risk, at the limit, and in the dangerous zone of that that has not 
yet been grasped, but which is threatened at any moment to be. The image doesn’t 
own anything to the self, as it comes always from the other. It is its own 
sufficiency, a masked and extreme fragility, since it is only opulence and 
superabundance of its own bedazzlement as surface without depth, strange and 
foreign from every ideality. 
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11. with-Drawing a Conclusion 
	  
Henri Matisse, French Window at Collioure, oil on canvas, 116x89 cm, 1914 
(Copyright 2007: Succession H. Matisse/DACS Photograph by P. Migeat/RMN Copyright 
CNAC/MNAM)  
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Abstract 
Das Thema dieser Diplomarbeit ist die Behandlung von Jean-Luc Nancys Buch 
“Am Grund der Bilder”, die Auseinandersetzung mit Nancys ontologischem 
Verständnis vom Bild und der Thematisierung der visuellen Perzeption in dem 
Kontext der Wende von einem metaphysischen Präsenzbegriff zu einem 
‘Praesentia’-begriff als ‘Ex-sistenz’, ‘Ex-zedenz’, ‘Ek-stasis’, und ‘Ek-phanes’. 
Mein Augenmerk liegt daher auf dem Bildbegriff, sowie auch auf dem Verhältnis 
zwischen dem Bild und dem Einbildungsvermögen. Zu untersuchen, ist in 
welcher Art und Weise das Bild und welche Bildart den Anspruch erheben kann, 
Dasein und den ‘Sinn’ der Welt in einer direkten und unmittelbaren Weise zu 
treffen und zu berühren. In dieser Hinsicht ist die Methode der Diplomarbeit, die 
eines close-readings von Nancys Buch, und zwar in der Form einer als Dialog 
poststrukturalistischen Denkern und Nancys selbst konzipierten Interpretation 
seines Bildvesrtändnisses. Ich werde mich daher in einer indirekten Weise auch 
auf Kants Schematismustheorie und auf Heideggers Auslegung derselben aus dem 
Buch “Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik” beziehen.  
“Am Grund der Bilder” ist eine Sammlung, ein Corpus, von neun Abhandlungen 
die zwischen 1999 und 2004 publiziert worden sind. Gemeinsames Interesse 
dieser Aufsätze ist der Begriff des Bildes und Nancys These, dass das Bild 
eigentlich eine „Dardichtung“ ist in dem ‘Alterität’ (Lévinas) verkörpert wird und 
in dem das ‘Da- des Jen-seits’ dargestellt werden kann. Alle Abhandlungen 
wurden ursprünglich für andere Kontexte geschrieben und die ersten sechs, die 
schon 2003 zum ersten Mal gemeinsam unter dem Titel “Am Grund der Bilder” 
publiziert worden sind, sind auch schon in Ausstellungskatalogen, akademischen 
Zeitschriften und einer Anthologie zum Verhältnis zwischen Kunst und der 
Erinnerung an Konzentrationslager erschienen.  
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Abstract 
This research project engages with J. L. Nancy’s book “The Ground of the Image” 
and his ontological understanding of the image in the context of the turn from the 
metaphysics of presence towards a presence as presentation in ‘ex-cess’; that is: as 
‘ek-sistence’, ‘ak-cedence’, ‘ek-stasis’ and ‘ek-phanes’. The main focus, 
throughout the text, is the notion of the image in relation to representation and 
arts, the faculty of imagination and the way in which Nancy establishes the claim 
that the image ‘touches’ in an immediate and direct way worldly existence and the 
sense of the world. In this respect, this thesis takes the form of a close reading of 
Nancy’s book in and as a dialogue with other poststructuralist thoughts in 
discussing also “On the schematism of pure concepts of the understanding”, a 
chapter from Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” and Heidegger’s take on Kant in 
his book, “Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics”, especially chapter §20 “Image 
and Schema” to which Nancy himself refers directly in “The Ground of the 
Image”.  
“The Ground of the Image” is a collection of nine essays written between 1999 
and 2004. In all these essays, Nancy appropriates the meaning or sense of the 
image and puts forward his belief that the image is the medium of presentation in 
which “alterity” can be embodied and in which the “there of the beyond” is 
presented. All essays were originally written for various other contexts and the 
first six essays were published for the first time in 2003 under the same title. 
These essays have been included previously also in exhibitions catalogues, 
academic journals, or in an anthology that explored the relation between art and 
the memory of concentration camps. 
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